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Abstract
The present article introduces ptarithmetic (short for “polynomial time arithmetic”) — a formal
number theory similar to the well known Peano arithmetic, but based on the recently born computability
logic instead of classical logic. The formulas of ptarithmetic represent interactive computational problems
rather than just true/false statements, and their “truth” is understood as existence of a polynomial time
solution. The system of ptarithmetic elaborated in this article is shown to be sound and complete. Sound
in the sense that every theorem T of the system represents an interactive number-theoretic computational
problem with a polynomial time solution and, furthermore, such a solution can be effectively extracted
from a proof of T . And complete in the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a
polynomial time solution is represented by some theorem T of the system.
The paper is self-contained, and can be read without any prior familiarity with computability logic.
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1 Introduction
Computability logic (CL), introduced in [11, 15, 24], is a semantical, mathematical and philosophical platform,
and an ambitious program, for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the
formal theory of truth which logic has more traditionally been. Under the approach of CL, formulas represent
computational problems, and their “truth” is seen as algorithmic solvability. In turn, computational problems
— understood in their most general, interactive sense — are defined as games played by a machine against
its environment, with “algorithmic solvability” meaning existence of a machine that wins the game against
any possible behavior of the environment. And an open-ended collection of the most basic and natural
operations on computational problems forms the logical vocabulary of the theory. With this semantics, CL
provides a systematic answer to the fundamental question “what can be computed?”, just as classical logic
is a systematic tool for telling what is true. Furthermore, as it turns out, in positive cases “what can be
computed” always allows itself to be replaced by “how can be computed”, which makes CL of potential
interest in not only theoretical computer science, but many more applied areas as well, including interactive
knowledge base systems, resource oriented systems for planning and action, or declarative programming
languages.
While potential applications have been repeatedly pointed out and outlined in introductory papers on
CL, so far all technical efforts had been mainly focused on finding axiomatizations for various fragments
of this semantically conceived and inordinately expressive logic. Considerable advances have already been
made in this direction ([12]-[14], [16]-[23], [25], [26]), and more results in the same style are probably still to
come. It should be however remembered that the main value of CL, or anything else claiming to be a “Logic”
with a capital “L”, will eventually be determined by whether and how it relates to the outside, extra-logical
world. In this respect, unlike many other systems officially qualified as “logics”, the merits of classical logic
are obvious, most eloquently demonstrated by the fact that applied formal theories, a model example of
which is Peano arithmetic PA, can be and have been successfully based on it. Unlike pure logics with their
meaningless symbols, such theories are direct tools for studying and navigating the real world with its non-
man-made, meaningful objects, such as natural numbers in the case of arithmetic. To make this point more
clear to a computer scientist, one could compare a pure logic with a programming language, and applied
theories based on it with application programs written in that language. A programming language created
for its own sake, mathematically or esthetically appealing but otherwise unusable as a general-purpose,
comprehensive basis for application programs, would hardly be of much interest.
So, in parallel with studying possible axiomatizations and various metaproperties of pure computability
logic, it would certainly be worthwhile to devote some efforts to justifying its right on existence through
revealing its power and appeal as a basis for applied theories. First and so far the only concrete steps
in this direction have been made only very recently in [25], where a CL-based system CLA1 of (Peano)
arithmetic was constructed.1 Unlike its classical-logic-based counterpart PA, CLA1 is not merely about
what arithmetical facts are true, but about what arithmetical problems can be actually computed or effectively
solved. More precisely, every formula of the language of CLA1 expresses a number-theoretic computational
problem (rather than just a true/false fact), every theorem expresses a problem that has an algorithmic
solution, and every proof encodes such a solution. Does not this sound exactly like what the constructivists
have been calling for?
Unlike the mathematical or philosophical constructivism, however, and even unlike the early-day the-
ory of computation, modern computer science has long understood that, what really matters, is not just
computability, but rather efficient computability. So, the next natural step on the road of revealing the im-
portance of CL for computer science would be showing that it can be used for studying efficient computability
1The paper [28] (in Chinese) is apparently another exception, focused on applications of CL in AI.
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just as successfully as for studying computability-in-principle. Anyone familiar with the earlier work on CL
could have found reasons for optimistic expectations here. Namely, every provable formula of any of the
known sound axiomatizations of CL happens to be a scheme of not only “always computable” problems,
but “always efficiently computable” problems just as well, whatever efficiency exactly mens in the context of
interactive computation that CL operates in. That is, at the level of pure logic, computability and efficient
computability yield the same classes of valid principles. The study of logic abounds with phenomena in this
style. One example would be the well known fact about classical logic, according to which validity with
respect to all possible models is equivalent to validity with respect to just models with countable domains.
At the level of reasonably expressive applied theories, however, one should certainly expect significant dif-
ferences depending on whether the underlying concept of interest is efficient computability or computability-
in-principle. For instance, the earlier-mentioned system CLA1 proves formulas expressing computable but
not always efficiently computable arithmetical problems. The purpose of the present paper is to construct a
CL-based system for arithmetic which, unlike CLA1, proves only efficiently — specifically, polynomial time
— computable problems. The new applied formal theory PTA (“ptarithmetic”, short for “polynomial time
arithmetic”) presented in Section 12 achieves this purpose.
Just like CLA1, our present system PTA is not only a cognitive, but also a problem-solving tool: in
order to find a solution for a given problem, it would be sufficient to write the problem in the language of
the system, and find a proof for it. An algorithmic solution for the problem then would automatically come
together with such a proof. However, unlike the solutions extracted from CLA1-proofs, which might be
intractable, the solutions extracted from PTA-proofs would always be efficient.
Furthermore, PTA turns out to be not only sound, but also complete in a certain reasonable sense that
we call extensional completeness. According to the latter, every number-theoretic computational problem
that has a polynomial time solution is represented by some theorem of PTA. Taking into account that
there are many ways to represent the same problem, extensional completeness is weaker than what can be
called intensional completeness, according to which any formula representing an (efficiently) computable
problem is provable. In these terms, Go¨del’s celebrated theorem, here with “truth”=“computability”, is
about intensional rather than extensional incompleteness. In fact, extensional completeness is not at all
interesting in the context of classical-logic-based theories such as PA. In such theories, unlike computability-
logic-based theories, it is trivially achieved, as the provable formula ⊤ represents every true sentence.
Syntactically, our PTA is an extension of PA, and the semantics of the former is a conservative general-
ization of the semantics of the latter. Namely, the formulas of PA, which form only a proper subclass of the
formulas of PTA, are seen as special, “moveless” sorts of problems/games, automatically solved/won when
true and failed/lost when false. This makes the classical concept of truth just a special case of computability
in our sense — it is nothing but computability restricted to (the problems represented) by the traditional
sorts of formulas. And this means that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems automatically extend from PA to
PTA, so that, unlike extensional completeness, intensional completeness in PTA or any other sufficiently
expressive CL-based applied theory is impossible to achieve in principle. As for CLA1, it turns out to be
incomplete in both senses. Section 22 shows that any sufficiently expressive sound system would be (not
only intensionally but also) extensionally incomplete, as long as the semantics of the system is based on
unrestricted (as opposed to, say, efficient) computability.
Among the main moral merits of the present investigation and its contributions to the overall CL project
is an illustration of the fact that, in constructing CL-based applied theories, successfully switching from
computability to efficient computability is possible and even more than just possible. As noted, efficient
computability, in fact, turns out to be much better behaved than computability-in-principle: the former
allows us to achieve completeness in a sense in which the latter yields inherent incompleteness.
An advanced reader will easily understand that the present paper, while focused on the system PTA of
(pt)arithmetic, in fact is not only about arithmetic, but also just as much about CL-based applied theories
or knowledge base systems in general, with PTA only serving as a model example of such systems and a
starting point for what may be a separate (sub)line of research within the CL enterprise. Generally, the
nonlogical axioms or the knowledge base of a CL-based applied system would be any collection of (formulas
expressing) problems whose algorithmic or efficient solutions are known. Sometimes, together with nonlogical
axioms, we may also have nonlogical rules of inference, preserving the property of computability or efficient
computability. An example of such a rule is the polynomial time induction (PTI) rule of PTA. Then, the
soundness of the corresponding underlying axiomatization of CL (in our present case, it is systemCL3 studied
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in [16]) — which usually comes in the strong form called uniform-constructive soundness — guarantees that
every theorem T of the theory also has an effective or efficient solution and that, furthermore, such a solution
can be effectively extracted from a proof of T . It is this fact that, as mentioned, makes CL-based systems
problem-solving tools.
Having said the above, motivationally (re)introducing and (re)justifying computability logic is not among
the goals of the present paper. This job has been done in [11, 15, 24], and the reader would benefit from
getting familiar with any of those pieces of literature first, of which most recommended is the first 10 tutorial-
style sections of [24]. While helpful in fully appreciating the import of the present results, however, from the
purely technical point of view, such familiarity is not necessary, as this paper provides all relevant definitions.
2 An informal overview of the main operations on games
As noted, formulas in CL represent computational problems. Such problems are understood as games
between two players: ⊤, called machine, and ⊥, called environment. ⊤ is a mechanical device with a
fully determined, algorithmic behavior. On the other hand, there are no restrictions on the behavior of ⊥.
A given machine is considered to be solving a given problem iff it wins the corresponding game no matter
how the environment acts.
Standard atomic sentences, such as “0=0” or “Peggy is John’s mother”, are understood as special sorts
of games, called elementary. There are no moves in elementary games, and they are automatically won or
lost. Specifically, the elementary game represented by a true sentence is won (without making any moves)
by the machine, and the elementary game represented by a false sentence is won by the environment.
Logical operators are understood as operations on games/problems. One of the important groups of such
operations, called choice operations, comprises ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔. These are called choice conjunction, choice
disjunction, choice universal quantifier and choice existential quantifier, respectively. A0 ⊓A1 is a
game where the first legal move (“choice”), which should be either 0 or 1, is by ⊥. After such a move/choice
i is made, the play continues and the winner is determined according to the rules of Ai; if a choice is never
made, ⊥ loses. A0 ⊔A1 is defined in a symmetric way with the roles of ⊥ and ⊤ interchanged: here it is
⊤ who makes an initial choice and who loses if such a choice is not made. With the universe of discourse
being {0, 1, 10, 11, 100, . . .} (natural numbers identified with their binary representations), the meanings of
the quantifiers ⊓ and ⊔ can now be explained by
⊓xA(x) = A(0) ⊓A(1) ⊓A(10) ⊓A(11) ⊓A(100) ⊓ . . .
and
⊔xA(x) = A(0) ⊔A(1) ⊔A(10) ⊔A(11) ⊔A(100) ⊔ . . . .
So, for example,
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ⊔Composite(x)
)
is a game where the first move is by the environment. Such a move should consist in selecting a particular
number n for x, intuitively amounting to asking whether n is prime or composite. This move brings the
game down to (in the sense that the game continues as)
Prime(n) ⊔Composite(n).
Now the machine has to move, or else it loses. The move should consist in choosing one of the two disjuncts.
Let us say the left disjunct is chosen, which further brings the game down to Prime(n). The latter is an
elementary game, and here the interaction ends. The machine wins iff it has chosen a true disjunct. The
choice of the left disjunct by the machine thus amounts to claiming/answering that n is prime. Overall, as
we see, ⊓x
(
Prime(x) ⊔Composite(x)
)
represents the problem of deciding the primality question.2
Similarly,
⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y)
2For simplicity, here we treat “Composite” as the complement of “Prime”, even though, strictly speaking, this is not quite
so: the numbers 0 and 1 are neither prime nor composite. Writing “Nonprime” instead of “Composite” would easily correct
this minor inaccuracy.
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is the problem of computing the product of any two numbers. Here the first two moves are by the environ-
ment, which selects some particular m = x and n = y, thus asking the machine to tell what the product of m
and n is. The machine wins if and only if, in response, it selects a (the) number k for z such that k=m×n.
The present paper replaces the above-described choice quantifiers ⊓ and ⊔ with their bounded coun-
terparts ⊓b and ⊔b, where b is a variable. These are the same as ⊓ and ⊔, with the difference that the
choice here is limited only to the objects of the universe of discourse whose sizes do not exceed a certain
bound, which is represented by the variable b. So, ⊓bxA(x) is essentially the same as ⊓x
(
|x|≤b→A(x)
)
and ⊔bxA(x) is essentially the same as ⊔x
(
|x|≤b ∧A(x)
)
, where (the meanings of → , ∧ will be explained
shortly and) |x|≤b means “the size of x does not exceed b”. As we are going to see later, it is exactly the
value of b with respect to which the computational complexity of games will be measured.
Another group of game operations dealt with in this paper, two of which have already been used in
the previous paragraph, comprises ¬, ∧ , ∨ , → . Employing the classical symbols for these operations is no
accident, as they are conservative generalizations of the corresponding Boolean operations from elementary
games to all games.
Negation ¬ is a role-switch operation: it turns ⊤’s moves and wins into ⊥’s moves and wins, and vice
versa. Since elementary games have no moves, only the winners are switched there, so that, as noted, ¬ acts
just as the ordinary classical negation. For instance, as ⊤ is the winner in 0+1=1, the winner in ¬0+1=1
will be ⊥. That is, ⊤ wins the negation ¬A of an elementary game A iff it loses A, i.e., if A is false. As
for the meaning of negation when applied to nonelementary games, at this point it may be useful to observe
that ¬ interacts with choice operations in the kind old DeMorgan fashion. For example, it would not be
hard to see that
¬⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) = ⊔x⊔y⊓z(z 6=x×y).
The operations ∧ and ∨ are called parallel conjunction and parallel disjunction, respectively.
Playing A0 ∧A1 (resp. A0 ∨A1) means playing the two games in parallel where, in order to win, ⊤ needs
to win in both (resp. at least one) of the components Ai. It is obvious that, just as in the case of negation,
∧ and ∨ act as classical conjunction and disjunction when applied to elementary games. For instance,
0+1=1 ∨ 0×1=1 is a game automatically won by the machine. There are no moves in it as there are no
moves in either disjunct, and the machine is an automatic winner because it is so in the left disjunct. To
appreciate the difference between the two — choice and parallel — groups of connectives, compare
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ⊔ ¬Prime(x)
)
and
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ∨ ¬Prime(x)
)
.
The former is a computationally nontrivial problem, existence of an easy (polynomial time) solution for
which had remained an open question until a few years ago. As for the latter, it is trivial, as the machine
has nothing to do in it: the first (and only) move is by the environment, consisting in choosing a number n
for x. Whatever n is chosen, the machine wins, as Prime(n) ∨ ¬Prime(n) is a true sentence and hence an
automatically ⊤-won elementary game.
The operation → , called reduction, is defined by A→B = (¬A) ∨B. Intuitively, this is indeed the
problem of reducing B to A: solving A→B means solving B while having A as an external computational
resource. Resources are symmetric to problems: what is a problem to solve for one player is a resource that
the other player can use, and vice versa. Since A is negated in (¬A) ∨B and negation means switching the
roles, A appears as a resource rather than problem for ⊤ in A→B.
Consider ⊓x⊔y(y=x2). Anyone who knows the definition of x2 in terms of × (but perhaps does not
know the meaning of multiplication, or is unable to compute this function for whatever reason) would be
able to solve the problem
⊓z⊓u⊔v(v=z×u) → ⊓x⊔y(y=x2), (1)
i.e., the problem
⊔z⊔u⊓v(v 6=z×u) ∨ ⊓x⊔y(y=x2),
as it is about reducing the consequent to the antecedent. A solution here goes like this. Wait till the
environment specifies a value n for x, i.e. asks “what is the square of n?”. Do not try to immediately
answer this question, but rather specify the same value n for both z and u, thus asking the counterquestion:
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“what is n times n?”. The environment will have to provide a correct answer m to this counterquestion
(i.e., specify v as m where m = n×n), or else it loses. Then, specify y as m, and rest your case. Note
that, in this solution, the machine did not have to compute multiplication, doing which had become the
environment’s responsibility. The machine only correctly reduced the problem of computing square to the
problem of computing product, which made it the winner.
Another group of operations that play an important role in CL comprises ∀ and its dual ∃ (with ∃xA(x) =
¬∀x¬A(x)), called blind universal quantifier and blind existential quantifier, respectively. ∀xA(x)
can be thought of as a “version” of ⊓xA(x) where the particular value of x that the environment selects is
invisible to the machine, so that it has to play blindly in a way that guarantees success no matter what that
value is.
Compare the problems
⊓x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
and
∀x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
.
Both of them are about telling whether a given number is even or odd; the difference is only in whether that
“given number” is known to the machine or not. The first problem is an easy-to-win, two-move-deep game
of a structure that we have already seen. The second game, on the other hand, is one-move deep with only
the machine to make a move — select the “true” disjunct, which is hardly possible to do as the value of x
remains unspecified.
Just like all other operations for which we use classical symbols, the meanings of ∀ and ∃ are exactly classi-
cal when applied to elementary games. Having this full collection of classical operations makes computability
logic a generalization and conservative extension of classical logic.
Going back to an earlier example, even though (1) expresses a “very easily solvable” problem, that
formula is still not logically valid. Note that the successfulness of the reduction strategy of the consequent to
the antecedent that we provided for it relies on the nonlogical fact that x2=x×x. That strategy would fail in
a general case where the meanings of x2 and x×x may not necessarily be the same. On the other hand, the
goal of CL as a general-purpose problem-solving tool should be to allow us find purely logical solutions, i.e.,
solutions that do not require any special, domain-specific knowledge and (thus) would be good no matter
what the particular predicate or function symbols of the formulas mean. Any knowledge that might be
relevant should be explicitly stated and included either in the antecedent of a given formula or in the set
of axioms (“implicit antecedents” for every potential formula) of a CL-based theory. In our present case,
formula (1) easily turns into a logically valid one by adding, to its antecedent, the definition of square in
terms of multiplication:
∀w(w2 =w×w) ∧⊓z⊓u⊔v(v=z×u) → ⊓x⊔y(y=x2). (2)
The strategy that we provided earlier for (1) is just as good for (2), with the difference that it is successful
for (2) no matter what x2 and z×u mean, whereas, in the case of (1), it was guaranteed to be successful
only under the standard arithmetic interpretations of the square and product functions. Thus, our strategy
for (2) is, in fact, a “purely logical” solution. Again, among the purposes of computability logic is to serve
as a tool for finding such “purely logical” solutions, so that it can be applied to any domain of study rather
than specific domains such as that of arithmetic, and to arbitrary meanings of nonlogical symbols rather
than particular meanings such as that of the multiplication function for the symbol × .
The above examples should not suggest that blind quantifiers are meaningful or useful only when applied
to elementary problems. The following is an example of an effectively winnable nonelementary ∀-game:
∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y) → ⊓x
(
Even(x+y) ⊔Odd(x+y)
))
. (3)
Solving this problem, which means reducing the consequent to the antecedent without knowing the value of
y, is easy: ⊤ waits till ⊥ selects a value n for x, and also tells — by selecting a disjunct in the antecedent —
whether y is even or odd. Then, if n and y are both even or both odd, ⊤ chooses the first ⊔ -disjunct in the
consequent, otherwise it chooses the second ⊔ -disjunct. Replacing the ∀y prefix by ⊓y would significantly
weaken the problem, obligating the environment to specify a value for y. Our strategy does not really need
to know the exact value of y, as it only exploits the information about y’s being even or odd, provided by
the antecedent of the formula.
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Many more — natural, meaningful and useful — operations beyond the ones discussed in this section
have been introduced and studied in computability logic. Here we have only surveyed those that are relevant
to our present investigation.
3 Constant games
Now we are getting down to formal definitions of the concepts informally explained in the previous section.
To define games formally, we need some technical terms and conventions. Let us agree that by a move
we mean any finite string over the standard keyboard alphabet. A labeled move (labmove) is a move
prefixed with ⊤ or ⊥, with such a prefix (label) indicating which player has made the move. A run is a
(finite or infinite) sequence of labmoves, and a position is a finite run.
Convention 3.1 We will be exclusively using the letters Γ,∆,Φ for runs, and α, β for moves. The letter ℘
will always be a variable for players, and
℘
will mean “℘’s adversary” (“the other player”). Runs will be often delimited by “〈” and “〉”, with 〈〉 thus
denoting the empty run. The meaning of an expression such as 〈Φ, ℘α,Γ〉 must be clear: this is the result
of appending to the position 〈Φ〉 the labmove 〈℘α〉 and then the run 〈Γ〉.
The following is a formal definition of what we call constant games, combined with some less formal
conventions regarding the usage of certain terminology.
Definition 3.2 A constant game is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where:
1. LrA is a set of runs satisfying the condition that a (finite or infinite) run is in LrA iff all of its
nonempty finite initial segments are in LrA (notice that this implies 〈〉 ∈ LrA). The elements of LrA are
said to be legal runs of A, and all other runs are said to be illegal. We say that α is a legal move for
℘ in a position Φ of A iff 〈Φ, ℘α〉 ∈ LrA; otherwise α is illegal. When the last move of the shortest illegal
initial segment of Γ is ℘-labeled, we say that Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A.
2. WnA is a function that sends every run Γ to one of the players ⊤ or ⊥, satisfying the condition that
if Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A, then WnA〈Γ〉 = ℘. When WnA〈Γ〉 = ℘, we say that Γ is a ℘-won (or won by
℘) run of A; otherwise Γ is lost by ℘. Thus, an illegal run is always lost by the player who has made the
first illegal move in it.
An important operation not explicitly mentioned in Section 2 is what is called prefixation. This operation
takes two arguments: a constant game A and a position Φ that must be a legal position of A (otherwise
the operation is undefined), and returns the game 〈Φ〉A. Intuitively, 〈Φ〉A is the game playing which means
playing A starting (continuing) from position Φ. That is, 〈Φ〉A is the game to which A evolves (will be
“brought down”) after the moves of Φ have been made. We have already used this intuition when explaining
the meaning of choice operations in Section 2: we said that after ⊥ makes an initial move i ∈ {0, 1}, the
game A0 ⊓A1 continues as Ai. What this meant was nothing but that 〈⊥i〉(A0 ⊓A1) = Ai. Similarly,
〈⊤i〉(A0 ⊔A1) = Ai. Here is a definition of prefixation:
Definition 3.3 Let A be a constant game and Φ a legal position of A. The game 〈Φ〉A is defined by:
• Lr〈Φ〉A = {Γ | 〈Φ,Γ〉 ∈ LrA};
• Wn〈Φ〉A〈Γ〉 =WnA〈Φ,Γ〉.
Convention 3.4 A terminological convention important to remember is that we often identify a legal po-
sition Φ of a game A with the game 〈Φ〉A. So, for instance, we may say that the move 1 by ⊥ brings the
game B0 ⊓B1 down to the position B1. Strictly speaking, B1 is not a position but a game, and what is a
position is 〈⊥1〉, which we here identified with the game B1 = 〈⊥1〉(B0 ⊓B1).
We say that a constant game A is finite-depth iff there is an integer d such that no legal run of A
contains more than d labmoves. The smallest of such integers d is called the depth of A. An elementary
game is a game of depth 0.
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In this paper will exclusively deal with finite-depth games. This restriction of focus makes many defini-
tions and proofs simpler. Namely, in order to define a finite-depth-preserving game operation O(A1, . . . , An)
applied to such games, it suffices to specify the following:
(i) Who wins O(A1, . . . , An) if no moves are made, i.e., the value of Wn
O(A1,...,An)〈〉.
(ii) What are the initial legal (lab)moves, i.e., the elements of {℘α | 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrO(A1,...,An)}, and to what
game is O(A1, . . . , An) brought down after such an initial legal labmove ℘α is made. Recall that, by
saying that a given labmove ℘α brings a given game A down to B, we mean that 〈℘α〉A = B.
Then, the set of legal runs of O(A1, . . . , An) will be uniquely defined, and so will be the winner in every legal
(and hence finite) run of the game.
Below we define a number of operations for finite-depth games only. Each of these operations can be
easily seen to preserve the finite-depth property. Of course, more general definitions of these operations —
not restricted to finite-depth games — do exist (see, e.g., [24]), but in this paper we are trying to keep things
as simple as possible, and reintroduce only as much of computability logic as necessary.
Definition 3.5 Let A, B, A0, A1, . . . be finite-depth constant games, and n be a positive integer.
1. ¬A is defined by:
(i) Wn¬A〈〉 = ℘ iff WnA〈〉 = ℘.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr¬A iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA. Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game down to
¬〈℘α〉A.
2. A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An is defined by:
(i) WnA0 ⊓ ... ⊓ An〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0 ⊓ ... ⊓ An iff ℘ = ⊥ and α = i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.3 Such an initial legal labmove ⊥i
brings the game down to Ai.
3. A0 ∧ . . . ∧An is defined by:
(i) WnA0 ∧ ... ∧ An〈〉 = ⊤ iff, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, WnAi〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0 ∧ ... ∧ An iff α = i.β, where i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and 〈℘β〉 ∈ LrAi . Such an initial
legal labmove ℘i.β brings the game down to
A0 ∧ . . . ∧Ai−1 ∧ 〈℘β〉Ai ∧Ai+1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
4. A0 ⊔ . . . ⊔An and A0 ∨ . . . ∨An are defined exactly as A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An and A0 ∧ . . . ∧An, respectively,
only with “⊤” and “⊥” interchanged.
5. In addition to the earlier-established meanings, the symbols ⊤ and ⊥ also denote two special — simplest
— constant games, defined by Wn⊤〈〉 = ⊤, Wn⊥〈〉 = ⊥ and Lr⊤ = Lr⊥ = {〈〉}.
6. A→B is treated as an abbreviation of (¬A) ∨B.
Example 3.6 The game (0=0 ⊓ 0=1)→ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), i.e.
¬(0=0 ⊓ 0=1) ∨ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10),
has thirteen legal runs, which are:
1 〈〉. It is won by ⊤, because ⊤ is the winner in the right ∨ -disjunct (consequent).
3According to our conventions, such a natural number i is identified with its binary representation. The same applies to the
other clauses of this definition.
9
2 〈⊤0.0〉. (The labmove of) this run brings the game down to ¬0=0 ∨ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), and ⊤ is the winner
for the same reason as in the previous case.
3 〈⊤0.1〉. It brings the game down to ¬0=1 ∨ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), and ⊤ is the winner because it wins in both
∨ -disjuncts.
4 〈⊥1.0〉. It brings the game down to ¬(0=0 ⊓ 0=1) ∨ 10=11. ⊤ loses as it loses in both ∨ -disjuncts.
5 〈⊥1.1〉. It brings the game down to ¬(0=0 ⊓ 0=1) ∨ 10=10. ⊤ wins as it wins in the right ∨ -disjunct.
6-7 〈⊤0.0,⊥1.0〉 and 〈⊥1.0,⊤0.0〉. Both bring the game down to the false ¬0=0 ∨ 10=11, and both are lost
by ⊤.
8-9 〈⊤0.1,⊥1.0〉 and 〈⊥1.0,⊤0.1〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0=1 ∨ 10=11, which makes ⊤
the winner.
10-11 〈⊤0.0,⊥1.1〉 and 〈⊥1.1,⊤0.0〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0=0 ∨ 10=10, so ⊤ wins.
12-13 〈⊤0.1,⊥1.1〉 and 〈⊥1.1,⊤0.1〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0=1 ∨ 10=10, so ⊤ wins.
4 Games as generalized predicates
Constant games can be seen as generalized propositions: while propositions in classical logic are just elements
of {⊤,⊥}, constant games are functions from runs to {⊤,⊥}. As we know, however, propositions only offer
a very limited expressive power, and classical logic needs to consider the more general concept of predicates,
with propositions being nothing but special — constant — cases of predicates. The situation in computability
logic is similar. Our concept of a (simply) game generalizes that of a constant game in the same sense as the
classical concept of a predicate generalizes that of a proposition.
We fix an infinite set of expressions called variables:
{w0,w1,w2,w3, . . .}.
The letters
x, y, z, s, r, t, u, v, w
will be used as metavariables for these variables. The Gothic letter
b
will be exclusively used as a metaname for the variable w0, which is going to have a special status throughout
our entire treatment.
We also fix another infinite set of expressions called constants:
{0, 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, 110, 111, 1000, . . .}.
These are thus binary numerals — the strings matching the regular expression 0 ∪ 1(0 ∪ 1)∗. We will be
typically identifying such strings — by some rather innocent abuse of concepts — with the natural numbers
represented by them in the standard binary notation, and vice versa. The above collection of constants is
going to be exactly the universe of discourse — i.e., the set over which the variables range — in all cases
that we consider. We will be mostly using a, b, c, d as metavariables for constants.
By a valuation we mean a function e that sends each variable x to a constant e(x). In these terms, a
classical predicate p can be understood as a function that sends each valuation e to a proposition, i.e., to a
constant predicate. Similarly, what we call a game sends valuations to constant games:
Definition 4.1 A game is a function A from valuations to constant games. We write e[A] (rather than
A(e)) to denote the constant game returned by A for valuation e. Such a constant game e[A] is said to be
an instance of A. For readability, we usually write LrAe and Wn
A
e instead of Lr
e[A] and Wne[A].
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Just as this is the case with propositions versus predicates, constant games in the sense of Definition
3.2 will be thought of as special, constant cases of games in the sense of Definition 4.1. In particular, each
constant game A′ is the game A such that, for every valuation e, e[A] = A′. From now on we will no longer
distinguish between such A and A′, so that, if A is a constant game, it is its own instance, with A = e[A]
for every e.
Where n is a natural number, we say that a game A is n-ary iff there is are n variables such that, for
any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all those variables, we have e1[A] = e2[A]. Generally, a game
that is n-ary for some n, is said to be finitary. Our paper is going to exclusively deal with finitary games
and, for this reason, we agree that, from now on, when we say “game”, we usually mean “finitary game”.
We say that a game A depends on a variable x iff there are two valuations e1, e2 that agree on all
variables except x such that e1[A] 6= e2[A]. An n-ary game thus depends on at most n variables. And
constant games are nothing but 0-ary games, i.e., games that do not depend on any variables.
We say that a (not necessarily constant) game A is elementary iff so are all of its instances e[A]. And
we say that A is finite-depth iff there is a (smallest) integer d, called the depth of A, such that the depth
of no instance of A exceeds d.
Just as constant games are generalized propositions, games can be treated as generalized predicates.
Namely, we will see each predicate p of whatever arity as the same-arity elementary game such that, for
every valuation e, Wnpe〈〉 = ⊤ iff p is true at e. And vice versa: every elementary game p will be seen
as the same-arity predicate which is true at a given valuation e iff Wnpe〈〉 = ⊤. Thus, for us, “predicate”
and “elementary game” are going to be synonyms. Accordingly, any standard terminological or notational
conventions familiar from the literature for predicates also apply to them seen as elementary games.
Just as the Boolean operations straightforwardly extend from propositions to all predicates, our opera-
tions ¬, ∧ , ∨ , → , ⊓ , ⊔ extend from constant games to all games. This is done by simply stipulating that
e[. . .] commutes with all of those operations: ¬A is the game such that, for every valuation e, e[¬A] = ¬e[A];
A ⊓B is the game such that, for every e, e[A ⊓B] = e[A] ⊓ e[B]; etc.
The operation of prefixation also extends to nonconstant games: 〈Φ〉A should be understood as the unique
game such that, for every e, e[〈Φ〉A] = 〈Φ〉e[A]. However, unlike the cases with all other operations, 〈Φ〉A,
as a function from valuations to constant games, may be partial even if A is total. Namely, it will be defined
only for those valuations e for which we have Φ ∈ LrAe . Let us call not-always-defined “games” partial (as
opposed to the total games of Definition 4.1). In the rare cases when we write 〈Φ〉A for a non-constant game
A (which always happens in just intermediate steps), it should be remembered that possibly we are dealing
with a partial rather than a total game. Otherwise, the default meaning of the word “game” is always a
total game.
Definition 4.2 Let A be a game, x1, . . . , xn be pairwise distinct variables, and c1, . . . , cn be constants. The
result of substituting x1, . . . , xn by c1, . . . , cn in A, denoted A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn), is defined by stipulating
that, for every valuation e, e[A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn)] = e
′[A], where e′ is the valuation that sends each xi to ci
and agrees with e on all other variables.
Following the standard readability-improving practice established in the literature for predicates, we will
often fix pairwise distinct variables x1, . . . , xn for a game A and write A as A(x1, . . . , xn). Representing A in
this form sets a context in which we can write A(c1, . . . , cn) to mean the same as the more clumsy expression
A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn).
Definition 4.3 Below x is an arbitrary variable other than b, and A(x) is an arbitrary finite-depth game.
1. We define ⊓0xA(x) = ⊔0xA(x) = A(0) and, for any positive integer b, with 1b standing for the binary
numeral consisting of b “1”s, we define the games ⊓bxA(x) and ⊔bxA(x) as follows:
⊓bxA(x) = A(0) ⊓A(1) ⊓A(10) ⊓A(11) ⊓A(100) ⊓A(101) ⊓ . . . ⊓A(1b);
⊔bxA(x) = A(0) ⊔A(1) ⊔A(10) ⊔A(11) ⊔A(100) ⊔A(101) ⊔ . . . ⊔A(1b).
2. Using the above notation, we define
⊓bxA(x)
as the unique game such that, for any valuation e, e[⊓bxA(x)] = e[⊓bxA(x)], where b = e(b). Similarly,
⊔bxA(x)
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is the unique game such that, for any valuation e, e[⊔bxA(x)] = e[⊔bxA(x)], where b = e(b). ⊓b and
⊔b are said to be bounded choice universal quantifier and bounded choice existential quantifier,
respectively.
As we see, ⊓b and ⊔b are like the ordinary choice quantifiers ⊓,⊔ of computability logic explained in
Section 2, with the only difference that the size of a constant chosen for x in ⊓bx or ⊔bx should not exceed
the value of b. (The case of that value being 0 is a minor technical exception which can be safely forgotten.)
Convention 4.4 Because throughout the rest of this paper we exclusively deal with the bounded choice
quantifiers ⊓b,⊔b (and never with the ordinary ⊓,⊔ discussed in Section 2), and because the variable b is
fixed and is the same everywhere, we agree that, from now on, when we write ⊓ or ⊔, we always mean ⊓b
or ⊔b, respectively.
This is not a change of interpretation of ⊓,⊔ but rather some, rather innocent, abuse of notation.
We will say that a game A is unistructural iff, for any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on b, we
have LrAe1 = Lr
A
e2
. Of course, all constant or elementary games are unistructural. It can also be easily seen
that all our game operations preserve the unistructural property of games. For the purposes of the present
paper, considering only unistructural games would be sufficient.
We define the remaining operations ∀ and ∃ only for unistructural games:
Definition 4.5 Let x be a variable other than b, and A(x) be a finite-depth unistructural game.
1. ∀xA(x) is defined by stipulating that, for every valuation e, player ℘ and move α, we have:
(i) Wn∀xA(x)e 〈〉 = ⊤ iff, for every constant
4 c, WnA(c)e 〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr∀xA(x)e iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr
A(x)
e . Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game
e[∀xA(x)] down to e[∀x〈℘α〉A(x)].
2. ∃xA(x) is defined in exactly the same way, only with ⊤ and ⊥ interchanged.
It is worth noting that ∀xA(x) and ∃xA(x) are total even if the game 〈℘α〉A(x) used in their definition
is only partial.
Example 4.6 Let G be the game (3) discussed earlier in Section 2 (only, now ⊓ seen as ⊓b), and let e be a
valuation with e(b) = 10. The sequence 〈⊥1.11, ⊥0.0, ⊤1.1〉 is a legal run of e[G], the effects of the moves
of which are shown below:
e[G] : ∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y)→⊓10x
(
Even(x+y) ⊔Odd(x+y)
))
〈⊥1.11〉e[G] : ∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y)→Even(11+y) ⊔Odd(11+y)
)
〈⊥1.11,⊥0.0〉e[G] : ∀y
(
Even(y)→Even(11+y) ⊔Odd(11+y)
)
〈⊥1.11,⊥0.0,⊤1.1〉e[G] : ∀y
(
Even(y)→Odd(11+y)
)
The play hits (ends as) the true proposition ∀y
(
Even(y)→Odd(11+y)
)
and hence is won by ⊤.
Before closing this section, we want to make the rather straightforward observation that the DeMorgan
dualities hold for all of our sorts of conjunctions, disjunctions and quantifiers, and so does the double negation
principle. That is, we always have:
¬¬A = A;
¬(A ∧B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B; ¬(A ∨B) = ¬A ∧ ¬B;
¬(A ⊓B) = ¬A ⊔ ¬B; ¬(A ⊔B) = ¬A ⊓ ¬B;
¬∀xA(x) = ∃x¬A(x); ¬∃xA(x) = ∀x¬A(x);
¬⊓xA(x) = ⊔x¬A(x); ¬⊔xA(x) = ⊓x¬A(x).
4It is important to note that, unlike the case with the choice quantifiers, here we are not imposing any restrictions on the
size of such a constant.
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5 Algorithmic strategies through interactive machines
In traditional game-semantical approaches, including Blass’s [3, 4] approach which is the closest precursor
of ours, player’s strategies are understood as functions — typically as functions from interaction histories
(positions) to moves, or sometimes ([1]) as functions that only look at the latest move of the history.
This strategies-as-functions approach, however, is inapplicable in the context of computability logic, whose
relaxed semantics, in striving to get rid of any “bureaucratic pollutants” and only deal with the remaining
true essence of games, does not impose any regulations on which player can or should move in a given
situation. Here, in many cases, either player may have (legal) moves, and then it is unclear whether the next
move should be the one prescribed by ⊤’s strategy function or the one prescribed by the strategy function
of ⊥. In fact, for a game semantics whose ambition is to provide a comprehensive, natural and direct tool
for modeling interaction, the strategies-as-functions approach would be simply less than adequate, even if
technically possible. This is so for the simple reason that the strategies that real computers follow are not
functions. If the strategy of your personal computer was a function from the history of interaction with you,
then its performance would keep noticeably worsening due to the need to read the continuously lengthening
— and, in fact, practically infinite — interaction history every time before responding. Fully ignoring that
history and looking only at your latest keystroke in the spirit of [1] is also certainly not what your computer
does, either.
In computability logic, (⊤’s effective) strategies are defined in terms of interactive machines, where com-
putation is one continuous process interspersed with — and influenced by — multiple “input” (environment’s
moves) and “output” (machine’s moves) events. Of several, seemingly rather different yet equivalent, machine
models of interactive computation studied in CL, here we will employ the most basic, HPM (“Hard-Play
Machine”) model.
An HPM is nothing but a Turing machine with the additional capability of making moves. The adversary
can also move at any time, with such moves being the only nondeterministic events from the machine’s
perspective. Along with the ordinary work tape, the machine has two additional tapes called the valuation
tape and the run tape. The valuation tape, serving as a static input, spells some (arbitrary but fixed)
valuation applied to the game. And the run tape, serving as a dynamic input, at any time spells the
“current position” of the play. The role of these two tapes is to make both the valuation and the run fully
visible to the machine.
In these terms, an algorithmic solution (⊤’s winning strategy) for a given game A is understood as an
HPMM such that, no matter how the environment acts during its interaction withM (what moves it makes
and when), and no matter what valuation e is spelled on the valuation tape, the run incrementally spelled
on the run tape is a ⊤-won run of e[A].
As for ⊥’s strategies, there is no need to define them: all possible behaviors by ⊥ are accounted for by
the different possible nondeterministic updates of the run tape of an HPM.
In the above outline, we described HPMs in a relaxed fashion, without being specific about technical
details such as, say, how, exactly, moves are made by the machine, how many moves either player can
make at once, what happens if both players attempt to move “simultaneously”, etc. As it turns out, all
reasonable design choices yield the same class of winnable games as long as we consider a certain natural
subclass of games called static. Such games are obtained by imposing a certain simple formal condition on
games (see, e.g., Section 5 of [24]), which we do not reproduce here as nothing in this paper relies on it.
We shall only point out that, intuitively, static games are interactive tasks where the relative speeds of the
players are irrelevant, as it never hurts a player to postpone making moves. In other words, static games are
games that are contests of intellect rather than contests of speed. And one of the theses that computability
logic philosophically relies on is that static games present an adequate formal counterpart of our intuitive
concept of “pure”, speed-independent interactive computational problems. Correspondingly, computability
logic restricts its attention (more specifically, possible interpretations of the atoms of its formal language) to
static games. All elementary games turn out to be trivially static, and the class of static games turns out to
be closed under all game operations studied in computability logic. More specifically, all games expressible
in the language of the later-defined logic CL3, or theory PTA, are static. And, in this paper, we use the
term “computational problem”, or simply “problem”, is a synonym of “static game”.
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6 The HPM model in greater detail
As noted, computability of static games is rather robust with respect to the technical details of the underlying
model of interaction. And the loose description of HPMs that we gave in the previous section would be
sufficient for most purposes, just as mankind had been rather comfortably studying and using algorithms
long before the Church-Turing thesis in its precise form came around. Namely, relying on just the intuitive
concept of algorithmic strategies (believed in CL to be adequately captured by the HPM model) would be
sufficient if we only needed to show existence of such strategies for various games. As it happens, however,
later sections of this paper need to arithmetize such strategies in order to prove the promised extensional
completeness of ptarithmetic. The complexity-theoretic concepts defined in the next section also require
certain more specific details about HPMs, and in this section we provide such details. It should be pointed
out again that most — if not all — of such details are “negotiable”, as different reasonable arrangements
would yield equivalent models.
Just like an ordinary Turing machine, an HPM has a finite set of states, one of which has the special
status of being the start state. There are no accept, reject, or halt states, but there are specially designated
states calledmove states. It is assumed that the start state is not among the move states. As noted earlier,
this is a three-tape machine, with a read-only valuation tape, read-write work tape, and read-only run
tape. Each tape has a beginning but no end, and is divided into infinitely many cells, arranged in the
left-to-right order. At any time, each cell will contain one symbol from a certain fixed finite set of tape
symbols. The blank symbol, as well as ⊤ and ⊥, are among the tape symbols. We also assume that these
three symbols are not among the symbols that any (legal or illegal) move can ever contain. Each tape has its
own scanning head, at any given time looking (located) at one of the cells of the tape. A transition from
one computation step (“clock cycle”) to another happens according to the fixed transition function
of the machine. The latter, depending on the current state, and the symbols seen by the three heads on the
corresponding tapes, deterministically prescribes the next state, the tape symbol by which the old symbol
should be overwritten in the current cell (the cell currently scanned by the head) of the work tape, and, for
each head, the direction — one cell left or one cell right — in which the head should move. A constraint
here is that the blank symbol, ⊤ or ⊥ can never be written by the machine on the work tape. An attempt
to move left when the head of a given tape is looking at the first (leftmost) cell results in staying put. So
does an attempt to move right when the head is looking at the blank symbol.
When the machine starts working, it is in its start state, all three scanning heads are looking at the
first cells of the corresponding tapes, the valuation tape spells some valuation e by listing the values of the
variables w0,w1,w2, . . . (in this precise order) separated by commas, and (all cells of) the work and run tapes
are blank (i.e., contain the blank symbol). Whenever the machine enters a move state, the string α spelled
by (the contents of) its work tape cells, starting from the first cell and ending with the cell immediately left
to the work-tape scanning head, will be automatically appended — at the beginning of the next clock cycle
— to the contents of the run tape in the ⊤-prefixed form ⊤α. And, on every transition, whether the machine
is in a move state or not, any finite sequence ⊥β1, . . . ,⊥βm of ⊥-labeled moves may be nondeterministically
appended to the content of the run tape. If the above two events happen on the same clock cycle, then the
moves will be appended to the contents of the run tape in the following order: ⊤α⊥β1 . . .⊥βm (note the
technicality that labmoves are listed on the run tape without blanks or commas between them).
With each labmove that emerges on the run tape we associate its timestamp, which is the number of
the clock cycle immediately preceding the cycle on which the move first emerged on the run tape. Intuitively,
the timestamp indicates on which cycle the move was made rather than appeared on the run tape; a move
made during cycle #i appears on the run tape on cycle #i+1 rather than #i. Also, we agree that the count
of clock cycles starts from 0, meaning that the very first clock cycle is cycle #0 rather than #1.
A configuration is a full description of (the “current”) contents of the work and run tapes, the locations
of the three scanning heads, and the state of the machine. An e-computation branch is an infinite sequence
C0, C1, C2, . . . of configurations, where C0 is the initial configuration (as explained earlier), and every Ci+1 is
a configuration that could have legally followed (again, in the sense explained earlier) Ci when the valuation
e is spelled on the valuation tape. For an e-computation branch B, the run spelled by B is the run Γ
incrementally spelled on the run tape in the corresponding scenario of interaction. We say that such a Γ is
a run generated by the machine on valuation e.
We say that a given HPM M wins (computes, solves) a given game A on valuation e — and write
M |=e A — iff every run Γ generated by M on valuation e is a ⊤-won run of e[A]. We say that A is
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computable iff there is an HPM M such that, for every valuation e, M |=e A; such an HPM is said to be
an (algorithmic) solution, or winning strategy, for A.
7 Towards interactive complexity
At present, the theory of interactive computation is far from being well developed, and even less so is the
theory of interactive complexity. The studies of interactive computation in the context of complexity, while
having going on since long ago, have been relatively scattered, and interaction has often been used for
better understanding certain traditional, non-interactive complexity issues (examples would be alternating
computation [7], or interactive proof systems and Arthur-Merlin games [8, 2]) rather than being treated as
an object of systematic studies in its own rights. As if complexity theory was not “complex” enough already,
taking it to the interactive level would most certainly generate a by an order of magnitude greater diversity
of species from the complexity zoo.
The present paper is the first modest attempt to bring complexity issues into computability logic and
the corresponding part of the under-construction theory of interactive computation. Here we introduce one,
perhaps the simplest, way of measuring interactive complexity out of the huge and interesting potential
variety of complexity measures meaningful and useful in the interactive context.
Games happen to be so expressive that most, if not all, ways of measuring complexity will be meaningful
and interesting only for certain (sub)classes of games and not quite so, or not so at all, for other classes. Our
present approach is no exception. The time complexity concept that we are going to introduce is meaningfully
applicable only to games that, in positive (winnable) cases, can be brought by ⊤ to a successful end within
a finite number of moves. In addition, every instance of a game under consideration should be such that the
length of any move in any legal run of it never exceeds a certain bound which only depends on the value of
our special-status variable b. As mentioned earlier, it is exactly the value of this variable relative to which
the computational complexity of games will be measured.
The above class of games includes all games obtained by closing elementary games (predicates) under
the operations of Sections 3 and 4, which also happens to be the class of games expressible in the language
of the later-defined logic CL3. Indeed, consider any such game A. Obviously the number of moves in any
legal run — and hence any ⊤-won run — of any instance of A cannot exceed its ( ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔)-depth; the
sizes of moves associated with ⊓ , ⊔ are constant; and the sizes of moves associated with ⊓,⊔, in any given
instance of the game, never exceed a certain constant plus the value of the variable b.
Games for which our present complexity concepts are meaningful also include the much wider class of
games expressible in the language of logic CL12 introduced in [25], if the quantifiers ⊓,⊔ of the latter are
understood (as they are in this paper) as their bounded counterparts ⊓b,⊔b. While those games may have
arbitrarily long or even infinite legal runs, all runs won by ⊤ are still finite.
Bringing computability logic to a complexity-sensitive level also naturally calls for considering only
bounded valuations. By a bounded valuation we mean a valuation e such that, for any variable x,
the size of the binary numeral e(x) does not exceed the value e(b) of b (note: the value of b rather than the
size of that value). This condition makes it possible to treat free variables in the same way as if they were
⊓-bounded.
The starting philosophical-motivational point of our present approach to time complexity is that it should
be an indicator of “how soon the game(s) can be won” in the worst case, with “how soon” referring to the
number of computation steps (clock cycles) a given HPM M takes to reach a final and winning position.
There is a little correction to be made in this characterization though. The point is that part of its time
M may spend just waiting for its adversary to move, and it would be unfair to bill M for the time for
which probably it is not responsible. Our solution is to subtract from the overall time the moveless intervals
preceding the adversary’s moves, i.e. the intervals that intuitively correspond to the adversary’s “thinking
periods”. These intuitions are accounted for by the following definitions.
LetM be an HPM, e a bounded valuation, B any e-computation branch ofM, and Γ the run spelled by
B. For any labmove λ of Γ, we define the thinking period for λ as m−n, where m is the timestamp of λ
and n is the timestamp of the labmove immediately preceding λ in Γ, or is 0 if there are no such labmoves.
Next, we define ⊤’s time in B (or in Γ) as the sum of the thinking periods for all ⊤-labeled moves of Γ.
⊥’s time is defined similarly. Note that, for either player ℘, ℘’s time will be finite iff there are only finitely
many moves made by ℘; otherwise it will be infinite.
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Definition 7.1 Let A be a game, h a function from natural numbers to natural numbers, and M an HPM.
1. We say that M runs in time h, or that M is an h time machine, iff, for any bounded valuation e
and any e-computation branch B of M, ⊤’s time in B is less than h
(
e(b)
)
.
2. We say that M wins (computes, solves) A in time h, or that M is an h time solution for A,
iff M is an h time machine and, for any bounded valuation e, M |=e A.
3. We say that A is computable (winnable, solvable) in time h iff it has an h time solution.
4. We say that M runs in polynomial time, or that M is a polynomial time machine, iff it runs
in time h for some polynomial function h.
5. We say that M wins (computes, solves) A in polynomial time, or that M is a polynomial
time solution for A, iff M is an h time solution for A for some polynomial function h. Symbolically, this
will be written as
M |=P A.
6. We say that A is computable (winnable, solvable) in polynomial time, or polynomial time
computable (winnable, solvable), iff it has a polynomial time solution.
Many concepts introduced within the framework of computability are generalizations — for the interactive
context — of ordinary and well-studied concepts of the traditional theory of computation. The above-defined
time complexity or polynomial time computability are among such concepts. Let us look at the traditional
notion of polynomial time decidability of a predicate p(x) for instance. With a moment’s thought, it can
be seen to be equivalent to polynomial time computability (in the sense of Definition 7.1) of the game
p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x), or — if you prefer — the game ⊓x
(
p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x)
)
(these two games are essentially the same,
with the only difference that, in one case, the value of x will have to be read from the valuation tape, while
in the other case from the run tape).
8 The language of logic CL3 and its semantics
Logic CL3 will be axiomatically constructed in Section 10. The present section is merely devoted to its
language. The building blocks of this formal language are:
• Nonlogical predicate letters, for which we use p, q (possibly indexed) as metavariables. With each
predicate letter is associated a nonnegative integer called its arity. We assume that, for any n, there
are infinitely many n-ary predicate letters.
• Function letters, for which we use f, g as metavariables. Again, each function letter comes with a
fixed arity, and we assume that, for any n, there are infinitely many n-ary function letters.
• The binary logical predicate letter = .
• Infinitely many variables. These are the same as the ones fixed in Section 4.
• Technical symbols: the left parenthesis, the right parenthesis, and the comma.
Terms, for which we use τ, θ, ω, ψ, ξ (possibly indexed) as metavariables, are defined as the elements of
the smallest set of expressions such that:
• Variables are terms.
• If f is an n-ary function letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms, then f(τ1, . . . , τn) is a term. When f is 0-ary,
we write f instead of f().
CL3-formulas, or, in most contexts simply formulas, are defined as the elements of the smallest set of
expressions such that:
• If p is an n-ary predicate letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms, then p(τ1, . . . , τn) is an (atomic) formula.
We write τ1=τ2 instead of =(τ1, τ2). Also, when p is 0-ary, we write p instead of p().
• If E is an atomic formula, ¬(E) is a formula. We can write τ1 6=τ2 instead of ¬(τ1 =τ2).
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• ⊥ and ⊤ are formulas.
• If E1, . . . , En (n≥2) are formulas, then so are (E1) ∧ . . . ∧ (En), (E1) ∨ . . . ∨ (En), (E1) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (En),
(E1) ⊔ . . . ⊔ (En).
• If E is a formula and x is a variable other than b, then ∀x(E), ∃x(E), ⊓x(E), ⊔x(E) are formulas.
Note that, terminologically, ⊤ and ⊥ do not count as atoms. For us, atoms are formulas containing no
logical operators. The formulas ⊤ and ⊥ do not qualify because they are (0-ary) logical operators themselves.
Sometimes we can write E1 ∧ . . . ∧En for an unspecified n≥1 (rather than n≥2). Such a formula, in the
case n = 1, should be understood as simply E1. Similarly for ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ .
Also, where S is a set of formulas, we may write
∧ S
for the ∧ -conjunction of the elements of S. Again, if S only has one element F , then ∧ S is simply F .
Similarly for ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ . Furthermore, we do not rule out the possibility of S being empty when using this
notation. It is our convention that, when S is empty, both ∧ S and ⊓ S mean ⊤, and both ∨ S and ⊔ S
mean ⊥.
¬E, where E is not atomic, will be understood as a standard abbreviation: ¬⊤ = ⊥, ¬¬E = E,
¬(A ∧B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B, ¬⊓xE = ⊔x¬E, etc. And E→ F will be understood as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F .
Also, if we write
E1→E2→E3→ . . . →En,
this is to be understood as an abbreviation of E1→ (E2→ (E3→ (. . . (En−1→En) . . .))).
Parentheses will often be omitted — as we just did — if there is no danger of ambiguity. When omitting
parentheses, we assume that ¬ and the quantifiers have the highest precedence, and → has the lowest
precedence. So, for instance, ¬⊓xE→ F ∨G means (¬(⊓x(E)))→ ((F ) ∨ (G)).
The expressions ~x, ~y, . . . will usually stand for tuples of variables. Similarly for ~τ, ~θ, . . . (for tuples of
terms) or ~a,~b, . . . (for tuples of constants).
The definitions of free and bound occurrences of variables are standard, with ⊓,⊔ acting as quantifiers
along with ∀, ∃. We will try to use x, y, z for bound variables only, while use s, r, t, u, v, w for free variables
only. There may be some occasional violations of this commitment though.
Convention 8.1 The present conventions apply not only to the language of CL3 but also to the other
formal languages that we deal with later, such as those of CL4 and PTA.
1. For safety and simplicity, throughout the rest of this paper we assume that no formula that we ever
consider — unless strictly implied otherwise by the context — may have both bound and free occurrences
of the same variable. This restriction, of course, does not yield any loss of expressive power as variables can
always be renamed so as to satisfy this condition.
2. Sometimes a formula F will be represented as F (s1, . . . , sn), where the si are variables. When doing
so, we do not necessarily mean that each si has a free occurrence in F , or that every variable occurring free in
F is among s1, . . . , sn. However, it will always be assumed (usually only implicitly) that the si are pairwise
distinct, and have no bound occurrences in F . In the context set by the above representation, F (τ1, . . . , τn)
will mean the result of replacing, in F , each occurrence of each si by term τi. When writing F (τ1, . . . , τn),
it will always be assumed (again, usually only implicitly) that the terms τ1, . . . , τn contain no variables that
have bound occurences in F , so that there are no unpleasant collisions of variables when doing replacements.
3. Similar — well established in the literature — notational conventions apply to terms.
An interpretation5 is a function ∗ that sends each n-ary predicate letter p to an n-ary predicate
(elementary game) p∗(s1, . . . , sn) which does not depend on any variables other than s1, . . . , sn; it also sends
each n-ary function letter f to a function
f∗ : {0, 1, 10, 11, 100, . . .}n → {0, 1, 10, 11, 100, . . .};
5The concept of an interpretation in CL is usually more general than the present one. Interpretations in our present sense
are called perfect. But here we omit the word “perfect” as we do not consider any nonperfect interpretations, anyway.
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the additional condition required to be satisfied by ∗ is that =∗ is an equivalence relation on {0, 1, 10, . . .}
preserved by f∗ for each function symbol f , and respected by p∗ for each nonlogical predicate symbol p.6
The above uniquely extends to a mapping that sends each term τ to a function τ∗, and each formula F
to a game F ∗, by stipulating that:
1. s∗ = s (any variable s).
2. Where f is an n-ary function letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms,
(
f(τ1, . . . , τn)
)∗
= f∗(τ∗1 , . . . , τ
∗
n).
3. Where p is an n-ary predicate letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms,
(
p(τ1, . . . , τn)
)∗
= p∗(τ∗1 , . . . , τ
∗
n).
4. ∗ commutes with all logical operators, seeing them as the corresponding game operations:
• ⊤∗ = ⊤;
• ⊥∗ = ⊥;
• (¬F )∗ = ¬F ∗;
• (E1 ∧ . . . ∧En)∗ = E∗1 ∧ . . . ∧E
∗
n;
• (E1 ∨ . . . ∨En)∗ = E∗1 ∨ . . . ∨E
∗
n;
• (E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓En)∗ = E∗1 ⊓ . . . ⊓E
∗
n;
• (E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔En)∗ = E∗1 ⊔ . . . ⊔E
∗
n;
• (∀xE)∗ = ∀x(E∗);
• (∃xE)∗ = ∃x(E∗);
• (⊓xE)∗ = ⊓x(E∗);
• (⊔xE)∗ = ⊔x(E∗).7
When O is a function symbol, a predicate symbol, or a formula, and O∗ =W , we say that ∗ interprets
O as W . We can also refer to such a W as “O under interpretation ∗”.
When a given formula is represented as F (x1, . . . , xn), we will typically write F
∗(x1, . . . , xn) instead of(
F (x1, . . . , xn)
)∗
. A similar practice will be used for terms as well.
Definition 8.2 We say that an HPM M is a uniform polynomial time solution for a formula F iff, for
any interpretation ∗, M is a polynomial time solution for F ∗.
Intuitively, a uniform polynomial time solution is a “purely logical” efficient solution. “Logical” in the
sense that it does not depend on the meanings of the nonlogical symbols (predicate and function letters) —
does not depend on a (the) interpretation ∗, that is. It is exactly these kinds of solutions that we are interested
in when seeing CL as a logical basis for applied theories or knowledge base systems. As a universal-utility
tool, CL (or a CL-based compiler) would have no knowledge of the meanings of those nonlogical symbols
(the meanings that will be changing from application to application and from theory to theory), other than
what is explicitly given by the target formula and the axioms or the knowledge base of the system.
9 Some closure properties of polynomial time computability
In this section we establish certain important closure properties for polynomial time computability of games.
For simplicity we restrict them to games expressible in the language of CL3, even though it should be
pointed out that these results can be stated and proven in much more general forms than presented here.
By an (inference) rule we mean a binary relationR between sequences of formulas and formulas, instances
of which are schematically written as
X1 . . . Xn
X
, (4)
6That is, =∗ is a congruence relation. More commonly classical logic simply treats = as the identity predicate. That
treatment of = , however, is known to be equivalent — in every respect relevant for us — to our present one. Namely, the latter
turns into the former by seeing any two =∗-equivalent constants as two different names of the same object of the universe, as
“Evening Star” and “Morning Star” are.
7Remember Convention 4.4, according to which ⊓ means ⊓b and ⊔ means ⊔b.
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where X1, . . . , Xn are (metavariables for) formulas called the premises, and X is (a metavariable for) a for-
mula called the conclusion. Whenever R(〈X1, . . . , Xn〉, X) holds, we say that X follows from X1, . . . , Xn
by R.
We say that such a rule R is uniform-constructively sound iff there is an effective procedure that
takes any instance (〈X1, . . . , Xn〉, X) of the rule, any HPMsM1, . . . ,Mn and returns an HPMM such that,
for any interpretation ∗, whenever M1 |=P X∗1 , . . . ,Mn |=
P X∗n, we have M |=
P X∗.
Our formulations of rules, as well as our later treatment, rely on the following notational and termino-
logical conventions.
1. A positive occurrence of a subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of ¬. Since officially
only atoms may come with a ¬, occurrences of non-atomic subformulas will always be positive.
2. A surface occurrence of a subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of any choice operators
( ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔).
3. A formula not containing choice operators — i.e., a formula of the classical language — is said to be
elementary.
4. The elementarization
‖F‖
of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all surface occurrences of ⊔ - and ⊔-subformulas by ⊥,
and all surface occurrences of ⊓ - and ⊓-subformulas by ⊤. Note that ‖F‖ is (indeed) an elementary
formula.
5. We will be using the notation
F [E1, . . . , En]
to mean a formula F together with some (single) fixed positive surface occurrences of each subformula
Ei. Here the formulas Ei are not required to be pairwise distinct, but their occurrences are. Using this
notation sets a context in which F [H1, . . . , Hn] will mean the result of replacing in F [E1, . . . , En] the
(fixed) occurrence of each Ei by Hi. Note again that here we are talking about some occurrences of
E1, . . . , En. Only those occurrences get replaced when moving from F [E1, . . . , En] to F [H1, . . . , Hn],
even if the formula also had some other occurrences of E1, . . . , En.
6. In any context where the notation of the previous clause is used (specifically, in the formulations of
the rules of ⊔ -Choose, ⊔-Choose and Wait below), all formulas are assumed to be in negation normal
form, meaning that they contain no → , and no ¬ applied to non-atomic subformulas.
Below we prove the uniform-constructive soundness of several rules. Our proofs will be limited to showing
how to construct an HPM M from an arbitrary instance — in the form (4) — of the rule and arbitrary
HPMs M1, . . . ,Mn (purported solutions for the premises). In each case it will be immediately clear from
our description of M that it can be constructed effectively, that it runs in polynomial time as long as so do
M1, . . . ,Mn, and that its work in no way does depend on an interpretation
∗ applied to the games involved.
Since an interpretation ∗ is typically irrelevant in such proofs, we will often omit it and write simply F where,
strictly speaking, F ∗ is meant. That is, we identify formulas with the games into which they turn once an
interpretation is applied to them. Likewise, we may omit a valuation e and write F instead of e[F ] or e[F ∗].
9.1 ⊔ -Choose
⊔ -Choose is the following rule:
F [Hi]
F [H0 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn]
,
where n ≥ 1 and i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
Whenever a formula F follows from a formula E by ⊔ -Choose, we say that E is a ⊔ -Choose-premise
of F .
Theorem 9.1 ⊔ -Choose is uniform-constructively sound.
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Idea. This rule most directly encodes an action that M should perform in order to successfully solve
the conclusion. Namely, M should choose Hi and then continue playing as the machine that (presumably)
solves the premise.
Proof. Let M1 be an arbitrary HPM (a purported polynomial time solution for the premise). We let
M (the will-be polynomial time solution for the conclusion) be the machine that works as follows.
At the beginning, without looking at its run tape or valuation tape, M makes the move α that brings
F [H0 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn] down to F [Hi]. For instance, if F [H0 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn] is X ∧ (Y ∨ (Z ⊔ T )) and F [Hi] is
X ∧ (Y ∨Z), then 1.1.0 is such a move.
What M does after that can be characterized as “turning itself into M1” and playing the rest of the
game as M1 would. In more detail, M starts simulating and mimicking M1. During this simulation, M
“imagines” that M1 has the same valuation e on its valuation tape as M itself has, and that the run tape
of M1 spells the same run as its own run tape does, with the difference that the move α made by M at
the beginning is ignored (as if it was not there). To achieve the effect of consistency between the real and
imaginary valuation and run tapes, what M does is that, every time the simulated M1 reads a cell of its
valuation or run tape, M reads the content of the corresponding cell of its own valuation or run tape, and
feeds that content to the simulation as the content of the cell that M1 was reading. And whenever, during
the simulation, M1 makes a move, M makes the same move in the real play.
The run generated by M in the real play will look like 〈⊤α,Γ〉. It is not hard to see that then Γ
will be a run generated by M1. So, if M1 wins F [Hi], implying that Wn
F [Hi]
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤, then M wins
F [H0 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn], because Wn
F [H0 ⊔ ...⊔ Hn]
e 〈⊤α,Γ〉 =Wn
F [Hi]
e 〈Γ〉.
Simulation does impose a certain overhead, which makes M slower than M1. But, with some analysis,
details of which are left to the reader, it can be seen that the slowdown would be at most polynomial,
meaning that, if M1 runs in polynomial time, then so does M.
9.2 ⊔-Choose
⊔-Choose is the following rule:
F [H(s)]
F [⊔xH(x)]
,
where x is any non-b variable, s is a variable with no bound occurrences in the premise, and H(s) is the
result of replacing by s all free occurrences of x in H(x) (rather than vice versa).
Whenever a formula F follows from a formula E by ⊔-Choose, we say that E is a ⊔-Choose-premise
of F .
Theorem 9.2 ⊔-Choose is uniform-constructively sound.
Idea. Very similar to the previous case. M should specify x as (the value of) s, and then continue
playing as the machine that solves the premise.
Proof. Let M1 be an arbitrary HPM (a purported polynomial time solution for the premise). We let
M (the will-be polynomial time solution for the conclusion) be the machine that, with a valuation e spelled
on its valuation tape, works as follows. At the beginning, M makes the move that brings F [⊔xH(x)] down
to F [H(s)]. For instance, if F [⊔xH(x)] is X ∧ (Y ∨⊔xZ(x)) and F [H(s)] is X ∧ (Y ∨Z(s)), then 1.1.c is
such a move, where c = e(s) (the machine will have to read c from its valuation tape). After this move, M
starts simulating and mimicking M1 in the same fashion as in the proof of Theorem 9.1. And, again, as
long as M1 wins F [H(s)] in polynomial time, M wins F [⊔xH(x)] in polynomial time.
9.3 Wait
Wait is the following rule:
‖F‖ F1 . . . Fn
F
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(remember that ‖F‖ means the elementarization of F ), where n ≥ 0 and the following two conditions are
satisfied:
1. Whenever F has the form X [Y0 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Ym], each formula X [Yi] (0 ≤ i ≤ m) is among F1, . . . , Fn.
2. Whenever F has the form X [⊓xY (x)], for some variable s different from b and not occurring in F , the
formula X [Y (s)] is among F1, . . . , Fn. Here Y (s) is the result of replacing by s all free occurrences of
x in Y (x) (rather than vice versa).
Whenever the above relation holds, we say that ‖F‖ is the special Wait-premise of F , and that
F1, . . . , Fn are ordinary Wait-premises of F .
The following lemma, on which we are going to rely in this subsection, can be verified by a straightforward
induction on the complexity of F , which we omit. Remember that 〈〉 stands for the empty run.
Lemma 9.3 For any formula F , interpretation ∗ and valuation e, WnF
∗
e 〈〉 =Wn
‖F‖∗
e 〈〉.
Theorem 9.4 Wait is uniform-constructively sound.
Idea. M should wait (hence the name “Wait” for the rule) until the adversary makes a move. If
this never happens, in view of the presence of the premise ‖F‖, a win for M is guaranteed by Lemma 9.3.
Otherwise, any (legal) move by the adversary essentially brings the conclusion down to one of the premises
F1, . . . , Fn; then M continues playing as the machine that wins that premise.
Proof. Assume M0,M1, . . . ,Mn are polynomial time solutions for ‖F‖, F1, . . . , Fn, respectively. We
let M, the will-be solution for F , whose construction does not depend on the just-made assumption, be a
machine that, with a bounded valuation e spelled on its valuation tape, works as follows.
At the beginning, M keeps waiting until the environment makes a move. If such a move is never made,
then the run that is generated is empty. Since ‖F‖ is elementary and M0 wins it, it is classically true (a
false elementary game would be automatically lost by any machine). But then, in view of Lemma 9.3, M
wins (the empty run of) F . And, note, ⊤’s time in this case is 0.
Suppose now the environment makes a move. Note that the time during which the machine was waiting
does not contribute anything to ⊤’s time. We may assume that the move made by the environment is legal,
or else the machine immediately wins. With a little thought, one can see that any legal move α by the
environment brings the game e[F ] down to g[Fi] for a certain bounded valuation g — with g(b) = e(b) —
and one of the premises Fi of the rule. For example, if F is (X ⊓ Y ) ∨⊓xZ(x), then a legal move α by the
environment should be either 0.0 or 0.1 or 1.c for some constant c (of size ≤e(b)). In the case α = 0.0, the
above-mentioned premise Fi will be X ∨⊓xZ(x), and g will be the same as e. In the case α = 0.1, Fi will
be Y ∨⊓xZ(x), and g, again, will be the same as e. Finally, in the case α = 1.c, Fi will be (X ⊓ Y ) ∨Z(s)
for a variable s different from b and not occurring in F , and g will be the valuation that sends s to c and
agrees with e on all other variables, so that g[(X ⊓ Y ) ∨Z(s)] is e[(X ⊓ Y ) ∨Z(c)], with the latter being the
game to which e[F ] is brought down by the labmove ⊥1.c.
After the above event,M starts simulating and mimicking the machineMi in the same fashion as in the
proofs of Theorems 9.1 and 9.2, with the only difference that, if g 6= e, the imaginary valuation tape of the
simulated machine now spells g rather than e.
As in the earlier proofs, it can be seen that M, constructed as above, is a polynomial time solution for
F .
9.4 Modus Ponens (MP)
Modus Ponens is the following rule:
F0 . . . Fn F0 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→ F
F
,
where n ≥ 0.
Theorem 9.5 Modus Ponens is uniform-constructively sound.
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Idea. Together with the real play of F , M plays an imaginary game for each of the premises, in which
it mimics the machines that win those premises. In addition, it applies copycat between each premise Fi
and the corresponding conjunct of the antecedent of the rightmost premise, as well as between (the real) F
and the consequent of that premise.
Proof. AssumeM0, . . . ,Mn andN are HPMs that win F0, . . . , Fn and F0 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→ F in polynomial
time, respectively (as in the previous proofs, our construction of M does not depend on this assumption;
only the to-be-made conclusion M |=P F does). For simplicity, below we reason under the assumption that
n ≥ 1. Extending our reasoning so as to also include the case n = 0 does not present a problem.
We letM be the following HPM. Its work on a valuation e consists in simulating, in parallel, the machines
M0, . . . ,Mn,N with the same e on their valuation tapes, and also continuously polling (in parallel with
simulation) its own valuation tape to see if the environment has made a new move. These simulations
proceed in the same fashion as in the proofs of the earlier theorems, with the only difference that now M
actually maintains records of the contents of the imaginary run tapes of the simulated machines (in the proof
of Theorem 9.1, M was simply using its own run tape in the role of such a “record”).
As before, we may assume that the environment does not make illegal moves, for then M immediately
wins. We can also safely assume that the simulated machines do not make illegal moves, or else our as-
sumptions about their winning the corresponding games would be wrong.8 If so, in the process of the above
simulation-polling routine, now and then, one of the following four types of events will be happening (or
rather detected):
Event 1. Mi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) makes a move α. Then M appends the labmove ⊥0.i.α at the end of the
position spelled on the imaginary run tape of N in its simulation.9
Event 2. N makes a move 0.i.α (0 ≤ i ≤ n). Then M appends the labmove ⊥α at the end of the
imaginary run tape of Mi in its simulation.
Event 3. N makes a move 1.α. Then M makes the move α in the real play.
Event 4. The environment makes a move α in the real play. Then M appends the labmove ⊥1.α at the
end of the imaginary run tape of N in its simulation.
What is going on here is that M applies copycat between n + 2 pairs of (sub)games, real or imaginary.
Namely, it mimics, in (the real play of) F , N ’s moves made in the consequent of (the imaginary play of)
F0 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→ F , and vice versa: uses (the real) environment’s moves made (in the real play of) F as (an
imaginary) environment’s moves in the consequent of F0 ∧ . . . ∧Fn → F . Also, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, M
uses the moves made by Mi in Fi as environment’s moves in the Fi component of F0 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→ F , and
vice versa: uses the moves made by N in that component as environment’s moves in Fi. Therefore, the final
positions10 hit by the above imaginary and real plays will be
F ′0, . . . , F
′
n, F
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ F
′
n→ F
′ and F ′
for some F ′0, . . . , F
′
n, F
′. Our assumption that the machines M0, . . . ,Mn and N win the games F0, . . . , Fn
and F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn→ F implies that each G ∈ {F ′0, . . . , F
′
n, F
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ F
′
n→ F
′} is ⊤-won, in the sense that
WnGe 〈〉 = ⊤. It is then obvious that so should be F
′. Thus, the (real) play of F brings it down to the ⊤-won
F ′, meaning that M wins F .
With some thought, one can also see that M runs in polynomial time. The only reason why M may
spend “too much” time thinking before making a move could be that it waited “too long” to see what
move was made by one (or several) of the simulated machines. But this would not happen because, by our
assumption, those machines run in polynomial time, so, whenever they make a move, it never takes them
“too long” to do so.
8Since we need to construct M no matter whether those assumptions are true or not, we can letM simply stop making any
moves as soon as it detects some illegal behavior.
9Here and later, of course, an implicit stipulation is that the position spelled on the imaginary run tape of the machine (Mi
in the present case) that made the move is also correspondingly updated (in the present case, by appending ⊤α to it).
10Remember Convention 3.4.
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10 Logic CL3
Before we get to our version of formal arithmetic, it would not hurt to identify the (pure) logic on which it
is based — based in the same sense as the traditional Peano arithmetic is based on classical logic. This logic
is CL3. With minor technical differences not worth our attention and not warranting a new name for the
logic, our present version of CL3 is the same as the same-name logic introduced and studied in [16].11
The language of CL3 has already been described in Section 8.
The axioms of this system are all classically valid elementary formulas. Here by classical validity, in
view of Go¨del’s completeness theorem, we mean provability in classical first-order calculus. Specifically, in
classical first-order calculus with function letters and = , where = is treated as the logical identity predicate
(so that, say, x=x, x=y→ (E(x)→E(y)), etc. are valid/provable).
As for the rules of inference of CL3, they are the ⊔ -Choose, ⊔-Choose and Wait rules of Section 9.
As will be easily seen from the forthcoming soundness and completeness theorem for CL3 (in conjunction
with Theorem 9.5), CL3 is closed under Modus Ponens. So, there is no need for officially including it among
the rules of inference, doing which would destroy the otherwise analytic property of the system.
A CL3-proof of a formula F is a sequence E1, . . . , En of formulas, with En = F , such that each Ei is
either an axiom or follows from some earlier formulas of the sequence by one of the rules of CL3. When
a CL3-proof of F exists, we say that F is provable in CL3, and write CL3 ⊢ F . Otherwise we write
CL3 6⊢ F . Similarly for any other formal systems as well.
Example 10.1 The formula ∀xp(x)→⊓xp(x) is provable in CL3. It follows by Wait from the axioms
∀xp(x)→⊤ (special Wait-premise) and ∀xp(x)→ p(s) (ordinary Wait-premise).
On the other hand, the formula ⊓xp(x)→ ∀xp(x), i.e. ⊔x¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x), in not provable. Indeed, this
formula has no ⊔ -Choose-premises because it does not contain ⊔ . Its elementarization (special Wait-
premise) is ⊥ ∨ ∀xp(x) which is not an axiom nor the conclusion of any rules. Hence ⊔x¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x)
cannot be derived by Wait, either. This leaves us with ⊔-Choose. But if ⊔x¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x) is derived by
⊔-Choose, then the premise should be ¬p(s) ∨ ∀xp(x) for some variable s. The latter, however, is neither an
axiom nor the conclusion of any of the three rules of CL3.
Example 10.2 The formula⊓x⊔y
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
, whose elementarization is⊤, is provable inCL3 as follows:
1. ⊤ Axiom
2. p(s)→ p(s) Axiom
3. ⊔y
(
p(s)→ p(y)
)
⊔-Choose: 2
4. ⊓x⊔y
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
Wait: 1,3
On the other hand, the formula⊔y⊓x
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
can be seen to be unprovable, even though its classical
counterpart ∃y∀x
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
is an axiom and hence provable.
Example 10.3 While the formula ∃x
(
x=f(s)
)
is classically valid and hence provable in CL3, its construc-
tive counterpart ⊔x
(
x=f(s)
)
can be easily seen to be unprovable. This is no surprise. In view of the
expected soundness of CL3, provability of ⊔x
(
x=f(s)
)
would imply that every function f is computable
(worse yet: efficiently computable), which, of course, is not the case.
Exercise 10.4 To see the resource-consciousness ofCL3, show that it does not prove p ⊓ q→ (p ⊓ q) ∧ (p ⊓ q),
even though this formula has the form F → F ∧ F of a classical tautology.
Theorem 10.5 CL3 ⊢ X iff X has a uniform polynomial time solution (any formula X). Furthermore:
Uniform-constructive soundness: There is an effective procedure that takes any CL3-proof of any
formula X and constructs a uniform polynomial time solution for X.
Completeness: If CL3 6⊢ X, then, for any HPM M, there is an interpretation ∗ such that M does not
win X∗ (let alone winning in polynomial time).
11In fact, an essentially the same logic, under the name L, was already known as early as in [10], where it emerged in the
related yet quite different context of the Logic of Tasks.
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Idea. The soundness ofCL3 was, in fact, already established in the preceding section. For completeness,
assume CL3 6⊢ X and consider any HPM M. If ‖X‖ is an axiom, a smart environment can always make a
move that brings X down to an unprovable ordinary Wait-premise of X , or else X would be derivable by
Wait; such a Wait-premise is less complex than X and, by the induction hypothesis, M loses. If ‖X‖ is not
an axiom, then it is false under a certain interpretation, and therefore M will have to make a move to avoid
an automatic loss. But any (legal) move by M brings X down to an unprovable Choose-premise of it (or
else X would be derivable by a Choose rule) and, by the induction hypothesis, M again loses.
Proof. Modulo the results of Section 9, the soundness (“only if”) part of this theorem, in the strong
“uniform-constructive” form, is straightforward. Formally this fact can be proven by induction on the lengths
of CL3-proofs. All axioms of CL3 are obviously “solved” by a machine that does nothing at all. Next, as an
induction hypothesis, assume X1, . . . , Xn are CL3-provable formulas, M1, . . . ,Mn are uniform polynomial
time solutions for them, and X follows from those formulas by one of the rules of CL3. Then, as immediately
implied by the results of Section 9, we can effectively construct a uniform polynomial time solution M for
X .
The rest of this proof will be devoted to the completeness (“if”) part of the theorem.
Consider an arbitrary formula X with CL3 6⊢ X , and an arbitrary HPMM. Here we describe a scenario
of the environment’s behavior in interaction withM— call this “behavior” the counterstrategy— that makes
M lose F ∗ on e for a certain appropriately selected interpretation ∗ and a certain appropriately selected
bounded valuation e even if the time of M is not limited at all.
For a formula Y and valuation g, we say that g is Y -distinctive iff g assigns different values to different
free variables of Y . We select e to be an X-distinctive bounded valuation. Here we let e(b) be “sufficiently
large” to allow certain flexibilities needed below.
How our counterstrategy acts depends on the current game (formula, “position”) Y to which the original
game X has been brought down by the present time in the play. Initially, Y is X .
As an induction hypothesis, we assume that CL3 6⊢ Y and e is Y -distinctive. We separately consider the
following two cases.
Case 1: ‖Y ‖ is classically valid. Then there should be a CL3-unprovable formula Z — an ordinary
Wait-premise of Y — satisfying the conditions of one of the following two subcases, for otherwise Y would
be derivable by Wait. Our counterstrategy selects one such Z (say, lexicographically the smallest one), and
acts according to the corresponding prescription as given below.
Subcase 1.1: Y has the form F [G0 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gm], and Z is F [Gi] (i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}). In this case, the
counterstrategy makes the move that brings Y down to Z, and calls itself on Z in the role of the “current”
formula Y .
Subcase 1.2: Y has the form F [⊓xG(x)], and Z is F [G(s)], where s is a variable different from b and
not occurring in Y . We may assume here that e(s) is different from any e(r) where r is any other (6= s)
free variable of Y . Thus, e remains a Z-distinctive valuation. In this case, our counterstrategy makes the
move that brings Y down to Z (such a move is the one that specifies the value of x as e(s) in the indicated
occurrence of ⊓xG(x)), and calls itself on Z in the role of Y .
Case 2: ‖Y ‖ is not classically valid. Then our counterstrategy inactively waits until M makes a move.
Subcase 2.1. If such a move is never made, then the run that is generated is empty. Since e is a Y -
distinctive valuation, of course, it is also ‖Y ‖-distinctive. It is a common knowledge from classical logic that,
whenever a formula F is invalid (as is ‖Y ‖ in our present case) and e is an F -distinctive valuation, e[F ] is
false in some model. So, e[‖Y ‖] is false in/under some model/interpretation ∗. This, in view of Lemma 9.3,
implies that WnY
∗
e 〈〉 = ⊥ and hence M is the loser in the overall play of X
∗ on e.
Subcase 2.2. Now suppose M makes a move. We may assume that such a move is legal, or else M
immediately loses. With a little thought, one can see that any legal move α by M will bring the game down
to Z for a certain formula Z such that Y follows from Z by ⊔ -Choose or ⊔-Choose, and e remains — or, at
least, can be safely assumed to remain — Z-distinctive. But then, since CL3 6⊢ Y , we also have CL3 6⊢ Z.
In this case, our counterstrategy calls itself on Z in the role of Y .
It is clear that, sooner or later, the interaction will end according to the scenario of Subcase 2.1, in which
case, as we observed, M will be the loser in the overall play of X∗ on e for a certain interpretation ∗.
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11 CL4, the metalogic of CL3
In this section we present an auxiliary deductive system CL4. Syntactically, it is a conservative extension
of CL3. Semantically, we treat CL4 as a metalogic of CL3, in the sense that the formulas of CL4 are
seen as schemata of CL3-formulas, and the theorems of CL4 as schemata of theorems of CL3. System
CL4— in an unsubstantially different form — was initially introduced and studied in [17] where, unlike our
present treatment, it was seen as a logic (rather than metalogic) in its own rights, soundly and completely
axiomatizing a more expressive fragment of computability logic than CL3 does. Simplicity is the only reason
why here we prefer to see CL4 as just a metalogic.
The language of CL4 is obtained from that of CL3 by adding to it nonlogical general letters, on top of
the predicate letters of the language of CL3 that in this new context, following the terminological tradition
of computability logic, we rename into elementary letters. We continue using the lowercase p, q (possibly
indexed) as metavariables for elementary letters, and will be using the uppercase P,Q (possibly indexed) as
metavariables for general letters. Just as this is the case with the elementary letters, we have infinitely many
n-ary general letters for each arity (natural number) n. In our present approach, the nonlogical elementary
letters of the language of CL4 will be seen as metavariables for elementary formulas of the language of CL3,
the general letters of the language of CL4 will be seen as metavariables for any, not-necessarily-elementary,
formulas of the language ofCL3, and the function letters of the language ofCL4 will be seen as metavariables
for terms of the language of CL3.
Formulas of the language of CL4, to which we refer as CL4-formulas, are built from atoms, terms,
variables and operators in exactly the same way as CL3-formulas are, with the only difference that now,
along with the old elementary atoms — atoms of the form p(τ1, . . . , τn) where p is an n-ary elementary
letter and the τi are terms — we also have general atoms, which are of the form P (τ1, . . . , τn), where P is
an n-ary general letter and the τi are terms. An elementary literal is ⊤, ⊥, or an elementary atom with
or without negation ¬. And a general literal is a general atom with or without negation. As before, we
always assume that negation can only occur in literals; ¬ applied to a non-atomic formula, as well as → , are
treated as abbreviations. The concepts of a surface occurrence, positive occurrence etc. straightforwardly
extend from the language of CL3 to the language of CL4.
We say that a CL4-formula is elementary iff it does not contain general atoms and choice operators.
Thus, “elementary CL4-formula”, “elementary CL3-formula” and “formula of classical logic” mean the
same. Note that we see the predicate letters of classical logic as elementary rather than general letters.
The elementarization ‖F‖ of a CL4-formula F is the result of replacing in it all surface occurrences of
⊓ - and ⊓-subformulas by ⊤, all surface occurrences of ⊔ - and ⊔-subformulas by ⊥, and all positive surface
occurrences of general literals by ⊥.
CL4 has exactly the same axioms as CL3 does (all classically valid elementary formulas), and has four
rules of inference. The first three rules are nothing but the rules of ⊔ -Choose, ⊔-Choose and Wait of CL3,
only now applied to any CL4-formulas rather than just CL3-formulas. The additional, fourth rule, which
we call Match, is the following:
F [p(~τ ),¬p(~θ)]
F [P (~τ ),¬P (~θ)]
,
where P is any n-ary general letter, p is any n-ary nonlogical elementary letter not occurring in the conclusion,
and ~τ ,~θ are any n-tuples of terms; also, according to our earlier notational conventions, F [P (~τ ),¬P (~θ)] is a
formula with two fixed positive occurrences of the literals P (~τ) and ¬P (~θ), and F [p(~τ ),¬p(~θ)] is the result
of replacing in F [P (~τ ),¬P (~θ)] the above two occurrences by p(~τ) and ¬p(~θ), respectively.
It may help some readers to know that CL4 is an extension of additive-multiplicative affine logic (classical
linear logic with weakening), with the letters of the latter understood as our general letters. This fact is
an immediate consequence of the earlier-known soundness of affine logic (proven in [24]) and completeness
of CL4 (proven in [17]) with respect to the semantics of computability logic. As seen from the following
example, the extension, however, is not conservative.
Example 11.1 Below is a CL4-proof of the formula (P ∧ P ) ∨ (P ∧ P )→ (P ∨ P ) ∧ (P ∨ P ). The latter was
used by Blass [4] as an example of a game-semantically valid principle not provable in affine logic.
1. (p1 ∧ p2) ∨ (p3 ∧ p4)→ (p1 ∨ p3) ∧ (p2 ∨ p4) Axiom
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2. (p1 ∧ p2) ∨ (p3 ∧ P )→ (p1 ∨ p3) ∧ (p2 ∨P ) Match: 1
3. (p1 ∧ p2) ∨ (P ∧ P )→ (p1 ∨ P ) ∧ (p2 ∨ P ) Match: 2
4. (p1 ∧ P ) ∨ (P ∧ P )→ (p1 ∨ P ) ∧ (P ∨ P ) Match: 3
5. (P ∧ P ) ∨ (P ∧ P )→ (P ∨ P ) ∧ (P ∨ P ) Match: 4
Example 11.2 In Example 10.2 we saw a CL3-proof of ⊓x⊔y
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
. The same proof, of course, is
also a CL4-proof. Below is a CL4-proof of the stronger version of this formula where we have an uppercase
rather than lowercase P :
1. ⊤ Axiom
2. p(s)→ p(s) Axiom
3. P (s)→ P (s) Match: 2
4. ⊔y
(
P (s)→ P (y)
)
⊔-Choose: 3
5. ⊓x⊔y
(
P (x)→ P (y)
)
Wait: 1,4
Example 11.3 WhileCL4 proves the elementary formula p→ p ∧ p, it does not prove its general counterpart
P → P ∧ P . Indeed, ‖P → P ∧ P‖ = ⊤→⊥ ∧⊥ and hence, obviously, P → P ∧ P cannot be derived by Wait.
This formula cannot be derived by Choose rules either, because it contains no choice operators. Finally, if
it is derived by Match, the premise should be p→ P ∧ p or p→ p ∧ P . In either case, such a premise cannot
be proven, as it contains no choice operators and its elementarization is p→⊥ ∧ p or p→ p ∧⊥.
Let F be a CL4-formula. A substitution for F is a function ♥ that sends:
• each nonlogical n-ary elementary letter p of F to an elementary CL3-formula p♥(x1, . . . , xn) — with
here and below x1, . . . , xn being a context-setting fixed n-tuple of pairwise distinct variables — which
does not contain any free variables that have bound occurrences in F ;
• each n-ary general letter P of F to an (elementary or nonelementary) CL3- formula P♥(x1, . . . , xn)
which does not contain any free variables that have bound occurrences in F ;
• each n-ary function symbol f of F to a term f♥(x1, . . . , xn) which does not contain any variables that
have bound occurrences in F .
The above uniquely extends to a mapping that sends each term τ of F to a term τ♥, and each subformula
H of F to a CL3-formula H♥ by stipulating that:
1. x♥ = x (any variable x).
2. Where f is an n-ary function symbol and τ1, . . . , τn are terms,
(
f(τ1, . . . , τn)
)♥
= f♥(τ♥1 , . . . , τ
♥
n ).
3. (τ1=τ2)
♥ is τ♥1 =τ
♥
2 .
4. Where L is an n-ary nonlogical elementary or general letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms,
(
L(τ1, . . . , τn)
)♥
=
L
♥(τ♥1 , . . . , τ
♥
n ).
5. ♥ commutes with all logical operators:
• ⊤♥ = ⊤;
• ⊥♥ = ⊥;
• (¬E)♥ = ¬E♥;
• (E1 ∧ . . . ∧En)♥ = E
♥
1 ∧ . . . ∧E
♥
n ;
• (E1 ∨ . . . ∨En)♥ = E
♥
1 ∨ . . . ∨E
♥
n ;
• (E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓En)♥ = E
♥
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓E
♥
n ;
• (E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔En)♥ = E
♥
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔E
♥
n ;
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• (∀xE)♥ = ∀x(E♥);
• (∃xE)♥ = ∃x(E♥);
• (⊓xE)♥ = ⊓x(E♥);
• (⊔xE)♥ = ⊔x(E♥).
We say that a CL3-formula E is an instance of a CL4-formula F , or that E matches F , iff E = F♥
for some substitution ♥ for F .
Theorem 11.4 A CL4-formula is provable in CL4 iff all of its instances are provable in CL3.
Idea. The completeness part of this theorem is unnecessary for the purposes of the present paper, and
its proof is omitted. For the soundness part, consider a CL4-provable formula F and an arbitrary instance
F♥ of it. We need to construct a CL3-proof of F♥. The idea here is to let such a proof simulate the
CL4-proof of F . Speaking very roughly, simulating steps associated with ⊔ -Choose, ⊔-Choose and Wait
is possible because these rules of CL4 are also present in CL3. As for the Match rule, it can be simulated
by a certain “deductive counterpart” of the earlier seen copycat strategy. Namely, in the bottom-up view
of the CL3-proof under construction, every application of Wait that modifies a subformula originating from
a matched (in the CL4-proof) literal, should be followed by a symmetric application of ⊔ -Choose or ⊔-
Choose in the subformula originating from the other matched literal — an application that evens out the
two subformulas so that one remains the negation of the other.
Proof. Our proof will be focused on the soundness (“only if”) part of the theorem, as nothing in this
paper relies on the completeness (“if”) part. We only want to point out that, essentially, the latter has
been proven in Section 5 of [17]. Specifically, the proof of Lemma 5.1 of [17] proceeds by showing that, if
CL4 6⊢ F , then there is a CL3-formula ⌈F ⌉ which is an instance of F such that CL3 6⊢ ⌈F ⌉. However, as
noted earlier, the logics under the names “CL3” and “CL4” are not exactly the same in [16, 17] as they
are here. Namely, [16, 17] allowed constants in formulas while now we do not allow them. On the other
hand, now we have = and function symbols in the language whereas the approach of [16, 17] did not consider
them, nor did it have the special-status variable b. Also, as we remember, in our present treatment ⊓,⊔
mean ⊓b,⊔b, whereas in [16, 17] they meant properly ⊓,⊔. Such technical differences, however, are minor,
and have no impact on the relevant proofs. So, the above-mentioned proof from [17], with just a few rather
straightforward adjustments, goes through as a proof of the completeness part of the present theorem as
well.
For the soundness part, we extend the language of CL4 by adding to it a new sort of nonlogical letters
called hybrid. Each n-ary hybrid letter is a pair Pq, where P — called its general component — is an
n-ary general letter, and q — called its elementary component— is a nonlogical n-ary elementary letter.
And vice versa: for every pair (P, q) of letters of the above sort, we have an n-ary hybrid letter Pq. Formulas
of this extended language, to which we will be referring as hyperformulas, are built in the same way as
CL4-formulas, with the difference that now atoms can be of any of the three — elementary, general or hybrid
— sorts. Surface occurrence, (elementary, general, hybrid) literal and similar concepts straightforwardly
extend from CL3- and CL4-formulas to hyperformulas. Furthermore, concepts such as surface occurrence,
positive occurrence, etc. extend from subformulas to parts of subformulas, such as letters occurring in them,
in the obvious way.
We say that a hyperformula E is a CL4◦-formula iff, for every hybrid letter Pq occurring in E, the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. E has exactly two occurrences of Pq, where one occurrence is positive and the other occurrence is
negative, and both occurrences are surface occurrences. We say that the corresponding two literals —
where one looks like Pq(~τ ) and the other like ¬Pq(~θ) — are matching.
2. The elementary letter q does not occur in E, nor is it the elementary component of any hybrid letter
occurring in E other than Pq.
Of course, every CL4-formula is also a CL4◦-formula — one with no hybrid letters.
The elementarization ‖E‖ of a CL4◦-formula E is the result of replacing, in E, each surface occurrence
of the form G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn or ⊓xG by ⊤, each surface occurrence of the form G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn or ⊔xG by ⊥,
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every positive surface occurrence of each general literal by ⊥, and every surface occurrence of each hybrid
letter by the elementary component of that letter.
We are going to employ a “version” of CL4 called CL4◦. Unlike CL4 whose language consists only of
CL4-formulas, the language of CL4◦ allows any CL4◦-formulas. The axioms and rules of CL4◦ are the
same as those of CL4 — only, now applied to any CL4◦-formulas rather than just CL4-formulas — with
the difference that the rule of Match is replaced by the following rule that we call Match◦:
F [Pq(~τ ),¬Pq(~θ)]
F [P (~τ ),¬P (~θ)]
,
where P is any n-ary general letter, q is any n-ary elementary letter not occurring in the conclusion (neither
independently nor as the elementary component of some hybrid letter), and ~τ ,~θ are any n-tuples of terms.
Claim 1. For any CL4-formula E, if CL4 ⊢ E, then CL4◦ ⊢ E.
Proof. The idea that underlies our proof of this claim is very simple: every application of Match
naturally turns into an application of Match◦.
Indeed, consider any CL4-proof of E. It can be seen as a tree all of the leaves of which are labeled with
axioms and every non-leaf node of which is labeled with a formula that follows by one of the rules of CL4
from (the labels of) its children, with E being the label of the root. By abuse of terminology, here we identify
the nodes of this tree with their labels, even though, of course, it may be the case that different nodes have
the same label. For each node G of the tree that is derived from its child H by Match — in particular, where
H is the result of replacing in G a positive and a negative surface occurrences of an n-ary general letter P
by an n-ary nonlogical elementary letter q — do the following: replace q by the hybrid letter Pq in H as well
as in all of its descendants in the tree. It is not hard to see that this way we will get a CL4◦-proof of E.
The concept of a substitution ♥ for a CL4◦-formula E, and the corresponding CL3-formula E♥, are
defined in the same ways as for CL4-formulas, treating each hybrid letter Pq as a separate (not related to
P or any other Pp with p 6= q) general letter.
We say that a CL3-formula E is a TROW-premise of a CL3-formula F (“TROW”=“Transitive Re-
flexive Ordinary Wait”) iff E is F , or an ordinary Wait-premise of F , or an ordinary Wait-premise of an
ordinary Wait-premise of F , or . . . .
Let E be a CL4◦-formula with exactly n positive surface occurrences of general literals, with those
occurences being (not necessarily pairwise distinct literals) G1, . . . , Gn. And let
♥ be a substitution for E.
Then E♥ can obviously be written as H [G♥1 , . . . , G
♥
n ], where G
♥
1 , . . . , G
♥
n are surface occurrences originating
from the occurrences of G1, . . . , Gn in E. Under these conditions, by a
♥-quasiinstance of E we will
mean any TROW-premise of H [G♥1 , . . . , G
♥
n ] that can be written as H [J1, . . . , Jn]. To summarize in more
intuitive terms, a ♥-quasiinstance of E is a TROW-premise of E♥ where all (if any) changes have taken
place exclusively in subformulas (G♥1 , . . . , G
♥
n ) that originate from positive occurrences of general literals
(G1, . . . , Gn) in E. Of course, E
♥ is one of the ♥-quasiinstances of E.
By a (simply) quasiinstance of a CL4◦-formula E we mean a ♥-quasiinstance of E for some substitution
♥ for E. Note that every instance is a quasiinstance but not necessarily vice versa.
Claim 2. For any CL4◦-formula E, if CL4◦ ⊢ E, then every quasiinstance of E is provable in CL3.
Proof. Consider any CL4◦-provable formula E. We want to show that CL3 proves any quasiinstance
of E. This will be done by induction on the length of the CL4◦-proof of E; within the inductive step of this
induction, we will use a second induction — induction on the complexity (the number of logical connectives)
of the quasiinstance of E under consideration. Call the first induction primary and the second induction
secondary. These adjectives will also be applied to the corresponding inductive hypotheses.
For the basis of the primary induction, assume E is an axiom of CL4◦ (and hence of CL3 as well), i.e. E
is a valid formula of classical logic. Consider any substitution ♥ for E. The formula E♥ is an axiom of (CL4◦
and) CL3, because classical validity is closed under applying substitutions. And, since E is elementary, E♥
is the only ♥-quasiinstance of it. So, we are done.
Below comes the inductive step of the primary induction, divided into three cases.
Case 1. Assume E is obtained from a premise G by ⊔ -Choose or ⊔-Choose. Consider any substitution
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♥ for E. Obviously, E♥ follows from G♥ by the same rule;12 and, by the primary induction hypothesis,
CL3 ⊢ G♥, so we have CL3 ⊢ E♥. Furthermore, what we just observed extends to any other (other than
E♥) ♥-quasiinstance H of E as well: with some thought, one can see that such an H follows from a certain
(the corresponding) ♥-quasiinstance of G by the same rule ⊔ -Choose or ⊔-Choose as E follows from G.
Case 2. Assume E is obtained from premises ‖E‖, G1, . . . , Gn by Wait. Consider any substitution ♥ for
E and any ♥-quasiinstance H of E. We want to show that H can be derived in CL3 by Wait.
The provability of the elementary formula ‖E‖ obviously means that it is an axiom, i.e., a valid formula
of classical logic. Let J1, . . . , Jk be all positive surface occurrences of general literals in E, and let E
′ be
the formula obtained from E by replacing those occurrences by q1, . . . , qk, where the qi are pairwise distinct
0-ary elementary letters not occurring in E. Observe that then ‖E′‖ differs from ‖E‖ in that, where the
former has k positive occurrences of ⊥ (originating from J1, . . . , Jk when elementarizing E), the latter has
the k atoms q1, . . . , qk. It is known from classical logic that replacing positive occurrences of ⊥ by whatever
formulas does not destroy validity. Hence, as ‖E‖ is valid, so is ‖E′‖. Now, with some analysis, details of
which are left to the reader, one can see that the formula ‖H‖ is a substitutional instance — in both our
present sense as well as in the classical sense — of ‖E′‖. So, as an instance of a classically valid formula,
‖H‖ is classically valid, i.e. is an axiom of CL3, and we thus have
CL3 ⊢ ‖H‖. (5)
We now want to show that:
Whenever H = H [K1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Km] and 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have CL3 ⊢ H [Ki]. (6)
Indeed, assuming the conditions of (6), one of the following should be the case:
1. The occurrence ofK1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Km inH originates from a (surface) occurrence of a subformula L1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Lm
in E (so that K1 = L
♥
1 , . . ., Km = L
♥
m). Then, obviously, H [Ki] is a
♥-quasiinstance of one of the
ordinary Wait-premises Gj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) of E. But then, by the primary induction hypothesis, we have
CL3 ⊢ H [Ki].
2. The occurrence of K1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Km in H originates from a (positive surface) occurrence of some general
literal L in E (so that K1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Km has a surface occurrence in a TROW-premise of L
♥). Note that
then H [Ki], just like H , is a
♥-quasiinstance of E. By the secondary induction hypothesis, the formula
H [Ki], as a quasiinstance of E less complex than H itself, is provable in CL3.
3. The occurrence of K1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Km in H originates from a (positive surface) occurrence of some hybrid
literal L in E (so that K1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Km has a surface occurrence in L
♥). Then H [Ki] contains a surface
occurrence of the subformula ¬K1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬Km, originating from the occurrence of the matching hybrid
literal L′ in E. Let H ′ be the result of replacing that ¬K1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬Km by ¬Ki in H [Ki]. Obviously
H ′, just like H , is a quasiinstance of E, but it is less complex than H . Hence, by the secondary
induction hypothesis, CL3 ⊢ H ′. But H [Ki] follows from H ′ by ⊔ -Choose. So, CL3 ⊢ H [Ki].
In all cases we thus get CL3 ⊢ H [Ki], as desired.
In a very similar way, we can further show that
Whenever H = H [⊓xK(x)], we have CL3 ⊢ H [K(s)] for some variable s not occurring in H. (7)
Now, from (5), (6) and (7), by Wait, we find the desired CL3 ⊢ H .
Case 3. Suppose P is a k-ary general letter, q is a k-ary nonlogical elementary letter, τ1, . . . , τk, θ1, . . . , θk
are terms,
E = E[P (τ1, . . . , τk), ¬P (θ1, . . . , θk)]
and it is obtained from the premise
E[Pq(τ1, . . . , τk), ¬Pq(θ1, . . . , θk)] (8)
12To ensure that Convention 8.1 is respected, here we can safely assume that, if E is obtained by ⊔-Choose and this rule (in
the bottom-up view) introduced a fresh variable s, then s has no (bound) occurrences in G♥, or otherwise rename s into some
neutral variable.
29
by Match◦. Consider any substitution ♥ for E, and any ♥-quasiinstance of E. Obviously such a quasiinstance
can be written in the form
H [K1(τ
♥
1 , . . . , τ
♥
k ), ¬K2(θ
♥
1 , . . . , θ
♥
k )], (9)
where H inherits the logical structure of E (but probably adds some extra complexity to it), K1(τ
♥
1 , . . . , τ
♥
k )
is a TROW-premise of P♥(τ♥1 , . . . , τ
♥
k ) and ¬K2(θ
♥
1 , . . . , θ
♥
k ) is a TROW-premise of ¬P
♥(θ♥1 , . . . , θ
♥
k ). With
a little thought, one can see that there is a series of ⊔ -Chooses and ⊔-Chooses that we can apply — in the
bottom-up sense — to (9) to “even out” the K1(τ
♥
1 , . . . , τ
♥
k ) and ¬K2(θ
♥
1 , . . . , θ
♥
k ) subformulas and bring
(9) to
H [K(τ♥1 , . . . , τ
♥
k ), ¬K(θ
♥
1 , . . . , θ
♥
k )] (10)
for a certain formula K(x1, . . . , xn). Let
♦ be the substitution for E which sends Pq to K(x1, . . . , xn) and
agrees with ♥ on everything else. With a little thought, we can see that (10) is a ♦-quasiinstance of (8).
Hence, by the primary induction hypothesis, CL3 ⊢ (10). Now, as we already know, (9) is obtained from
(10) using a series of ⊔ -Chooses and ⊔-Chooses. Hence (9) — which, as we remember, was an arbitrary
quasiinstance of E — is provable in CL3.
The above Cases 1,2,3 complete the inductive step of our primary induction, and we conclude that,
whenever E is a CL4◦-provable formula, every quasiinstance of it is provable in CL3.
To complete our proof of (the soundness part of) Theorem 11.4, assume CL4 ⊢ F . Then, by Claim 1,
CL4◦ ⊢ F . Consider any substitution ♥ for F . F♥ is a (quasi)instance of F and hence, by Claim 2,
CL3 ⊢ F♥. Since both F and ♥ are arbitrary, we conclude that every instance of every CL4-provable
formula is provable in CL3.
12 The basic system of ptarithmetic introduced
There can be various interesting systems of arithmetic based on computability logic (“clarithmetics”),
depending on what language we consider, what fragment of CL is taken as a logical basis, and what extra-
logical rules and axioms are employed. [25] introduced three systems of clarithmetic, named CLA1, CLA2
and CLA3, all based on the fragment CL12 (also introduced in [25]) of computability logic. The basic
one of them is CLA1, with the other two systems being straightforward modifications of it through slightly
extending (CLA2) or limiting (CLA3) the underlying nonlogical language. Unlike our present treatment,
the underlying semantical concept for the systems of [25] was computability-in-principle rather than efficient
computability.
The new system of clarithmetic introduced in this section, meant to axiomatize efficient computability
of number-theoretic computational problems, is named PTA. The term “ptarithmetic” is meant to be a
generic name for systems in this style, even though we often use it to refer to our present particular system
PTA of ptarithmetic.
The language of PTA, whose formulas we refer to as PTA-formulas, is obtained from the language of
CL3 by removing all nonlogical predicate letters (thus only leaving the logical predicate letter =), and also
removing all but four function letters, which are:
• zero, 0-ary. We will write 0 for zero.
• successor, unary. We will write τ ′ for successor(τ).
• sum, binary. We will write τ1+τ2 for sum(τ1, τ2).
• product, binary. We will write τ1×τ2 for product(τ1, τ2).
From now on, when we just say “formula”, we mean “PTA-formula”, unless otherwise specified or
suggested by the context.
Formulas that have no free occurrences of variables are said to be sentences.
The concept of an interpretation explained earlier can now be restricted to interpretations that are only
defined on 0, ′, + , × and = , as the present language has no other nonlogical function or predicate letters.
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Of such interpretations, the standard interpretation † is the one that interprets 0 as (the 0-ary function
whose value is) 0, interprets ′ as the standard successor (x+1) function, interprets + as the sum function,
interprets × as the product function, and interprets = as the identity relation. Where F is a PTA-formula,
the standard interpretation of F is the game F †, which we typically write simply as F unless doing so
may cause ambiguity.
The axioms of PTA are grouped into logical and nonlogical.
The logical axioms of PTA are all elementary PTA-formulas provable in classical first-order logic.
That is, all axioms of CL3 that are PTA-formulas.
As for the nonlogical axioms, they are divided into what we call “Peano” and “extra-Peano” axioms.
ThePeano axioms ofPTA are all sentences matching the following seven schemes,13 with x, y, y1, . . . , yn
being any pairwise distinct variables other than b:
Axiom 1: ∀x(0 6=x ′)
Axiom 2: ∀x∀y(x ′ =y ′ → x=y)
Axiom 3: ∀x(x+0=x)
Axiom 4: ∀x∀y
(
x+y ′ =(x+y) ′
)
Axiom 5: ∀x(x×0=0)
Axiom 6: ∀x∀y
(
x×y ′ =(x×y)+x
)
Axiom 7: ∀y1 . . . ∀yn
(
F (0) ∧ ∀x
(
F (x)→ F (x ′)
)
→ ∀xF (x)
)
, where F (x) is any elementary formula and
y1, . . . , yn are all of the variables occurring free in it and different from b, x.
Before we present the extra-Peano axioms of PTA, we need to agree on some notational matters. The
language of PTA extends that of Peano Arithmetic PA (see, for example, [9]) through adding to it
⊓ , ⊔ ,⊔,⊓. And the language of PA is known to be very expressive, despite its nonlogical vocabulary
officially being limited to only 0, ′, + , × . Specifically, it allows us to express, in a certain reasonable and
standard way, all recursive functions and relations, and beyond. Relying on the common knowledge of the
power of the language of PA, we will be using standard expressions such as x≤y, y>x, etc. in formulas as
abbreviations of the corresponding proper expressions of the language. Namely, in our metalanguage, |x|
will refer to the length of (the binary numeral for the number represented by) x.14 So, when we write, say,
“|x|≤b”, it is to be understood as an abbreviation of a standard formula of PA saying that the size of x
does not exceed b.
Where τ is a term, we will be using τ0 and τ1 as abbreviations for the terms 0 ′ ′×τ and (0 ′ ′×τ) ′,
respectively. The choice of this notation is related to the fact that, given any natural number a, the binary
representation of 0 ′ ′×a (i.e., of 2a) is nothing but the binary representation of a with a “0” added on
its right. Similarly, the binary representation of (0 ′ ′×a) ′ is nothing but the binary representation of a
with a “1” added to it. Of course, here an exception is the case a=0. It can be made an ordinary case
by assuming that adding any number of 0s at the beginning of a binary numeral b results in a legitimate
numeral representing the same number as b.
The number a0 (i.e. 2a) will be said to be the binary 0-successor of a, and a1 (i.e. 2a+ 1) said to be
the binary 1-successor of a; in turn, we can refer to a as the binary predecessor of a0 and a1. As for
a ′, we can refer to it as the unary successor of a, and refer to a as the unary predecessor of a ′. Every
number has a binary predecessor, and every number except 0 has a unary predecessor. Note that the binary
predecessor of a number is the result of deleting the last digit in its binary representation. Two exceptions
are the numbers 0 and 1, both having 0 as their binary predecessor.
Below and elsewhere, by a b-term we mean a term of the official language of PTA containing no variables
other than b. That is, a term exclusively built from b, 0, ′, + , × .
Now, the extra-Peano axioms of PTA are all formulas matching the following six schemes, where s is
any variable and x is any variable other than b, s:
13Only Axiom 7 is a scheme in the proper sense. Axioms 1-6 are “schemes” only in the sense that x and y are metavariables
for variables rather than particular variables. These axioms can be painlessly turned into particular formulas by fixing some
particular variables in the roles of x and y. But why bother.
14Warning: here we do not follow the standard convention, according to which |0| is considered to be 0 rather than 1.
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Axiom 8: ⊔x(x=0)
Axiom 9: s=0 ⊔ s 6=0
Axiom 10: |s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′)
Axiom 11: |s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0)
Axiom 12: ⊔x(s=x0 ⊔ s=x1)
Axiom 13: |s|≤b
The rules of inference are also divided into two groups: logical and nonlogical.
The logical rules of PTA are the rules ⊔ -Choose, ⊔-Choose, Wait and Modus Ponens of Section 9.
And there is a single nonlogical rule of inference, that we call Polynomial Time Induction (PTI),
in which τ is any b-term, s is any non-b variable, and E(s), F (s) are any formulas:
PTI
E(0) ∧ F (0) E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
)
s≤τ →E(s) ∧F (s)
Here the left premise is called the basis of induction, and the right premise called the inductive step.
A formula F is considered provable in PTA iff there is a sequence of formulas, called a PTA-proof of
F , where each formula is either a (logical or nonlogical) axiom, or follows from some previous formulas by
one of the (logical or nonlogical) rules of inference, and where the last formula is F . We write PTA ⊢ F to
say that F is provable (has a proof) in PTA, and PTA 6⊢ F to say the opposite.
In view of the following fact, an alternative way to present PTA would be to delete Axioms 1-7 together
with all logical axioms and, instead, declare all theorems of PA to be axioms of PTA along with Axioms
8-13:
Fact 12.1 Every (elementary PTA-) formula provable in PA is also provable in PTA.
Proof. Suppose (the classical-logic-based) PA proves F . By the deduction theorem for classical logic
this means that, for some nonlogical axioms H1, . . . , Hn of PA, the formula H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn→ F is provable
in classical first order logic. Hence H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn→ F is a logical axiom of PTA and is thus provable in
PTA. But the nonlogical axioms of PA are nothing but the Peano axioms of PTA. So, PTA proves each
of the formulas H1, . . . , Hn. Now, in view of the presence of the rule of Modus Ponens in PTA, we find that
PTA ⊢ F .
The above fact, on which we will be implicitly relying in the sequel, allows us to construct “lazy” PTA-
proofs where some steps can be justified by simply indicating their provability in PA. That is, we will treat
theorems of PA as if they were axioms of PTA. As PA is well known and studied, we safely assume that the
reader has a good feel of what it can prove, so we do not usually further justify PA-provability claims that
we make. A reader less familiar with PA, can take it as a rule of thumb that, despite Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorems, PA proves every true number-theoretic fact that a contemporary high school student can establish,
or that mankind was or could be aware of before 1931.
Definition 12.2
1. By an arithmetical problem in this paper we mean a game A such that, for some formula F of the
language of PTA, A = F † (remember that † is the standard interpretation). Such a formula F is said a
representation of A.
2. We say that an arithmetical problem A is provable in PTA iff it has a PTA-provable representation.
In these terms, the central result of the present paper sounds as follows:
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Theorem 12.3 An arithmetical problem has a polynomial time solution iff it is provable in PTA.
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary PTA-proof of an arbitrary formula
X and constructs a polynomial time solution for X (for X†, that is).
Proof. The soundness (“if”) part of this theorem will be proven in Section 15, and the completeness
(“only if”) part in Section 21.
13 On the extra-Peano axioms of PTA
While the well known Peano axioms hardly require any explanations as their traditional meanings are fully
preserved in our treatment, the extra-Peano axioms of PTA may be worth briefly commenting on. Below
we do so with the soundness of PTA (the “if” part of Theorem 12.3) in mind, according to which every
PTA-provable formula expresses an efficiently (i.e. polynomial time) computable number-theoretic problem.
13.1 Axiom 8
⊔x(x=0)
This axiom expresses our ability to efficiently name the number (constant) 0. Nothing — even such a “trivial”
thing — can be taken for granted when it comes to formal systems!
13.2 Axiom 9
s=0 ⊔ s 6=0
This axiom expresses our ability to efficiently tell whether any given number is 0 or not. Yet another “trivial”
thing that still has to be explicitly stated in the formal system.
13.3 Axiom 10
|s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′)
This axiom establishes the efficient computability of the unary successor function (as long as the size of the
value of the function does not exceed the bound b). Note that its classical counterpart |s ′|≤b→ ∃x(x=s ′)
is simply a valid formula of classical first-order logic (because so is its consequent) and, as such, carries no
information. Axiom 10, on the other hand, is not at all a logically valid formula, and does carry certain
nontrivial information about the standard meaning of the successor function. A nonstandard meaning
(interpretation) of s ′ could be an intractable or even incomputable function.
13.4 Axiom 11
|s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0)
Likewise, Axiom 11 establishes the efficient computability of the binary 0-successor function. There is no
need to state a similar axiom for the binary 1-successor function, as can be seen from the following lemma:
Lemma 13.1 PTA ⊢ |s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1).
Proof. Informally, a proof of |s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1) would be based on the fact (known from PA) that
the binary 1-successor of s is nothing but the unary successor of the binary 0-successor of s; the binary
0-successor r of s can be found using Axiom 11; and the unary successor u of that r can be further found
using Axiom 10.
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Here is a (“lazy” in the earlier-mentioned sense) PTA-proof formalizing the above argument:
1. ⊤ ∧
(
|s0|≤b→⊥
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→⊥
)
PA
2. ⊤ Logical axiom
3. |s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′) Axiom 10
4. ⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
Wait: 2,3
5. |s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0) Axiom 11
6.
(
|t ′|≤b→⊥
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b→ (t=s0)
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→⊥
)
PA
7.
(
|t ′|≤b→ r=t ′
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b→ (t=s0)
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→ r=s1
)
PA
8.
(
|t ′|≤b→ r=t ′
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b→ (t=s0)
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1)
)
⊔-Choose: 7
9.
(
|t ′|≤b→⊔x(x= t ′)
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b→ (t=s0)
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1)
)
Wait: 6,8
10. ⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b→ (t=s0)
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1)
)
⊔-Choose: 9
11. ⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0)
)
→
(
|s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1)
)
Wait: 1,10
12. |s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1) MP: 4,5,11
This was our first experience with generating a formal PTA-proof. We will do quite some more exercising
with PTA-proofs later in order to start seeing that behind every informal argument in the style of the one
given at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 13.1 is a “real”, formal proof.
13.5 Axiom 12
⊔x(s=x0 ⊔ s=x1) (11)
Let us compare the above with three other, “similar” formulas:
∃x(s=x0 ⊔ s=x1) (12)
⊔x(s=x0 ∨ s=x1) (13)
∃x(s=x0 ∨ s=x1) (14)
All four formulas “say the same” about the arbitrary number represented by s, but in different ways. (14)
is the weakest, least informative, of the four. It says that s has a binary predecessor x, and that s is
even (i.e., is the binary 0-successor of its binary predecessor) or odd (i.e., is the binary 1-successor of its
binary predecessor). This is an almost trivial piece of information. (13) and (12) carry stronger information.
According to (13), s not just merely has a binary predecessor x, but such a predecessor can be actually and
efficiently found. (12) strengthens (14) in another way. It says that s can be efficiently determined to be
even or odd. As for (11), which is Axiom 12 proper, it is the strongest. It carries two pieces of good news at
once: we can efficiently find the binary predecessor x of s and, simultaneously, tell whether s is even or odd.
13.6 Axiom 13
|s|≤b
Remember that our semantics considers only bounded valuations, meaning that the size of the number
represented by a (free) variable s will never exceed the bound represented by the variable b. Axiom 13
simply states this fact. Note that this is the only elementary formula among the extra-Peano axioms.
In view of the above-said, whenever we say “an arbitrary s” in an informal argument, unless otherwise
suggested by the context, it is always to be understood as an arbitrary s whose size does not exceed the
bound b.
Due to Axiom 13, PTA proves that the bound is nonzero:
Lemma 13.2 PTA ⊢ b 6=0.
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Proof. No binary numeral is of length 0 and, of course, PA knows this. Hence PA ⊢ |s|≤b→ b 6=0. From
here and Axiom 13, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ b 6=0.
The formula of the following lemma is similar to Axiom 8, only it is about 0 ′ instead of 0.
Lemma 13.3 PTA ⊢ ⊔x(x=0 ′).
Proof.
1. b 6=0 Lemma 13.2
2. ⊔x(x=0) Axiom 8
3. ⊤ Logical axiom
4. |s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′) Axiom 10
5. ⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
Wait: 3,4
6. b 6=0 ∧⊥ ∧⊤→⊥ Logical axiom
7. b 6=0 ∧w=0 ∧ (|w ′|≤b→⊥)→⊥ PA
8. b 6=0 ∧w=0 ∧ (|w ′|≤b→ v=w ′)→ v=0 ′ PA
9. b 6=0 ∧w=0 ∧ (|w ′|≤b→ v=w ′)→⊔x(x=0 ′) ⊔-Choose: 8
10. b 6=0 ∧w=0 ∧
(
|w ′|≤b→⊔x(x=w ′)
)
→⊔x(x=0 ′) Wait: 7,9
11. b 6=0 ∧w=0 ∧⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
→⊔x(x=0 ′) ⊔-Choose: 10
12. b 6=0 ∧⊔x(x=0) ∧⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
→⊔x(x=0 ′) Wait: 6,11
13. ⊔x(x=0 ′) MP: 1,2,5,12
14 On the Polynomial Time Induction rule
E(0) ∧ F (0) E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
)
s≤τ →E(s) ∧F (s)
Induction is the cornerstone of every system of arithmetic. The many versions of formal arithmetic studied
in the literature (see [9]) mainly differ in varying — typically weakening — the unrestricted induction of the
basic PA, which is nothing but our Axiom 7. In PTA, induction comes in two forms: Axiom 7, and the
above-displayed PTI rule. Axiom 7, along with the other axioms of PA, is taken to preserve the full power of
PA. But it is limited to elementary formulas and offers no inductive mechanism applicable to computational
problems in general. The role of PTI is to provide such a missing mechanism.
A naive attempt to widen the induction of PA would be to remove, from Axiom 7, the condition requiring
that F (x) be an elementary formula. This would be a terribly wrong idea though. The resulting scheme
would not even be a scheme of computable problems, let alone efficiently computable problems. Weakening
the resulting scheme by additionally replacing the blind quantifiers with choice quantifiers, resulting in (a
scheme equivalent to)
F (0) ∧⊓x
(
F (x)→ F (x ′)
)
→⊓xF (x), (15)
would not fix the problem, either. The intuitive reason why (15) is unsound with respect to the semantics
of computability logic, even if the underlying concept of interest is computability-in-principle without any
regard for efficiency, is the following. In order to solve F (s) for an arbitrary s (i.e., solve the problem⊓xF (x)),
one would need to “modus-ponens” F (x)→ F (x ′) with F (0) to compute F (1), then further “modus-ponens”
F (x)→ F (x ′) with F (1) to compute F (2), etc. up to F (s). This would thus require s “copies” of the resource
F (x)→ F (x ′). But the trouble is that only one copy of this resource is available in the antecedent of (15)!
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The problem that we just pointed out can be neutralized by taking the following rule instead of the
formula (scheme) (15):
F (0) ⊓x
(
F (x)→ F (x′)
)
⊓xF (x)
.
Taking into account that both semantically and syntactically ⊓xY (x) (in isolation) is equivalent to just
Y (s), we prefer to rewrite the above in the following form:
F (0) F (s)→ F (s′)
F (s)
. (16)
Unlike the situation with (15), the resource F (s)→ F (s′) comes in an unlimited supply in (16). As a rule,
(16) assumes that the premise F (s)→ F (s′) has already been proven. If proven, we know how to solve it.
And if we know how to solve it, we can solve it as many times as needed. In contrast, in the case of (15)
we do not really know how to solve the corresponding problem of the antecedent, but rather we rely on the
environment to demonstrate such a solution; and the environment is obligated to do so only once.
(16) can indeed be shown to be a computability-preserving rule. As we remember, however, we are
concerned with efficient computability rather than computability-in-principle. And, in this respect, (16) is
not sound. Roughly, the reason is the following: the way of computing F (s) offered by (16) would require
performing at least as many MP-style steps as the numeric value of s (rather than the dramatically smaller
size of s). This would yield a computational complexity exponential in the size of s. (16) can be made sound
by limiting s to “sufficiently small” numbers as done below, where τ is an arbitrary b-term:
F (0) F (s)→ F (s′)
s≤τ → F (s)
. (17)
Here the value of τ , being a (b, 0, ′, + , ×)-combination, is guaranteed to be polynomial in (the value of) b.
Hence, we are no longer getting an exponential complexity of computation. This, by the way, explains the
presence of “s≤τ” in the conclusion of PTI. Unlike (15) and (16), (17) is indeed sound with respect to our
present semantics of efficient computability.
A problem with (17), however, is that it is not strong enough — namely, not as strong as PTI, and
with (17) instead of PTI, we cannot achieve the earlier promised extensional completeness of PTA. What
makes PTI stronger than (17) is that its right premise is weaker. Specifically, while the right premise of (17)
requires the ability to compute F (s ′) only using F (s) as a computational resource, the right premise of PTI
allows using the additional resource E(s) in such a computation.
Note that, in a classical context, identifying the two sorts of conjunction, there would be no difference
between (17) and PTI. First of all, the (sub)conjunct E(s) in the consequent of the right premise of PTI
would be meaningless and hence could be deleted, as it is already present in the antecedent. Second, the
conjunction of E(s) and F (s) could be thought of as one single formula of induction, and thus PTI would
become simply (17).
Our context is not classical though, and the difference between PTI and (17) is huge. First of all, we
cannot think of “the conjunction” of E(s) and F (s) as a single formula of induction, for that “conjunction” is
⊓ in the consequent of the right premise while ∧ elsewhere. For simplicity, consider the case E(s) = F (s).
Also, let us ignore the technicality imposed by the presence of “E(s)” in the consequent of the right premise of
PTI. Then that premise would look like F (s) ∧ F (s)→ F (s ′) ⊓ F (s ′) which, taking into account that X ⊓X
is equivalent to X , would be essentially the same as simply F (s) ∧F (s)→ F (s ′). This is a much weaker
premise than the premise F (s)→ F (s ′) of (17). It signifies that computing a single copy of F (s ′) requires
computing two copies of F (s). By back-propagating this effect, it would eventually mean that computing
F (s) requires computing an exponential number of copies of F (0), even when s is “small enough” such as
s≤τ .
The above sort of an explosion is avoided in PTI due to the presence of E(s) in the consequent of the right
premise — the “technical detail” that we have ignored so far. The reemergence of E(s) in the consequent of
that premise makes this resource “recyclable”. Even though computing F (s ′) still requires computing both
E(s) and F (s), a new copy of E(s) comes “for free” as a side-product of this computation, and hence can be
directly passed to another, parallel computation of F (s ′). Such and all other parallel computations would
thus require a new copy of F (s) but not a new copy of E(s), as they get the required resource E(s) from the
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neighboring computation. So, a group of n parallel computations of F (s ′) would require n copies of F (s)
and only one copy of E(s). This essentially cuts the demand on resources at each step (for each s) by half,
and the eventual number of copies of E(0) ∧ F (0) to be computed will be of the order of s rather than 2s.
How this effect is exactly achieved will be clear after reading the following section.
15 The soundness of PTA
This section is devoted to proving the soundness part of Theorem 12.3. It means showing that any PTA-
provable formula X (identified with its standard interpretation X†) has a polynomial time solution, and
that, furthermore, such a solution for X can be effectively extracted from any PTA-proof of X .
We prove the above by induction on the lengths of PTA-proofs.
Consider any PTA-provable formula X .
For the basis of induction, assume X is an axiom of PTA. Let us say that an elementary PTA-formula
G is true iff, for any bounded valuation e, e[G] is true in the standard arithmetical sense, i.e., WnG
†
e 〈〉 = ⊤.
If X is a logical axiom or a Peano axiom, then it is a true elementary formula and therefore is “computed”
by a machine that makes no moves at all. The same holds for the case when X is Axiom 13, remembering
that, for any bounded valuation e, the size of e(s) (whatever variable s) never exceeds e(b).
If X is ⊔x(x=0) (Axiom 8), then it is computed by a machine that makes the move 0 and never makes
any moves after that.
If X is s=0 ⊔ s 6=0 (Axiom 9), then it is computed by a machine that reads the value e(s) of s from the
valuation tape and, depending on whether that value is 0 or not, makes the move 0 or 1, respectively.
If X is |s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′) (Axiom 10), it is computed by a machine that reads the value e(s) of s from
the valuation tape, then finds (the binary numeral) c with c=e(s)+1, compares its size with e(b) (the latter
also read from the valuation tape) and, if |c|≤e(b), makes 1.c as its only move in the game.
Similarly, if X is |s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0) (Axiom 11), it is computed by a machine that reads the value e(s)
of s from the valuation tape, then finds (the binary numeral) c with c = e(s)0, compares its size with e(b)
and, if |c|≤e(b), makes 1.c as its only move in the game.
Finally, if X is ⊔x(s=x0 ⊔ s=x1) (Axiom 12), it is computed by a machine that reads the value e(s) of
s from the valuation tape, then finds the binary predecessor c of e(s), and makes the two moves c and 0 or
c and 1, depending whether the last digit of e(s) is 0 or 1, respectively.
Needless to point out that, in all of the above cases, the machines that solve the axioms run in polynomial
time. And, of course, such machines can be constructed effectively.
For the inductive step, suppose X is obtained from premises X1, . . . , Xk by one of the four logical rules.
By the induction hypothesis, we know how to (effectively) construct a polynomial time solution for each Xi.
Then, by the results of Section 9 on the uniform-constructive soundness of the four logical rules, we also
know how to construct a polynomial time solution for X .
Finally, suppose X is s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s), where τ is a b-term, and X is obtained by PTI as follows:
E(0) ∧ F (0) E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
)
s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s)
.
By the induction hypothesis, the following two problems have polynomial time solutions — and, further-
more, we know how to construct such solutions:
E(0) ∧F (0); (18)
E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
)
. (19)
Then the same holds for the following four problems:
E(0); (20)
F (0); (21)
E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′); (22)
E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s) ∧ F (s ′). (23)
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For (20) and (21), this is so because CL4 ⊢ P1 ∧P2→ Pi (i = 1, 2), whence CL3 proves both E(0) ∧ F (0)
→E(0) and E(0) ∧F (0)→ F (0), whence — by the uniform-constructive soundness of CL3— we know how
to construct polynomial time solutions for these two problems, whence — by the polynomial time solvability
of (18) and the closure of this property (in the strong sense of Theorem 9.5) under Modus Ponens — we also
know how to construct polynomial time solutions for E(0) and F (0). With (19) instead of (18), the arguments
for (22) and (23) are similar, the first one relying on the fact that CL4 proves (P1→ P2 ⊓Q)→ (P1→ P2),
and the second one relying on the fact that CL4 proves
(
P1→ P2 ⊓ (Q1 ∧Q2)
)
→ (P1→Q2 ∧Q1).
Throughout the rest of this proof, assume some arbitrary bounded valuation e to be fixed. Correspond-
ingly, when we write b or τ , they are to be understood as e(b) or e(τ). As always, saying “polynomial”
means “polynomial in b”.
For a formula G and a positive integer n, we will be using the abbreviation
∧
| nG
for the ∧ -conjunction G ∧ . . . ∧G of n copies of G. If here n = 1, ∧|
n
G simply means G.
Claim 1.For any integer k ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, the following problem has a polynomial time solution which, in
turn, can be constructed in polynomial time:
E(s) ∧ ∧|
k+1
F (s)→E(s ′) ∧ ∧|
k
F (s ′). (24)
Proof. In this proof and later, we use the term “synchronizing” to mean applying copycat between
two (sub)games of the form A and ¬A. This means copying one player’s moves made in A as the other
player’s moves in ¬A, and vice versa. The effect achieved this way is that the games to which A and ¬A
eventually evolve (the final positions hit by them, that is) will be of the form A′ and ¬A′, that is, one will
remain the negation of the other, so that one will be won by a given player iff the other is lost by the same
player. We already saw an application of this idea/technique in the proof of Theorem 9.5. Partly for this
reason and partly because now we are dealing with a more complicated case, our present proof will be given
in less detail than the proof of Theorem 9.5 was.
Here is a solution/strategy for (24). While playing the real play of (24) on valuation e, also play, in
parallel, one imaginary copy of (22) and k imaginary copies of (23) on the same valuation e, using the
strategies for (22) and (23) whose existence we already know. In this mixture of the real and imaginary
plays, do the following:
• Synchronize the F (s) of the antecedent of each ith copy of (23) with the ith conjunct of the ∧|
k+1
F (s)
part of the antecedent of (24).
• Synchronize the E(s) of the antecedent of the first copy of (23) with the E(s) of the antecedent of (24).
• Synchronize the E(s) of the antecedent of each copy #(i+1) of (23) with the E(s) of the consequent
of copy #i of (23).
• Synchronize the E(s) of the antecedent of (the single copy of) (22) with the E(s) of the consequent of
copy #k of (23).
• Synchronize the F (s) of the antecedent of (22) with the last conjunct of the ∧|
k+1
F (s) part of the
antecedent of (24).
• Synchronize the E(s ′) of the consequent of (22) with the E(s ′) of the consequent of (24).
• Synchronize the F (s ′) of the consequent of each copy #i of (23) with the ith conjunct of the ∧|
k
F (s ′)
part of the consequent of (24).
Below is an illustration of such synchronization arrangements — indicated by arcs — for the case k = 3:
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(24): E(s) ∧F (s) ∧ F (s) ∧ F (s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ∧ F (s ′) ∧ F (s ′) ∧ F (s ′)
(23)1: E(s) ∧F (s)→E(s) ∧ F (s
′)
(23)2: E(s) ∧F (s)→E(s) ∧ F (s
′)
(23)3: E(s) ∧F (s)→E(s) ∧ F (s
′)
(22): E(s) ∧F (s)→E(s ′)
✜
✜
✜✜
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
✭✭✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭✭✭
Of course, the strategy that we have just described can be constructed effectively and, in fact, in poly-
nomial time, from the strategies for (22) and (23). Furthermore, since the latter run in polynomial time,
obviously so does our present one. It is left to the reader to verify that our strategy indeed wins (24).
Now, the sought polynomial time solution for
s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s) (25)
on valuation e will go like this. Read the value d = e(s) of s from the valuation tape. Also read the value
of b and, using it, compute the value c of τ . Since τ is a (0, ′, + ,×)-combination of b, computing c only
takes a polynomial amount of steps. If d>c, do nothing — you are the winner (again, comparing d with c,
of course, takes only a polynomial amount of steps). Otherwise, using the strategy from Claim 1, for each
a ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, play (a single copy of) the imaginary game Ga on valuation e, defined by
Ga = E(a) ∧ ∧
| d−a+1F (a)→E(a ′) ∧ ∧|
d−a
F (a ′).
Namely, the effect of playingGa on valuation e is achieved by playingE(s) ∧ ∧
| d−a+1F (s)→E(s ′) ∧ ∧|
d−a
F (s ′)
on the valuation e′ which sends s to a and agrees with e on all other variables. In addition, using the strategy
for (20), play a single imaginary copy of E(0) on e, and, using the strategy for (21), play d+1 imaginary
copies of F (0) on e. In this mixture of imaginary plays and the real play of (25), do the following:
• Synchronize the above E(0) and F (0)s with the corresponding conjuncts of the antecedent of G0.
• Synchronize the antecedent of each Gi+1 with the consequent of Gi.
• Synchronize the consequent of Gd−1 with the consequent of (25).
Below is an illustration of these synchronization arrangements for the case d = 11 (decimal 3):
11≤τ → E(11) ∧ F (11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(10) ∧ F (10) ∧ F (10)︸ ︷︷ ︸ →
︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(11) ∧ F (11)
E(1) ∧F (1) ∧ F (1) ∧ F (1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ →
︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(10) ∧ F (10) ∧ F (10)
E(0) ∧F (0) ∧ F (0) ∧ F (0) ∧ F (0) →
︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(1) ∧F (1) ∧ F (1) ∧ F (1)
E(0) F (0) F (0) F (0) F (0)
(25):
G10:
G1:
G0:
❤❤❤❤
❤❤❤❤
❤❤❤❤
❤❤❤❤
❤❤❤❤
❤❤❤❤
❤❤❤❤
❤❤
❵❵❵
❵❵❵
❵❵
Again, with some thought, one can see that our strategy — which, of course, can be constructed effectively
— runs in polynomial time, and it indeed wins (25), as desired.
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16 Some admissible logical rules of PTA
When we say that a given rule is admissible in PTA, we mean that, whenever all premises of any given
instance of the rule are provable in PTA, so is the conclusion.
This section is devoted to observing the admissibility of a number of rules. From our admissibility proofs
it can be seen that these rules are admissible not only in PTA but also in any CL3-based applied theory
in general. This is the reason why these rules can be called “logical”. Such rules can and will be used as
shortcuts in PTA-proofs. Many of such rules can be further strengthened, but in this paper — for the sake
of simplicity and at the expense of (here) unnecessary generality — we present them only in forms that (and
as much as they) will be actually used in our further treatment.
In the formulations of some of the rules we use the expression
E∨[F ].
It means the same as the earlier-used E[F ], i.e., a formula E with a fixed positive surface occurrence of
a subformula F ; only, in E∨[F ], the additional (to being a positive surface occurrence) condition on the
occurrence of F is that this occurrence is not in the scope of any operator other than ∨ .
16.1 CL4-Instantiation
F
,
where F is any PTA-formula which is an instance of some CL4-provable formula E.
Unlike all other rules given in the present section, this one, as we see, takes no premises. It is a “rule”
that simply allows us to jump to a formula F as long as it is an instance of a CL4-provable formula.
Fact 16.1 CL4-Instantiation is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume a PTA-formula F is an instance of some CL4-provable formula. Then, by Theorem
11.4, CL3 ⊢ F . CL3 is an analytic system, in the sense that it never introduces into premises any function
or predicate letters that are not present in the conclusion. So, all formulas involved in the CL3-proof of
F will be PTA-formulas. This includes the axioms used in the proof. But such axioms are also axioms
of PTA. And PTA has all inference rules that CL3 does. Hence, the above CL3-proof of F will be a
PTA-proof of F as well.
16.2 Transitivity (TR)
E1→ F F →E2
E1→E2
Fact 16.2 Transitivity is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume
PTA ⊢ E1→ F and PTA ⊢ F →E2. (26)
CL4 proves (P1→Q) ∧ (Q→ P2)→ (P1→ P2) (it is derived from the classical tautology (p1→ q) ∧ (q→ p2)→
(p1→ p2) by Match applied three times). Hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢ (E1→ F ) ∧ (F →E2)→ (E1→E2). (27)
Now, from (26) and (27), by Modus Ponens, we get the desired PTA ⊢ E1→E2.
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16.3 ⊓-Elimination
⊓xF (x)
F (s)
,
where x is any variable, F (x) is any formula, s is any variable not bound in the premise, and F (s) is the
result of replacing all free occurrences of x by s in F (x).
Fact 16.3 ⊓-Elimination is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume PTA ⊢ ⊓xF (x). p(s)→ p(s) is classically valid and hence, by Match, CL4 ⊢
P (s)→ P (s). From here, by ⊔-Choose, CL4 ⊢ ⊓xP (x)→ P (s). Then, by CL4-Instantiation, PTA ⊢
⊓xF (x)→ F (s). Now, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ F (s).
16.4 ⊔ -Elimination
F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Fn F1→E . . . Fn→E
E
Fact 16.4 ⊔ -Elimination is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume PTA proves all premises. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the formula
pi ∧ (⊥→⊤) ∧ . . . ∧ (⊥→⊤) ∧ (pi→ q) ∧ (⊥→⊤) ∧ . . . ∧ (⊥→⊤)→ q
is a classical tautology and hence an axiom of CL4. By Wait from the above, we have
CL4 ⊢ pi ∧ (P1→Q) ∧ . . . ∧ (Pi−1→Q) ∧ (pi → q) ∧ (Pi+1→Q) ∧ . . . ∧ (Pn →Q)→ q.
Now, by Match applied twice, we get
CL4 ⊢ Pi ∧ (P1→Q) ∧ . . . ∧ (Pn→Q)→Q.
We also have
CL4 ⊢ ⊥ ∧ (⊥→⊤) ∧ . . . ∧ (⊥→⊤)→⊥
because the above formula is a classical tautology. From the last two facts, by Wait, we find
CL4 ⊢ (P1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pn) ∧ (P1→Q) ∧ . . . ∧ (Pn→Q)→Q
and hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢ (F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Fn) ∧ (F1→E) ∧ . . . ∧ (Fn →E)→E.
As all of the conjuncts of the antecedent of the above formula are PTA-provable by our original assumption,
Modus Ponens yields PTA ⊢ E.
As an aside, one could show that the present rule with ∨ instead of ⊔ , while admissible in classical
logic, is not admissible in PTA or CL3-based applied theories in general.
16.5 Weakening
E∨[G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gm ∨H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn]
E∨[G1 ∨ . . . ∨Gm ∨ F ∨H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn]
,
where m,n ≥ 0 and m+ n 6= 0.
Fact 16.5 Weakening is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume PTA proves the premise. It is not hard to see that Premise→Conclusion can be
obtained by CL4-Instantiation, so it is also provable in PTA. Hence, by Modus Ponens, PTA proves the
conclusion.
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16.6 ⊓ -Introduction
E∨[F1] . . . E
∨[Fn]
E∨[F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn]
Fact 16.6 ⊓ -Introduction is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume PTA proves each of the n premises. Let G be the ∨ -disjunction of all subformulas of
E∨[F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn], other than the indicated occurrence of F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn, that do not occur in the scope of
any operators other than ∨ and whose main operator (if nonatomic) is not ∨ . We want to first verify the
rather expected fact that PTA ⊢ Fi ∨G for each i (expected, because, modulo the associativity of ∨ , the
formulas E∨[Fi] and Fi ∨G are the same). Indeed, E
∨[Fi]→ Fi ∨G can be easily seen to be obtainable by
CL4-Instantiation. Then, Fi ∨G follows by Modus Ponens. In a similar manner one can show that whenever
PTA ⊢ (F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Fn) ∨G, we also have PTA ⊢ E∨[F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Fn]. So, in order to complete our proof of
Fact 16.6, it would suffice to show that
PTA ⊢ (F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn) ∨G. (28)
From PTA ⊢ F1 ∨G, . . . , PTA ⊢ F1 ∨G and the obvious fact that PTA ⊢ ⊤, by Wait, we get
PTA ⊢ (F1 ∨G) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Fn ∨G). (29)
Next, p ∨ q→ p ∨ q is an axiom of CL4. From it, by Match applied twice, we get CL4 ⊢ Pi ∨Q→ Pi ∨Q
(any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}). Now, by ⊔ -Choose, we get
CL4 ⊢ (P1 ∨Q) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Pn ∨Q)→ Pi ∨Q.
From here and from (the obvious) CL4 ⊢ ⊤→⊤ ∨⊥, by Wait, we get
CL4 ⊢ (P1 ∨Q) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Pn ∨Q)→ (P1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Pn) ∨Q.
The above, by CL4-Instantiation, yields
PTA ⊢ (F1 ∨G) ⊓ . . . ⊓ (Fn ∨G)→ (F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn) ∨G. (30)
Now, the desired (28) follows from (29) and (30) by Modus Ponens.
It is worth pointing out that the present rule with ∧ instead of ⊓ , while admissible in classical logic, is
not admissible in PTA or CL3-based applied theories in general.
16.7 ⊓-Introduction
E∨[F (s)]
E∨[⊓xF (x)]
,
where x is any (non-b) variable, F (x) is any formula, s is any non-b variable not occurring in the conclusion,
and F (s) is the result of replacing all free occurrences of x by s in F (x).
Fact 16.7 ⊓-Introduction is admissible in PTA.
Proof. Assume PTA ⊢ E∨[F (s)]. Let G be the ∨ -disjunction of all subformulas of E∨[⊓xF (x)], other
than the indicated occurrence of ⊓xF (x), that do not occur in the scope of any operators other than ∨
and whose main operator (if nonatomic) is not ∨ . As in the previous subsection, we can easily find that
PTA ⊢ F (s) ∨G, and that whenever PTA ⊢ ⊓xF (x) ∨G, we also have PTA ⊢ E∨[⊓xF (x)]. So, in order
to complete our proof of Fact 16.7, it would suffice to show that
PTA ⊢ ⊓xF (x) ∨G. (31)
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From PTA ⊢ F (s) ∨G and the obvious fact that PTA ⊢ ⊤, by Wait, we get
PTA ⊢ ⊓y
(
F (y) ∨G
)
, (32)
where y is a “fresh” variable — a variable not occurring in F (s) ∨G.
Next, p(t) ∨ q→ p(t) ∨ q is an axiom of CL4. From it, by Match applied twice, we find that CL4 proves
P (t) ∨Q→ P (t) ∨Q. Now, by ⊔-Choose, we get CL4 ⊢ ⊓y
(
P (y) ∨Q
)
→ P (t) ∨Q. From here and from
(the obvious) CL4 ⊢ ⊤→⊤ ∨⊥, by Wait, we get CL4 ⊢ ⊓y
(
P (y) ∨Q
)
→⊓xP (x) ∨Q. This, by CL4-
Instantiation, yields
PTA ⊢ ⊓y
(
F (y) ∨G
)
→⊓xF (x) ∨G. (33)
Now, the desired (31) follows from (32) and (33) by Modus Ponens.
We are again pointing out that the present rule with ∀ instead of ⊓, while admissible in classical logic,
is not admissible in PTA or CL3-based applied theories in general.
17 Formal versus informal arguments in PTA
We have already seen a couple of nontrivial formal PTA-proofs, and will see more later. However, continuing
forever in this style will be hardly possible. Little by little, we will need to start trusting and relying on
informal arguments in the style of the argument found at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 13.1, or the
arguments that we employed when discussing the PTI rule in Section 14. Just as in PA, formal proofs in
PTA tend to be long, and generating them in every case can be an arduous job. The practice of dealing
with informal proofs or descriptions instead of detailed formal ones is familiar not only from the metatheory
of PA or similar systems. The same practice is adopted, say, when dealing with Turing machines, where
full transition diagrams are typically replaced by high-level informal descriptions, relying on the reader’s
understanding that, if necessary, every such description can be turned into a real Turing machine.
In the nearest few sections we will continue generating formal proofs, often accompanied with underlying
informal arguments to get used to such arguments and see that they are always translatable into formal ones.
As we advance, however, our reliance on informal arguments and the degree of our “laziness” will gradually
increase, and in later sections we may stop producing formal proofs altogether.
The informal language and methods of reasoning induced by computability logic and clarithmetic or
ptarithmetic in particular, are in the painful initial process of forming and, at this point, can be characterized
as “experimental”. They cannot be concisely or fully explained, but rather they should be learned through
experience and practicing, not unlike the way one learns a foreign language. A reader who initially does
not find some of our informal PTA-arguments very clear or helpful, should not feel disappointed. Both the
readers and the author should simply keep trying their best. Greater fluency and better understanding will
come gradually and inevitably.
At this point we only want to make one general remark on the informal PTA-arguments that will be
employed. Those arguments will often proceed in terms of game-playing and problem-solving instead of
theorem-proving, or will be some kind of a mixture of these two. That is, a way to show how to prove a
formula F will often be to show how to win/solve the game/problem F . The legitimacy of this approach is
related to the fact that the logic CL3 underlying PTA is a logic of problem-solving and, as such, is complete
(Theorem 10.5). That is, whenever a problem F can be solved in a way that relies merely on the logical
structure of F — and perhaps also those of some axioms of PTA — then we have a guarantee that F can
as well be proven. Basic problem-solving steps are very directly simulated (translated through) the rules of
CL3 or some derivative rules in the style of the rules of the previous section, with those rules seen bottom-up
(in the “from conclusion to premises” direction). For instance, a step such as “choose the ith disjunct in
the subformula/subgame F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Fn” translates as a bottom-up application of ⊔ -Choose which replaces
F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Fn by Fi; a step such as “specify x as s in ⊔xF (x)” translates as a bottom-up application of
⊔-Choose; a step such as “wait till the environment specifies a value s for x in ⊓xF (x)” translates as a
bottom-up application of ⊓-Introduction; etc. Correspondingly, an informally described winning/solution
strategy for F can usually be seen as a relaxed, bottom-up description of a formal proof of F .
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18 Some admissible induction rules of PTA
The present section introduces a few new admissible rules of induction. These rules are weaker than PTI,
but are still useful in that, in many cases, they may offer greater convenience than PTI does.
18.1 WPTI
Here we reproduce rule (17) discussed in Section 14, and baptize it as “WPTI” (“W” for “Weak”):
F (0) F (s)→ F (s ′)
s≤τ → F (s)
,
where s is any non-b variable, F (s) is any formula, and τ is any b-term.
Theorem 18.1 WPTI is admissible in PTA.
Idea. WPTI is essentially nothing but PTI with ⊤ in the role of E(s).
Proof. Assume s, F (s), τ are as stipulated in the rule, and PTA proves both F (0) and F (s)→ F (s ′).
The following formula matches the CL4-provable (P →Q)→
(
⊤ ∧ P →⊤ ⊓ (Q ∧⊤)
)
and hence, by CL4-
Instantiation, is provable in PTA:
(
F (s)→ F (s ′)
)
→
(
⊤ ∧ F (s)→⊤ ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧⊤
))
. (34)
By Modus Ponens from F (s)→ F (s ′) and (34), we find that PTA proves
⊤ ∧ F (s)→⊤ ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧⊤
)
. (35)
Similarly, F (0)→⊤ ∧F (0) is obviously provable in PTA by CL4-Instantiation. Modus-ponensing this
with our assumption PTA ⊢ F (0) yields PTA ⊢ ⊤ ∧ F (0). From here and (35), by PTI with ⊤ in the role
of E(s), we find that PTA proves s≤τ →⊤ ∧ F (s). But PTA also proves ⊤ ∧ F (s)→ F (s) because this is
an instance of the CL4-provable ⊤ ∧ P → P . Hence, by Transitivity, PTA ⊢ s≤τ → F (s), as desired.
18.2 BSI
What we call BSI (Binary-Successor-based Induction) is the following rule, where s is any non-b variable
and F (s) is any formula:
F (0) F (s) → F (s0) ⊓ F (s1)
F (s)
.
Theorem 18.2 BSI is admissible in PTA.
Idea. We manage to reduce BSI to WPTI with ⊓x
(
|x|≤s→ F (x)
)
in the role of F (s) of the latter.
Proof. Assume s, F (s) are as stipulated in the rule,
PTA ⊢ F (0) (36)
and
PTA ⊢ F (s)→ F (s0) ⊓ F (s1). (37)
Let us observe right now that, by ⊓-Introduction, (37) immediately implies
PTA ⊢ ⊓x
(
F (x)→ F (x0) ⊓F (x1)
)
. (38)
The goal is to verify that PTA ⊢ F (s).
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An outline of our strategy for achieving this goal is that we take the formula ⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
— let us
denote it by G(t) — and show that both G(0) and G(t)→G(t ′) are provable. This, by (the already shown
to be admissible) WPTI, allows us to immediately conclude that t≤b→G(t) is also provable, which, in turn,
implies that so is ⊓y
(
y≤b→G(y)
)
, and hence b≤b→G(b), and hence G(b). G(b) asserts that, for any
(⊓) given x whose length does not exceed b, we can solve F (x). But the length of no x that we consider
exceeds b, so that G(b), in fact, simply says that (we can solve) F (x). Formalizing this argument in PTA
and taking s for x yields the desired conclusion PTA ⊢ F (s).
In following the above outline, we first claim that PTA ⊢ G(0), i.e.,
PTA ⊢ ⊓x
(
|x|≤0→ F (x)
)
. (39)
An informal argument here is that, since no constant is of length 0, |x|≤0 is false, and hence the problem
|x|≤0→ F (x) is automatically “solved” (i.e., won without any moves by⊤) no matter what F (x) is. Formally,
PA and hence PTA proves the true fact ¬|v|≤0. PTA also proves ¬|v|≤0→
(
|v|≤0→ F (v)
)
, as this is an
instance of the CL4-provable ¬p→ (p→Q). Then, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ |v|≤0→ F (v), whence, by
⊓-Introduction, PTA ⊢ ⊓x
(
|x|≤0→ F (x)
)
, as desired.
Our next goal is to show that PTA ⊢ G(t)→G(t ′), i.e.,
PTA ⊢ ⊓x
(
|x|≤t→ F (x)
)
→⊓x
(
|x|≤ t ′ → F (x)
)
. (40)
This can be done by showing the PTA-provability of
⊓x
(
|x|≤t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v), (41)
from which (40) follows by ⊓-Introduction.
Let us first try to justify (41) informally. Consider any t, v with |v|≤t ′, and also assume that (a single
copy of) the resource ⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
is at our disposal. The goal is to establish F (v). F (0) is immediate
by (36). In turn, by (37), F (0) easily implies F (1). Thus, we are done for the case v≤1. Suppose now v>1.
Then (unlike the case v≤1), remembering that |v|≤t ′, v must have a binary predecessor r with |r|≤ t. By
Axiom 12, we can actually find such an r and, furthermore, tell whether v=r0 or v=r1. Specifying x as
r in the antecedent of (41), we can bring it down to the resource |r|≤ t→ F (r) and — as we already know
that |r|≤ t — essentially to the resource F (r). By (38), the resource ⊓x
(
F (x)→ F (x0) ⊓ F (x1)
)
and hence
F (r)→ F (r0) ⊓F (r1) is also available. This is a resource that consumes F (r) and generates F (r0) ⊓ F (r1).
Feeding to its consumption needs15 our earlier-obtained F (r), we thus get the resource F (r0) ⊓ F (r1). As
noted earlier, we know precisely whether v=r0 or v=r1. So, by choosing the corresponding ⊓ -conjunct, we
can further turn F (r0) ⊓ F (r1) into the sought F (v).
Strictly verifying (41) is quite some task, and we break in into several subtasks/subgoals.
Our first subgoal is to show that PTA proves the following:
v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′, (42)
implying our ability to (efficiently) tell whether v is 0, 1, or greater than 1. For simplicity considerations,
in our earlier informal justification of (41), we, in a sense, cheated by taking this ability for granted — or,
rather, by not really mentioning the need for it at all. Some additional evidence of such “cheating” can be
discovered after reading the later parts of the present proof as well.
Informally, an argument for (42) goes like this. Due to Axiom 12, we can find the binary predecessor r of
v. Moreover, due to the same axiom, we can tell whether v=r0 or v=r1. Using Axiom 9, we can further tell
whether r=0 or r 6=0. So, we will know precisely which of the four combinations v=r0 ∧ r=0, v=r1 ∧ r=0,
v=r0 ∧ r 6=0, v=r1 ∧ r 6=0 is the case. From PA, we also know that in the first case we have v=0, in the
second case we have v=1, and in the third and the fourth cases we have v>1. So, one of v=0, v=1, v>1 will
be true and, moreover, we will be able to actually tell which one is true.
Below is a full formalization of this argument:
1. s=0 ⊔ s 6=0 Axiom 9
2. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) ⊓-Introduction: 1
15Do you see or feel a possible application of MP, or TR, or Match behind this informal phrase?
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3. ⊔x(v=x0 ⊔ v=x1) Axiom 12
4. r=0 ∧ v=r0 → v=0 PA
5. r=0 ∧ v=r0 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊔ -Choose: 4
6. r 6=0 ∧ v=r0 → v>0 ′ PA
7. r 6=0 ∧ v=r0 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊔ -Choose: 6
8. (r=0 ⊔ r 6=0) ∧ v=r0 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊓ -Introduction: 5,7
9. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) ∧ v=r0 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊔-Choose: 8
10. r=0 ∧ v=r1 → v=0 ′ PA
11. r=0 ∧ v=r1 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊔ -Choose: 10
12. r 6=0 ∧ v=r1 → v>0 ′ PA
13. r 6=0 ∧ v=r1 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊔ -Choose: 12
14. (r=0 ⊔ r 6=0) ∧ v=r1 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊓ -Introduction: 11,13
15. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) ∧ v=r1 → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊔-Choose: 14
16. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) ∧ (v=r0 ⊔ v=r1) → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊓ -Introduction: 9,15
17. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) ∧⊔x(v=x0 ⊔ v=x1) → v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ ⊓-Introduction: 16
18. v=0 ⊔ v=0 ′ ⊔ v>0 ′ MP: 2,3,17
The theoremhood of (42) thus has been verified.
Our next subgoal is to show that each disjunct of (42) implies (41), that is, that each of the following
formulas is provable in PTA:
v=0→⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤t ′ → F (v) (43)
v=0 ′ →⊓x
(
|x|≤t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) (44)
v>0 ′ →⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) (45)
To see the provability of (43), observe that CL4 proves the formula
P (f)→ g=f → P (g). (46)
The formula F (0)→ v=0→ F (v) is an instance of (46) and therefore is provable in PTA. By (36), F (0) is
also provable. Hence, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ v=0→ F (v). From here, by Weakening applied twice, we
find the desired PTA ⊢ (43).
The PTA-provability of (44) is established as follows:
1. ⊔x(x=0) Axiom 8
2. F (0)→ s=0→ F (s) CL4-Instantiation, matches (46)
3. s=0→ F (s) MP: (36),2
4. s=0→ F (s0) ⊓ F (s1) TR: 3, (37)
5. F (s0) ⊓F (s1)→ F (s1) CL4-Instantiation, matches P ⊓Q→Q
6. s=0→ F (s1) TR: 4,5
7.
(
s=0→ F (s1)
)
→
(
s=0→ F (01)
)
CL4-Instantiation, matches (s=f → P (g(s)))→ (s=f → P (g(f)))
8. s=0→ F (01) MP: 6,7
9. ⊔x(x=0)→ F (01) ⊓-Introduction: 8
10. F (01) MP: 1,9
11. 01=0 ′ PA
12. F (01) ∧ 01=0 ′ → F (0 ′) CL4-Instantiation, matches P (f) ∧ f =g→ P (g)
13. F (0 ′) MP: 10,11,12
14. F (0 ′)→ v=0 ′ → F (v) CL4-Instantiation, matches (46)
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15. v=0 ′ → F (v) MP: 13,14
16. v=0 ′ →⊓x
(
|x|≤t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) Weakening (twice): 15
Finally, to construct a proof of (45), observe that the following formula is valid in classical logic:
(
p1(f) ∧ p2(f)→ p3
)
→
(
p4→ p5(f)
)
∧ v=f → p2(v) →
(
p3→ p4
)
→ p1(v)→ p5(v).
Hence, by Match applied twice, CL4 proves
(
p1(f) ∧ p2(f)→ p3
)
→
(
P →Q(f)
)
∧ v=f → p2(v) →
(
p3→ P
)
→ p1(v)→ Q(v). (47)
The following two formulas are instances of (47), and are therefore provable in PTA:
(
|r0|≤ t ′ ∧ r0>0 ′ → |r|≤ t
)
→
(
F (r)→ F (r0)
)
∧ v=r0→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤t ′ → F (v). (48)
(
|r1|≤ t ′ ∧ r1>0 ′ → |r|≤ t
)
→
(
F (r)→ F (r1)
)
∧ v=r1→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤t ′ → F (v). (49)
Now, the following sequence is a PTA-proof of (45):
1. ⊔x(v=x0 ⊔ v=x1) Axiom 12
2. |r0|≤ t ′ ∧ r0>0 ′ → |r|≤ t PA
3.
(
F (r)→ F (r0)
)
∧ v=r0→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤t ′ → F (v) MP: (48),2
4.
(
F (r)→ F (r0) ⊓F (r1)
)
∧ v=r0→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) ⊔ -Choose: 3
5. |r1|≤ t ′ ∧ r1>0 ′ → |r|≤ t PA
6.
(
F (r)→ F (r1)
)
∧ v=r1→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤t ′ → F (v) MP: (49),5
7.
(
F (r)→ F (r0) ⊓F (r1)
)
∧ v=r1→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) ⊔ -Choose: 8
8.
(
F (r)→ F (r0) ⊓F (r1)
)
∧ (v=r0 ⊔ v=r1)→ v>0 ′ →
(
|r|≤ t→ F (r)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) ⊓ -Intro: 4,7
9. ⊓x
(
F (x)→ F (x0) ⊓ F (x1)
)
∧ (v=r0 ⊔ v=r1)→ v>0 ′ →⊓x
(
|x|≤t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) ⊔-Chooses: 8
10. ⊓x
(
F (x)→ F (x0) ⊓ F (x1)
)
∧⊔x(v=x0 ⊔ v=x1)→ v>0 ′ →⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤ t ′ → F (v) ⊓-Intro: 9
11. v>0 ′ →⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
→ |v|≤t ′ → F (v) MP: (38),1,10
The provability of each of the three formulas (43), (44) and (43) has now been verified. From these three
facts and the provability of (42), by ⊔ -Elimination, we find that PTA proves (41). This, in turn, as noted
earlier, implies (40). Now, from (39) and (40), by WPTI, we find that
PTA ⊢ t≤b→⊓x
(
|x|≤ t→ F (x)
)
.
The above, by⊓-Introduction, yieldsPTA ⊢ ⊓y
(
y≤b→⊓x
(
|x|≤y→ F (x)
))
, from which, by⊓-Elimination,
PTA ⊢ b≤b→⊓x
(
|x|≤b→ F (x)
)
. But PA ⊢ b≤b. So, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ ⊓x
(
|x|≤b→ F (x)
)
, from
which, by ⊓-Elimination, PTA ⊢ |s|≤b→ F (s). This, together with Axiom 13, by Modus ponens, yields the
desired conclusion PTA ⊢ F (s).
18.3 An illustration of BSI in work
In this section we prove one PTA-provability fact which, with the soundness of PTA in mind, formally
establishes the efficient decidability of the equality predicate. The proof of this fact presents a good exercise
on using BSI, and may help the reader appreciate the convenience offered by this rule, which is often a more
direct and intuitive tool for efficiency-preserving inductive reasoning than PTI is.
Lemma 18.3 PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x).
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Idea. Using BSI, prove ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s), from which the target formula follows by ⊓-Introduction.
Proof. Let us first give an informal justification for ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x). We proceed by BSI-induction
on s, where the formula F (s) of induction is ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s). By Axiom 9, for an arbitrary y, we can tell
whether y=0 or y 6=0. This takes care of the basis (left premise)
⊓y(y=0 ⊔ y 6=0) (50)
of induction. For the inductive step (right premise)
⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→⊓y(y=s0 ⊔ y 6=s0) ⊓⊓y(y=s1 ⊔ y 6=s1), (51)
assume the resource ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s) is at our disposal. We need to show that we can solve
⊓y(y=s0 ⊔ y 6=s0) ⊓⊓y(y=s1 ⊔ y 6=s1),
i.e., either one of the problems ⊓y(y=s0 ⊔ y 6=s0) and ⊓y(y=s1 ⊔ y 6=s1). Let us for now look at the first
problem. Consider an arbitrary y. Axiom 12 allows us to find the binary predecessor r of y and also tell
whether y=r0 or y=r1. If y=r1, then we already know that y 6=s0 (because s0 is even while r1 is odd). And
if y=r0, then y=s0 — i.e. r0=s0 — iff r=s. But whether r=s we can figure out using (the available single
copy of) the resource ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s). To summarize, in any case we can tell whether y=s0 or y 6=s0, meaning
that we can solve ⊓y(y=s0 ⊔ y 6=s0). The case of ⊓y(y=s1 ⊔ y 6=s1) is handled in a similar way. Then, by
BSI, (50) and (51) imply ⊓y(s=y ⊔ s 6=y), which, in turn (by ⊓-Introduction), implies ⊓x⊓y(x=y ⊔ x 6=y).
The above informal argument can be formalized as follows:
1. s=0 ⊔ s 6=0 Axiom 9
2. ⊓y(y=0 ⊔ y 6=0) ⊓-Introduction: 1
3. ⊔x(t=x0 ⊔ t=x1) Axiom 12
4. t=r0→ r=s→ t=s0 Logical axiom
5. t=r0→ r=s→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊔ -Choose: 4
6. t=r0→ r 6=s→ t 6=s0 PA
7. t=r0→ r 6=s→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊔ -Choose: 6
8. t=r0→ r=s ⊔ r 6=s→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊓ -Introduction: 5,7
9. t=r0→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊔-Choose: 8
10. t=r1→ t 6=s0 PA
11. t=r1→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t 6=s0 Wakening: 10
12. t=r1→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊔ -Choose: 11
13. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊓ -Introduction: 9,12
14. ⊔x(t=x0 ⊔ t=x1)→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 ⊓-Introduction: 13
15. ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s0 ⊔ t 6=s0 MP: 3,14
16. ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→⊓y(y=s0 ⊔ y 6=s0) ⊓-Introduction: 15
17. t=r1→ r=s→ t=s1 Logical axiom
18. t=r1→ r=s→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊔ -Choose: 17
19. t=r1→ r 6=s→ t 6=s1 PA
20. t=r1→ r 6=s→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊔ -Choose: 19
21. t=r1→ r=s ⊔ r 6=s→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊓ -Introduction: 18,20
22. t=r1→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊔-Choose: 21
23. t=r0→ t 6=s1 PA
24. t=r0→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t 6=s1 Weakening: 23
25. t=r0→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊔ -Choose: 24
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26. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊓ -Introduction: 25,22
27. ⊔x(t=x0 ⊔ t=x1)→⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 ⊓-Introduction: 26
28. ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→ t=s1 ⊔ t 6=s1 MP: 3,27
29. ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→⊓y(y=s1 ⊔ y 6=s1) ⊓-Introduction: 28
30. ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s)→⊓y(y=s0 ⊔ y 6=s0) ⊓⊓y(y=s1 ⊔ y 6=s1) ⊓ -Introduction: 16,29
31. ⊓y(y=s ⊔ y 6=s) BSI: 2,30
32. ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x) ⊓-Introduction: 31
18.4 PTI+, WPTI+ and BSI+
The conclusion of PTI limits s to “very small” values — those that do not exceed (the value of) some b-term
τ . On the other hand, the right premise of the rule does not impose the corresponding restriction s<τ on s,
and appears to be stronger than necessary. Imposing the additional condition |s ′|≤b on s in that premise
also seems reasonable, because the size of s in the conclusion cannot exceed b anyway, and hence there is no
need to prove the induction hypothesis for the cases with |s ′|>b.16 So, one might ask why we did not state
PTI in the following, seemingly stronger, form — call it “PTI+”:
E(0) ∧F (0) s<τ ∧ |s ′|≤b ∧E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
)
s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s)
(with the same additional conditions as in PTI.)
The answer is very simple: PTI+, while being esthetically (or from the point of view of simplicity) inferior
to PTI, does not really offer any greater deductive power, as implied by the forthcoming Theorem 18.6.
The following two rules — call them WPTI+ (left) and BSI+ (right) — are pseudostrengthenings of
WPTI and BSI in the same sense as PTI+ is a pseudostrengthening of PTI:
F (0) s<τ ∧ |s ′|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s ′)
s≤τ → F (s)
F (0) |s0|≤b ∧F (s)→ F (s0) ⊓ F (s1)
F (s)
where s is any variable different from b, F (s) is any formula, and τ is any b-term.
Theorem 18.4 WPTI+ is admissible in PTA.
Idea. WPTI+ is essentially a special case of WPTI with |s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s) in the role of F (s).
Proof. Assume s, F (s), τ are as stipulated in the rule,
PTA ⊢ F (0) (52)
and
PTA ⊢ s<τ ∧ |s ′|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s ′). (53)
Our goal is to verify that PTA ⊢ s≤τ → F (s).
From (52), by Weakening applied twice, we get
PTA ⊢ |0|≤b→ 0≤τ → F (0). (54)
Next, observe that
CL4 ⊢
(
q1 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3
)
∧
(
p1 ∧ q2 ∧ P →Q
)
→
(
p3→ p2→ P
)
→
(
q2→ q1→Q
)
.
16The condition s<τ would not automatically imply |s ′|≤b: in pathological cases where b is “very small”, it may happen
that the first condition holds but the second condition is still violated.
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Hence, by CL4-Instantiation, we have
PTA ⊢
(
s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b→ s<τ ∧ s≤τ ∧ |s|≤b
)
∧
(
s<τ ∧ |s ′|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s ′)
)
→(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
→
(
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ → F (s ′)
)
.
(55)
We also have PA ⊢ s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b→ s<τ ∧ s≤τ ∧ |s|≤b. This, together with (53) and (55), by Modus
Ponens, yields
PTA ⊢
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
→
(
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ → F (s ′)
)
. (56)
From (54) and (56), by WPTI, we get
PTA ⊢ s≤τ →
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
. (57)
But CL4 ⊢
(
p→ (q→ p→Q)
)
→ (q→ p→Q) and hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢
(
s≤τ →
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
))
→
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
.
Modus-ponensing the above with (57) yields PTA ⊢ |s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s). Now, remembering Axiom 13, by
Modus Ponens, we get the desired PTA ⊢ s≤τ → F (s).
Note that the above proof established something stronger than what Theorem 18.4 states. Namely, our
proof of the admissibility of WPTI+ relied on WPTI without appealing to PTI. This means that WPTI+
would remain admissible even if PTA had WPTI instead of PTI. It is exactly this fact that justifies the
qualification “pseudostrengthening of WPTI” that we gave to WPTI+. The same applies to the other two
pseudostrengthening rules PTI+ and BSI+ discussed in this subsection.
Theorem 18.5 BSI+ is admissible in PTA.
Idea. BSI+ reduces to BSI with |s|≤b→ F (s) in the role of F (s).
Proof. Assume s, F (s) are as stipulated in the rule,
PTA ⊢ F (0) (58)
and
PTA ⊢ |s0|≤b ∧F (s)→ F (s0) ⊓ F (s1). (59)
Our goal is to verify that PTA ⊢ F (s).
From (58), by Weakening, we have
PTA ⊢ |0|≤b→ F (0). (60)
Next, in a routine (analytic) syntactic exercise, one can show that
CL4 ⊢
(
p0 ∨ p1→ p0 ∧ q
)
∧
(
p0 ∧Q→ P0 ⊓ P1
)
→
(
q→Q
)
→
(
p0→ P0
)
⊓
(
p1→ P1
)
.
Hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢
(
|s0|≤b ∨ |s1|≤b→ |s0|≤b ∧ |s|≤b
)
∧
(
|s0|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s0) ⊓ F (s1)
)
→(
|s|≤b→ F (s)
)
→
(
|s0|≤b→ F (s0)
)
⊓
(
|s1|≤b→ F (s1)
)
.
(61)
But PA ⊢ |s0|≤b ∨ |s1|≤b→ |s0|≤b ∧ |s|≤b. This, together with (59) and (61), by Modus Ponens, yields
PTA ⊢
(
|s|≤b→ F (s)
)
→
(
|s0|≤b→ F (s0)
)
⊓
(
|s1|≤b→ F (s1)
)
.
The above and (60), by BSI, yield PTA ⊢ |s|≤b→ F (s). Finally, modus-ponensing the latter with Axiom
13, we get the desired PTA ⊢ F (s).
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Theorem 18.6 PTI+ is admissible in PTA.
Idea. PTI+ reduces to PTI with |s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s) and |s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s) in the roles of E(s) and
F (s), respectively.
The present theorem will never be relied upon later, so, a reader satisfied with this explanation can safely
omit the technical proof given below.
Proof. Assume s, E(s), F (s), τ are as stipulated in the rule,
PTA ⊢ E(0) ∧ F (0) (62)
and
PTA ⊢ s<τ ∧ |s ′|≤b ∧E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
)
. (63)
Our goal is to show that PTA ⊢ s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s).
CL4 proves P ∧Q→
(
p→ q→ P ) ∧ (p→ q→Q) and hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢ E(0) ∧ F (0)→
(
|0|≤b→ 0≤τ →E(0)
)
∧
(
|0|≤b→ 0≤τ → F (0)
)
.
Modus-ponensing the above with (62) yields
PTA ⊢
(
|0|≤b→ 0≤τ →E(0)
)
∧
(
|0|≤b→ 0≤τ → F (0)
)
. (64)
Next, in a routine syntactic exercise we observe that
CL4 ⊢ ¬(p ∧ q)→Q ∧P1→ (q→ p→ P2) ⊓
(
(q→ p→ P3) ∧Q
)
.
Hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢ ¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b)→
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
→(
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ →E(s ′)
)
⊓
((
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ → F (s ′)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
))
.
(65)
In another syntactic exercise we find that
CL4 ⊢ (p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧
(
p0 ∧ q2 ∧P1 ∧Q1→ P2 ⊓ (Q2 ⊓ P1)
)
→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ P1) ∧ (q1→ p1→Q1)→ (q2→ p2→ P2) ⊓
(
(q2→ p2→Q2) ⊓ (q1→ p1→ P1)
)
.
(66)
Since this “exercise” is longer than the previous one, below we provide a full proof of (66):
1.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧ (p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→⊤)→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→⊤
Tautology
2.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧ (p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→ p4)→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→ p4)
Tautology
3.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧ (p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→ P2)→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→ P2)
Match: 2
4.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧
(
p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→ P2 ⊓ (Q2 ∧ P1)
)
→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→ P2)
⊔ -Choose: 3
5.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧ (p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→ q4 ∧ p4)→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→ q4) ∧ (q1→ p1→ p4)
Tautology
6.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧ (p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→Q2 ∧ P1)→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→Q2) ∧ (q1→ p1→ P1)
Match (twice): 5
7.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧
(
p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→ P2 ⊓ (Q2 ∧ P1)
)
→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→Q2) ∧ (q1→ p1→ P1)
⊔ -Choose: 6
8.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧
(
p0 ∧ q2 ∧ p3 ∧ q3→ P2 ⊓ (Q2 ∧ P1)
)
→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ p3) ∧ (q1→ p1→ q3)→ (q2→ p2→ P2) ⊓
(
(q2→ p2→Q2) ∧ (q1→ p1→ P1)
) Wait: 1,4,7
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9.
(p2 ∧ q2→ p1 ∧ q1 ∧ p0) ∧
(
p0 ∧ q2 ∧ P1 ∧Q1→ P2 ⊓ (Q2 ∧P1)
)
→ p2 ∧ q2→
(q1→ p1→ P1) ∧ (q1→ p1→Q1)→ (q2→ p2→ P2) ⊓
(
(q2→ p2→Q2) ∧ (q1→ p1→ P1)
) Match (twice): 8
The formula below matches the formula of (66) and therefore, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b→ s≤τ ∧ |s|≤b ∧ s<τ) ∧(
s<τ ∧ |s ′|≤b ∧E(s) ∧ F (s)→E(s ′) ⊓
(
F (s ′) ∧E(s)
))
→
s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b→
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
→(
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ →E(s ′)
)
⊓
((
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ → F (s ′)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
))
.
(67)
Obviously we have PA ⊢ s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b→ s≤τ ∧ |s|≤b ∧ s<τ . This fact, together with (63) and (67), by
Modus Ponens, implies
PTA ⊢ s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b→
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
→(
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ →E(s ′)
)
⊓
((
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ → F (s ′)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
))
.
(68)
According to the forthcoming Lemmas 19.8 and 19.9, whose proofs (as any other proofs in this paper)
do not rely on PTI+, we have:
For any term θ, PTA ⊢ ¬|θ|≤b ⊔⊔z(z=θ); (69)
PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊓y⊔z(x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z). (70)
Below is a proof of the fact that
PTA ⊢ ¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) : (71)
1. ¬|s ′|≤b ⊔⊔z(z=s ′) (69) with θ = s ′
2. ¬|s ′|≤b→¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) Logical axiom
3. ¬|s ′|≤b→¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Choose: 2
4. ¬|τ |≤b ⊔⊔z(z=τ) (69) with θ = τ
5. |r|≤b Axiom 13
6. |r|≤b→¬|τ |≤b→ r=s ′ → s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b PA
7. ¬|τ |≤b→ r=s ′ → s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b MP: 5,6
8. ¬|τ |≤b→ r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Choose: 7
9. ⊔z(t=r+z ⊔ r=t+z) ⊓-Elimination (twice): (70)
10. |r|≤b ∧ t=r+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ → s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b PA
11. |r|≤b ∧ t=r+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Choose: 10
12. v=0 ⊔ v 6=0 Axiom 8
13. v=0→ |r|≤b ∧ r=t+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ → s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b PA
14. v=0→ |r|≤b ∧ r=t+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Choose: 13
15. v 6=0→ |r|≤b ∧ r=t+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) PA
16. v 6=0→ |r|≤b ∧ r=t+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Choose: 15
17. |r|≤b ∧ r=t+v→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Elimination: 12,14,16
18. |r|≤b ∧ (t=r+v ⊔ r=t+v)→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊓ -Introduction: 11,17
19. |r|≤b ∧⊔z(t=r+z ⊔ r=t+z)→ t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊓-Introduction: 18
20. t=τ → r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) MP: 5,9,19
21. ⊔z(z=τ)→ r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊓-Introduction: 20
22. r=s ′ →¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Elimination: 4,8,21
23. ⊔z(z=s ′)→¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊓-Introduction: 22
52
24. ¬(s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ (s ′≤τ ∧ |s ′|≤b) ⊔ -Elimination: 1,3,23
Now, from (71), (65) and (68), by ⊔ -Elimination, we get
PTA ⊢
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
→(
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ →E(s ′)
)
⊓
((
|s ′|≤b→ s ′≤τ → F (s ′)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
))
.
(72)
From (64) and (72), by PTI, we get
PTA ⊢ s≤τ →
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
)
. (73)
ButCL4 obviously proves
(
p→ (q→ p→ P ) ∧ (q→ p→Q)
)
→ (q→ p→ P ∧Q) and hence, byCL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢
(
s≤τ →
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s)
)
∧
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ → F (s)
))
→
(
|s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s)
)
.
Modus-ponensing the above with (73) yields PTA ⊢ |s|≤b→ s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s), further modus-ponensing
which with Axiom 13 yields the desired PTA ⊢ s≤τ →E(s) ∧ F (s).
18.5 BPI
For any formula E(s), we let E(⌊s/2⌋) stand for the formula ∀z
(
s=z0 ∨ s=z1→E(z)
)
, asserting that E
holds for the binary predecessor of s.
One last rule of induction that we are going to look at is what we call BPI (Binary-Predecessor-based
Induction):
F (0) F (⌊s/2⌋)→ F (s)
F (s)
,
where s is any non-b variable and F (s) is any formula.17
This rule could be characterized as an “alternative formulation of BSI+”, and is apparently equivalent
to the latter in the sense that replacing PTI with BSI+ in ptarithmetic yields the same class of provable
formulas as replacing PTI with BPI. One direction of this equivalence is immediately implied by our proof
of the following theorem.
Theorem 18.7 BPI is admissible in PTA.
Idea. As noted, BPI is essentially the same as BSI+.
Proof. Assume s, F (s) are as stipulated in the rule,
PTA ⊢ F (0) (74)
and
PTA ⊢ F (⌊s/2⌋)→ F (s). (75)
Our goal is to verify that PTA ⊢ F (s).
We observe that
CL4 ⊢
(
p→ t=f(s)
)
∧
(
∀z
(
t=f(z) ∨ q→ P (z)
)
→Q(t)
)
→ p ∧ P (s)→Q
(
(f(s)
)
(bottom-up, apply Match twice and you will hit a classically valid formula). By ⊔-Choose, this yields
CL4 ⊢
(
p→ t=f(s)
)
∧⊓x
(
∀z
(
x=f(z) ∨ q→ P (z)
)
→Q(x)
)
→ p ∧P (s)→Q
(
(f(s)
)
.
17Those familiar with bounded arithmetics will notice a resemblance between BPI and the version of induction axiom known
as PIND ([5, 9]). An important difference, however, is that PIND assumes s to be (actually or potentially) ∀-bound, while in
our case s, as a free variable, can be seen as ⊓ -bound but by no means as ∀-bound.
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The above, together with the obvious fact CL4 ⊢
(
p→⊥
)
∧⊤→ p ∧⊤→⊥, by Wait, yields
CL4 ⊢
(
p→⊔x
(
x=f(s)
))
∧⊓x
(
∀z
(
x=f(z) ∨ q→ P (z)
)
→Q(x)
)
→ p ∧ P (s)→Q
(
(f(s)
)
.
Hence, by CL4-Instantiation, we have
PTA ⊢
(
|s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0)
)
∧⊓x
(
∀z
(
x=z0 ∨ x=z1→ F (z)
)
→ F (x)
)
→ |s0|≤b ∧F (s)→ F (s0),
which we abbreviate as
PTA ⊢
(
|s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0)
)
∧⊓x
(
F (⌊x/2⌋)→ F (x)
)
→ |s0|≤b ∧F (s)→ F (s0). (76)
In a similar way we find that
PTA ⊢
(
|s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s1)
)
∧⊓x
(
F (⌊x/2⌋)→ F (x)
)
→ |s0|≤b ∧F (s)→ F (s1). (77)
Now, we construct a sought PTA-proof of F (s) as follows:
1. ⊓x
(
F (⌊x/2⌋)→ F (x)
)
⊓-Introduction: (75)
2. |s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0) Axiom 11
3. |s0|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s0) MP: 2,1,(76)
4. |s0|≤b→ |s1|≤b PA
5. |s1|≤b→⊔x(x=s1) Lemma 13.1
6. |s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s1) TR: 4,5
7. |s0|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s1) MP: 6,1,(77)
8. |s0|≤b ∧ F (s)→ F (s0) ⊓F (s1) ⊓ -Introduction: 3,7
9. F (s) BSI+: (74),8
19 Efficient computability through PTA-provability
In this section we establish several PTA-provability facts. In view of the soundness of PTA, each such fact
tells us about the efficient solvability of the associated number-theoretic computational problem.
19.1 The efficient computability of logarithm
The term “logarithm” in the title of this subsection refers to the size of the binary numeral for a given
number, which happens to be an integer approximation of the (real) base-2 logarithm of that number.
Lemma 19.1 PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊔y(y= |x|).
Proof. An outline of our proof is that ⊓x⊔y(y= |x|) follows by ⊓-Introduction from ⊔y(y= |s|), and
the latter will be proven by BPI. Let us first try to justify the two premises of BPI informally.
From PA, we know that the size of 0 is 0 ′, and the value of 0 ′ can be found using Lemma 13.3. This
allows us to resolve ⊔y(y= |0|), which is the basis of our BPI-induction.
The inductive step looks like
⊔y(y= |⌊s/2⌋|)→⊔y(y= |s|).
Resolving it means telling the size of s (in the consequent) while knowing (from the antecedental resource)
the size r of the binary predecessor ⌊s/2⌋ of s. As was established earlier in the proof of Theorem 18.2,
we can tell whether s equals 0, 0 ′, or neither. If s=0 or s=0 ′, then its size is the value of 0 ′ which, as
pointed out in the previous paragraph, we know how to compute. Otherwise, the size of s is r ′, which we can
compute using Axiom 10. In all cases we thus can tell the size of s, and thus we can resolve the consequent
of the above-displayed inductive step.
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Below is a formal counterpart of the above argument.
1. ⊔x(x=0 ′) Lemma 13.3
2. v=0 ′ → v= |0| PA
3. v=0 ′ →⊔y(y= |0|) ⊔-Choose: 2
4. ⊔x(x=0 ′)→⊔y(y= |0|) ⊓-Introduction: 3
5. ⊔y(y= |0|) MP: 1,4
6. s=0 ⊔ s=0 ′ ⊔ s>0 ′ (42), established in the proof of Theorem 18.2
7. v=0 ′ → s=0→ v= |s| PA
8. v=0 ′ → s=0→⊔y(y= |s|) ⊔-Choose: 7
9. ⊔x(x=0 ′)→ s=0→⊔y(y= |s|) ⊓-Introduction: 8
10. s=0→⊔y(y= |s|) MP: 1,9
11. s=0→⊔y(y= |⌊s/2⌋|)→⊔y(y= |s|) Weakening: 10
12. v=0 ′ → s=0 ′ → v= |s| PA
13. v=0 ′ → s=0 ′ →⊔y(y= |s|) ⊔-Choose: 12
14. ⊔x(x=0 ′)→ s=0 ′ →⊔y(y= |s|) ⊓-Introduction: 13
15. s=0 ′ →⊔y(y= |s|) MP: 1,14
16. s=0 ′ →⊔y(y= |⌊s/2⌋|)→⊔y(y= |s|) Weakening: 15
17. |s|≤b Axiom 13
18. |s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′) Axiom 10
19. ⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
⊓-Introduction: 18
20. |s|≤b ∧
(
|r ′|≤b→⊥
)
→ s>0 ′ → r= |⌊s/2⌋|→⊥ PA
21. |s|≤b ∧ (|r ′|≤b→w=r ′)→ s>0 ′ → r= |⌊s/2⌋|→w= |s| PA
22. |s|≤b ∧ (|r ′|≤b→w=r ′)→ s>0 ′ → r= |⌊s/2⌋|→⊔y(y= |s|) ⊔-Choose: 21
23. |s|≤b ∧
(
|r ′|≤b→⊔x(x=r ′)
)
→ s>0 ′ → r= |⌊s/2⌋|→⊔y(y= |s|) Wait: 20,22
24. |s|≤b ∧⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
→ s>0 ′ → r= |⌊s/2⌋|→⊔y(y= |s|) ⊔-Choose: 23
25. |s|≤b ∧⊓y
(
|y ′|≤b→⊔x(x=y ′)
)
→ s>0 ′ →⊔y(y= |⌊s/2⌋|)→⊔y(y= |s|) ⊓-Introduction: 24
26. s>0 ′ →⊔y(y= |⌊s/2⌋|)→⊔y(y= |s|) MP: 17,19,25
27. ⊔y(y= |⌊s/2⌋|)→⊔y(y= |s|) ⊔ -Elimination: 6,11,16,26
28. ⊔y(y= |s|) BPI: 5,27
Lemma 19.2 PTA ⊢ ⊓x(|x|=b ⊔ |x|<b).
Proof. An informal argument for ⊓x(|x|=b ⊔ |x|<b) is the following. Given an arbitrary x, we can find
a t with t= |x| using Lemma 19.1. Lemma 18.3 allows us to tell whether t=b or t 6=b. In the second case, in
view of Axiom 13, we have t<b. Thus, we can tell whether t=b or t<b, i.e., whether |x|=b or |x|<b. This
means that we can resolve |x|=b ⊔ |x|<b. Formally, we have:
1. ⊓x⊔y(y = |x|) Lemma 19.1
2. ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x) Lemma 18.3
3. t= |s| ∧ t=b→ |s|=b Logical axiom
4. t= |s| ∧ t=b→ |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊔ -Choose: 3
5. |s|≤b Axiom 13
6. |s|≤b→ t= |s| ∧ t 6=b→ |s|<b PA
7. t= |s| ∧ t 6=b→ |s|<b MP: 5,6
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8. t= |s| ∧ t 6=b→ |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊔ -Choose: 7
9. t= |s| ∧ (t=b ⊔ t 6=b)→ |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊓ -Introduction: 4,8
10. t= |s| ∧⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x)→ |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊔-Choose (twice): 9
11. ⊔y(y= |s|) ∧⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x)→ |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊓-Introduction: 10
12. ⊓x⊔y(y= |x|) ∧⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x)→ |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊔-Choose: 11
13. |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b MP: 1,2,12
14. ⊓x(|x|=b ⊔ |x|<b) ⊓-Introduction: 13
19.2 The efficient computability of unary successor
In our subsequent treatment we will be using the abbreviation
E ⊐F
for the expression ¬E ⊔ F . The operator ⊐ thus can be called choice implication.
When omitting parentheses, ⊐ will have the same precedence level as ⊔ , so that, say, E ⊐ F →G should
be understood as (E ⊐ F )→G rather than E ⊐ (F →G).
The following lemma strengthens (the ⊓-closure of) Axiom 10 by replacing → with ⊐ .
Lemma 19.3 PTA ⊢ ⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
.
Proof. An informal argument for ⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
goes like this. Given an arbitrary x, using
Lemma 19.2, we can figure out whether |x|=b or |x|<b.
If |x|<b, then (by PA) |x ′|≤b. Then, using Axiom 10, we can find a t with t=x ′. In this case,
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′) will be resolved by choosing its right component ⊔y(y=x ′) and then specifying y as t in
it.
Suppose now |x|=b. Then, by PA, |x ′|≤b if and only if x is even. And Axiom 12 allows us to tell whether
x is even or odd. If x is even, we resolve |x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′) as in the previous case. And if x is odd, then
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′), i.e. ¬|x ′|≤b ⊔⊔y(y=x ′), is resolved by choosing its left component ¬|x ′|≤b.
The following is a formalization of the above argument.
1. ⊓x(|x|=b ⊔ |x|<b) Lemma 19.2
2. |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊓-Elimination: 1
3. ⊔x(s=x0 ⊔ s=x1) Axiom 12
4. |s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′) Axiom 10
5.
(
|s ′|≤b→⊥
)
→ s=r0→ |s|=b→⊥ PA
6.
(
|s ′|≤b→ t=s ′
)
→ s=r0→ |s|=b→ t=s ′ PA
7.
(
|s ′|≤b→ t=s ′
)
→ s=r0→ |s|=b→⊔y(y=s ′) ⊔-Choose: 6
8.
(
|s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′)
)
→ s=r0→ |s|=b→⊔y(y=s ′) Wait: 5,7
9. s=r0→ |s|=b→⊔y(y=s ′) MP: 4,8
10. s=r0→ |s|=b→ |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) ⊔ -Choose: 9
11. s=r1→ |s|=b→¬|s ′|≤b PA
12. s=r1→ |s|=b→ |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) ⊔ -Choose: 11
13. s=r0 ⊔ s=r1→ |s|=b→ |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) ⊓ -Introduction: 10,12
14. ⊔x(s=x0 ⊔ s=x1)→ |s|=b→ |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) ⊓-Introduction: 13
15. |s|=b→ |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) MP: 3,14
16.
(
|s ′|≤b→⊥
)
→ |s|<b→⊥ PA
17.
(
|s ′|≤b→ t=s ′
)
→ |s|<b→ t=s ′ PA
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18.
(
|s ′|≤b→ t=s ′
)
→ |s|<b→⊔y(y=s ′) ⊔-Choose: 17
19.
(
|s ′|≤b→⊔x(x=s ′)
)
→ |s|<b→⊔y(y=s ′) Wait: 16,18
20. |s|<b→⊔y(y=s ′) MP: 4,19
21. |s|<b→ |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) ⊔ -Choose: 20
22. |s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′) ⊔ -Elimination: 2,15,21
23. ⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
⊓-Introduction: 22
19.3 The efficient computability of binary 0-successor
The following lemma strengthens Axiom 11 in the same way as Lemma 19.3 strengthens Axiom 10.
Lemma 19.4 PTA ⊢ ⊓x(|x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0)
)
.
Proof. Informally, the argument underlying our formal proof of ⊓x(|x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0)
)
is the follow-
ing. Consider an arbitrary x. Using Lemma 19.2, we can tell whether |x|=b or |x|<b. If |x|<b, then |x0|≤b
and, using Axiom 11, we can find a t with t=x0. We then resolve |x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0) by choosing its right
⊐ -component and specifying y as t in it. Suppose now |x|=b. Using Axiom 9, we can tell whether x is 0 or
not. If x is 0, then |x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0) is resolved by choosing its right ⊐ -component and specifying y as x
in it. Otherwise, if x 6=0, then the size of x0 exceeds b. So, |x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0) is resolved by choosing its
left ⊐ -component ¬|x0|≤b. Formally, we have:
1. ⊓x(|x|=b ⊔ |x|<b) Lemma 19.2
2. |s|=b ⊔ |s|<b ⊓-Elimination: 1
3. s=0 ⊔ s 6=0 Axiom 9
4. s=0→ |s|=b→ s=s0 PA
5. s=0→ |s|=b→⊔y(y=s0) ⊔-Choose: 4
6. s=0→ |s|=b→ |s0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s0) ⊔ -Choose: 5
7. s 6=0→ |s|=b→¬|s0|≤b PA
8. s 6=0→ |s|=b→ |s0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s0) ⊔ -Choose: 7
9. |s|=b→ |s0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s0) ⊔ -Elimination: 3,6,8
10. |s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0) Axiom 11
11.
(
|s0|≤b→⊥
)
→ |s|<b→⊥ PA
12.
(
|s0|≤b→ t=s0
)
→ |s|<b→ t=s0 PA
13.
(
|s0|≤b→ t=s0
)
→ |s|<b→⊔y(y=s0) ⊔-Choose: 12
14.
(
|s0|≤b→⊔x(x=s0)
)
→ |s|<b→⊔y(y=s0) Wait: 11,13
15. |s|<b→⊔y(y=s0) MP: 10,14
16. |s|<b→ |s0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s0) ⊔ -Choose: 15
17. |s0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s0) ⊔ -Elimination: 2,9,16
18. ⊓x(|x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0)
)
⊓-Introduction: 17
19.4 The efficient computability of binary 1-successor
The following lemma is the same to Lemma 13.1 as Lemma 19.4 is to Axiom 11.
Lemma 19.5 PTA ⊢ ⊓x(|x1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x1)
)
.
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Proof. The argument underlying our formal proof of ⊓x(|x1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x1)
)
is the following. Consider
an arbitrary x. Using Lemma 19.4, we can tell whether the size of x0 exceeds b, or else find a t with t=x0.
In the first case we resolve |x1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x1) by choosing its left component ¬|x1|≤b, because (we know
from PA that) |x0| = |x1|. In the second case, using Axiom 10, we find an r with r=t ′. This axiom is
applicable here because |t ′|≤b; |t ′|≤b, in turn, is true because |t|≤b (by Axiom 13) and t is even, so the
unary successor of t is of the same size as t itself. Note that (as PA can help us to figure out), in the present
case, r=x1. So, we can resolve |x1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x1) by choosing its right component and then specifying y
as r in it. Formally, we have:
1. ⊓x(¬|x0|≤b ⊔⊔y(y=x0)
)
Lemma 19.4
2. ¬|s0|≤b ⊔⊔y(y=s0) ⊓-Elimination: 1
3. ¬|s0|≤b→¬|s1|≤b PA
4. ¬|s0|≤b→ |s1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s1) ⊔ -Choose: 3
5. |t|≤b Axiom 13
6. |t ′|≤b→⊔x(x= t ′) Axiom 10
7. |t|≤b ∧
(
|t ′|≤b→⊥
)
→ t=s0→⊥ PA
8. |t|≤b ∧
(
|t ′|≤b→ r=t ′
)
→ t=s0→ r=s1 PA
9. |t|≤b ∧
(
|t ′|≤b→ r=t ′
)
→ t=s0→⊔y(y=s1) ⊔-Choose: 8
10. |t|≤b ∧
(
|t ′|≤b→⊔x(x= t ′)
)
→ t=s0→⊔y(y=s1) Wait: 7,9
11. t=s0→⊔y(y=s1) MP: 5,6,10
12. ⊔y(y=s0)→⊔y(y=s1) ⊓-Introduction: 11
13. ⊔y(y=s0)→ |s1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s1) ⊔ -Choose: 12
14. |s1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s1) ⊔ -Elimination: 2,4,13
15. ⊓x(|x1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x1)
)
⊓-Introduction: 14
19.5 The efficient computability of addition
Lemma 19.6 PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
.
Proof. The main idea behind our proof of ⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
, which proceeds by BSI
induction, is the fact — known from PA — that the sum of two numbers can be “easily” found from the
sum of the binary predecessors of those numbers. Specifically, observe that we have:
(i) s0+r0=(s+r)0, because 2s+2r=2(s+r);
(ii) s0+r1=(s+r)1, because 2s+(2r+1)=2(s+r)+1;
(iii) s1+r0=(s+r)1, because (2s+1)+2r=2(s+r)+1;
(iv) s1+r1=
(
(s+r)1
)
′, because (2s+1)+(2r+1)=
(
2(s+r)+1
)
+1.
The formula of induction is ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
(from which the target formula immediately
follows by ⊓-Introduction).
The basis ⊓y
(
|0+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=0+y)
)
of induction can be established/resolved rather easily, by choosing
the right component of the ⊐ combination and selecting the value of z to be the same as the value of y.
In resolving the inductive step
⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→⊓y
(
|s0+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+y)
)
⊓⊓y
(
|s1+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+y)
)
,
we wait for the environment to select a ⊓ -conjunct in the consequent (bottom-up ⊓ -Introduction) and then
select a value t for y in it (bottom-up ⊓-Introduction). Let us say the left conjunct is selected, meaning that
the inductive step will be brought down to (i.e. the premise we are talking about will be)
⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→
(
|s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t)
)
.
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Using Axiom 12, we can find the binary predecessor r of t, and also figure out whether t is r0 or r1. Let us
say t=r0. Then we specify y as r in the antecedent of the above formula, after which the problem we need
to resolve is, in fact, (
|s+r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+r)
)
→
(
|s0+r0|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+r0)
)
.
Here we can wait till the environment selects one of the ⊐ -components in the antecedent. If the left
component is selected, we can resolve the problem by selecting the left ⊐ -component in the consequent,
because, if |s+r| exceeds b, then “even more so” does |s0+r0|. Otherwise, if the right component is selected,
then we further wait till the environment also selects a value u for z there, after which the problem will be
brought down to
u=s+r→
(
|s0+r0|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+r0)
)
.
But from the earlier observation (i) we know that s0+r0 = (s+r)0. So, the above problem is, in fact, nothing
but
u=s+r→
(
|u0|≤b⊐⊔z(z=u0)
)
,
which — whose consequent, that is — we can resolve using Lemma 19.4.
The remaining three possibilities of the above scenario are similar, but will rely on observation (ii), (iii)
or (iv) instead of (i), and Lemma 19.5 instead of 19.4. The case corresponding to (iv), in addition, will also
use Lemma 19.3.
Below is a formal counterpart of the above argument in full detail:
1. s=0+s PA
2. ⊔z(z=0+s) ⊔-Choose: 1
3. |0+s|≤b⊐⊔z(z=0+s) ⊔ -Choose: 2
4. ⊓y
(
|0+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=0+y)
)
⊓-Introduction: 3
5. t=r0→¬|s+r|≤b→¬|s0+t|≤b PA
6. t=r1→¬|s+r|≤b→¬|s0+t|≤b PA
7. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→¬|s+r|≤b→¬|s0+t|≤b ⊓ -Introduction: 5,6
8. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→¬|s+r|≤b→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔ -Choose: 7
9. ⊓x(|x0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x0)
)
Lemma 19.4
10. |u0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=u0) ⊓-Elimination: 9
11. ¬|u0|≤b→ t=r0→ u=s+r→¬|s0+t|≤b PA (observation (i))
12. ¬|u0|≤b→ t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔ -Choose: 11
13. w=u0→ t=r0→ u=s+r→w=s0+t PA (observation (i))
14. w=u0→ t=r0→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔-Choose: 13
15. ⊔y(y=u0)→ t=r0→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓-Introduction: 14
16. ⊔y(y=u0)→ t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔ -Choose: 15
17. |u0|≤b⊐⊔y(y=u0)→ t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 12,16
18. t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) MP: 10,17
19. ⊓x(|x1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x1)
)
Lemma 19.5
20. |u1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=u1) ⊓-Elimination: 19
21. ¬|u1|≤b→ t=r1→ u=s+r→¬|s0+t|≤b PA (observation (ii))
22. ¬|u1|≤b→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔ -Choose: 21
23. w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→w=s0+t PA (observation (ii))
24. w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔-Choose: 23
25. ⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r1→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓-Introduction: 24
26. ⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔ -Choose: 25
27. |u1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 22,26
59
28. t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) MP: 20,27
29. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 18,28
30. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→⊔z(z=s+r)→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓-Introduction: 29
31. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→ |s+r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+r)→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 8,30
32. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊔-Choose: 31
33. ⊔x(t=x0 ⊔ t=x1)→⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) ⊓-Introduction: 32
34. ⊔x(t=x0 ⊔ t=x1) Axiom 12
35. ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→ |s0+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+t) MP: 34,33
36. ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→⊓y
(
|s0+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+y)
)
⊓-Introduction: 35
37. t=r0→¬|s+r|≤b→¬|s1+t|≤b PA
38. t=r1→¬|s+r|≤b→¬|s1+t|≤b PA
39. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→¬|s+r|≤b→¬|s1+t|≤b ⊓ -Introduction: 37,38
40. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→¬|s+r|≤b→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔ -Choose: 39
41. ¬|u1|≤b→ t=r0→ u=s+r→¬|s1+t|≤b PA (observation (iii))
42. ¬|u1|≤b→ t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔ -Choose: 41
43. w=u1→ t=r0→ u=s+r→w=s1+t PA (observation (iii))
44. w=u1→ t=r0→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔-Choose: 43
45. ⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r0→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓-Introduction: 44
46. ⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔ -Choose: 45
47. |u1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 42,46
48. t=r0→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) MP: 20,47
49. ¬|u1|≤b→ t=r1→ u=s+r→¬|s1+t|≤b PA (observation (iv))
50. ¬|u1|≤b→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔ -Choose: 49
51. ⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
Lemma 19.3
52. |w ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=w ′) ⊓-Elimination: 51
53. ¬|w ′|≤b→w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→¬|s1+t|≤b PA (observation (iv))
54. ¬|w ′|≤b→w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔ -Choose: 53
55. v=w ′ →w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ v=s1+t PA (observation (iv))
56. v=w ′ →w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔-Choose: 55
57. ⊔y(y=w ′)→w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓-Introduction: 56
58. ⊔y(y=w ′)→w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊔ -Choose: 57
59. |w ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=w ′)→w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 54,58
60. w=u1→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) MP: 52,59
61. ⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓-Introduction: 60
62. |u1|≤b⊐⊔y(y=u1)→ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 50,61
63. t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) MP: 20,62
64. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→ u=s+r→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 48,63
65. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→⊔z(z=s+r)→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓-Introduction: 64
66. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→ |s+r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+r)→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓ -Introduction: 40,65
67. t=r0 ⊔ t=r1→⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓-Choose: 66
68. ⊔x(t=x0 ⊔ t=x1)→⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) ⊓-Introduction: 67
69. ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→ |s1+t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+t) MP: 34,68
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70. ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→⊓y
(
|s1+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+y)
)
⊓-Introduction: 69
71. ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
→⊓y
(
|s0+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0+y)
)
⊓⊓y
(
|s1+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1+y)
)
⊓ -Introduction: 36,70
72. ⊓y
(
|s+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s+y)
)
BSI: 4,71
73. ⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
⊓-Introduction: 72
19.6 The efficient computability of multiplication
The following lemma is fully analogous to the lemma of the previous subsection, with the difference that
this one is about multiplication instead of addition. Morally, the proof of this lemma is also very similar to
the proof of its counterpart. But, as multiplication is somewhat more complex than addition, technically
a formal proof here would be considerably longer than the 73-step proof of Lemma 19.6, and producing it
would be no fun. For this reason, we limit ourselves to only an informal proof. As noted earlier, sooner or
later it would be necessary to abandon the luxury of generating formal proofs, anyway.
Lemma 19.7 PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊓y
(
|x×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x×y)
)
.
Proof. By BSI induction on s, we want to prove ⊓y
(
|s×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s×y)
)
, from which the target
formula follows by ⊓-Introduction.
The basis
⊓y
(
|0×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=0×y)
)
(78)
of induction is simple: for whatever y, since 0=0×y, the problem |0×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=0×y) is resolved by
choosing the right ⊐ -component and specifying z as the value of 0. Our ability to produce such a value is
guaranteed by Axiom 8.
The inductive step is
⊓y
(
|s×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s×y)
)
→⊓y
(
|s0×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0×y)
)
⊓⊓y
(
|s1×y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1×y)
)
. (79)
In justifying it, we rely on the following facts — call them “observations” for subsequent references —
provable in PA:
(i) s0×r0=(s×r)00, because 2s×2r=4(s×r);
(ii) s0×r1= (s×r)00+s0, because 2s×(2r+1)=4(s×r)+2s;
(iii) s1×r0=(s×r)00+r0, because (2s+1)×2r=4(s×r)+2r;
(iv) s1×r1=(s×r)00+(s+r)1, because (2s+1)×(2r+1)=4(s×r)+
(
2(s+r)+1
)
.
In resolving (79), at the beginning we wait till the environment selects one of the two ⊓ -conjuncts in
the consequent, and also a value t for y there. What we see as a “beginning” here is, in fact, the end of
the proof of (79) for, as pointed out in Section 17, such proofs correspond to winning strategies only when
they are read bottom-up. And, as we know, the steps corresponding to selecting a ⊓ -conjunct and selecting
t for y are (bottom-up) ⊓ -Introduction and ⊓-Introduction. Then, using Axiom 12, we find the binary
predecessor r of t. Furthermore, the same axiom will simultaneously allow us to tell whether t=r0 or t=r1.
We immediately specify (bottom-up ⊔-Choose) y as r in the antecedent of (79). We thus have the following
four possibilities to consider now, depending on whether the left or the right ⊓ -conjunct was selected in the
consequent of (79), and whether t=r0 or t=r1. In each case we will have a different problem to resolve.
Case 1: The problem to resolve (essentially) is
|s×r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s×r)→ |s0×r0|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0×r0). (80)
Pretending for a while — for simplicity — that no values that we are going to deal with have sizes exceeding
b, here is our strategy. Using the resource provided by the antecedent of (80), we find the product w of
s and r. Then, using the resource provided by Lemma 19.4 (which, unlike the resource provided by the
61
antecedent of (80), comes in an unlimited supply) twice, we find the value v of w00, i.e. of (s × r)00. In
view of observation (i), that very v will be (equal to) s0×r0, so (80) can be resolved by choosing the right
⊐ -component in its consequent and specifying z as v.
The above, however, was a simplified scenario. In a complete scenario without “cheating”, what may
happen is that, while using the antecedent of (80) in computing s× r, or while — after that — using Lemma
19.4 in (first) computing (s× r)0 and (then) (s× r)00, we discover that the size of the to-be-computed value
exceeds b and hence the corresponding resource (the antecedent of (80), or Lemma 19.4) does not really allow
us to compute that value. Such a corresponding resource, however, does allow us to tell that the size of the
sought value has exceeded b. And, in that case, (80) is resolved by choosing the left component ¬|s0×r0|≤b
of its consequent.
Case 2: The problem to resolve is
|s×r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s×r)→ |s0×r1|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s0×r1). (81)
Here and in the remaining cases, as was done in the first paragraph of Case 1, we will continue pretending
that no values that we deal with have sizes exceeding b. Violations of this simplifying assumption will be
handled in the way explained in the second paragraph of Case 1.
Here, we fist compute (the value of) (s × r)00 exactly as we did in Case 1. Exploiting Lemma 19.4 one
more time, we also compute s0. Using these values, we then employ Lemma 19.6 to compute (s× r)00+s0,
and use the computed value to specify z in the consequent of (81) (after first choosing the right ⊐ -component
there, of course). Observation (ii) guarantees success.
Case 3: The problem to resolve is
|s×r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s×r)→ |s1×r0|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1×r0). (82)
This case is very similar to the previous one, with the only difference that Lemma 19.4 will be used to
compute r0 rather than s0, and the success of the strategy will be guaranteed by observation (iii) rather
than (ii).
Case 4: The problem to resolve is
|s×r|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s×r)→ |s1×r1|≤b⊐⊔z(z=s1×r1). (83)
First, we compute (s× r)00 exactly as in Case 1. Using Lemma 19.6, we also compute s+r and then, using
Lemma 19.5, compute (s+r)1. With the values of (s× r)00 and (s+r)1 now known, Lemma 19.6 allows us
to compute the value of (s× r)00+(s+r)1. Finally, using the resulting value to specify z in the consequent
of (83), we achieve success. It is guaranteed by observation (iv).
19.7 The efficient computability of all explicitly polynomial functions
By “explicitly polynomial functions” in the title of this subsection we mean functions represented by terms
of the language of PTA. Such functions are “explicitly polynomial” because they, along with variables, are
only allowed to use 0, ′, + and ×.
Lemma 19.8 For any18 term τ , PTA ⊢ |τ |≤b⊐⊔z(z=τ).
Proof. We prove this lemma by (meta)induction on the complexity of τ . The following Cases 1 and 2
comprise the basis of this induction, and Cases 3-5 the inductive step.
Case 1: τ is a variable t. In this case the formula |τ |≤b⊐⊔z(z=τ), i.e. |t|≤b⊐⊔z(z=t), immediately
follows from the logical axiom t=t by ⊔-Choose and then ⊔ -Choose.
Case 2: τ is 0. Then |0|≤b⊐⊔z(z=0) follows in a single step from Axiom 8 by ⊔ -Choose.
18In view of Convention 8.1, it is implicitly assumed here that τ does not contain z, for otherwise the formula would have
both bound and free occurrences of z. Similarly, since z is quantified, it cannot be b.
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Case 3: τ is θ ′ for some term θ. By the induction hypothesis, PTA proves
|θ|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ). (84)
Our goal is to establish the PTA-provability of |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′), which is done as follows:
1. ⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
Lemma 19.3
2. ¬|θ|≤b→¬|θ ′|≤b PA
3. ¬|θ|≤b ∧⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
→¬|θ ′|≤b Weakening: 2
4. ¬|θ|≤b ∧⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊔ -Choose: 3
5. s=θ ∧ ¬|s ′|≤b→¬|θ ′|≤b Logical axiom
6. s=θ ∧ ¬|s ′|≤b→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊔ -Choose: 5
7. s=θ ∧ t=s ′ → t=θ ′ Logical axiom
8. s=θ ∧ t=s ′ →⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊔-Choose: 7
9. s=θ ∧⊔y(y=s ′)→⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊓-Introduction: 8
10. s=θ ∧⊔y(y=s ′)→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊔ -Choose: 9
11. s=θ ∧
(
|s ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=s ′)
)
→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊓ -Introduction: 6,10
12. s=θ ∧⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊔-Choose: 11
13. ⊔z(z=θ) ∧⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊓-Introduction: 12
14.
(
|θ|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ)
)
∧⊓x
(
|x ′|≤b⊐⊔y(y=x ′)
)
→ |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) ⊓ -Introduction: 4,13
15. |θ ′|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ ′) MP: (84),1,14
Case 4: τ is θ1+θ2 for some terms θ1 and θ2. By the induction hypothesis, PTA proves both of the
following formulas:
|θ1|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1); (85)
|θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ2). (86)
Our goal is to establish the PTA-provability of |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2), which is done as follows:
1. ⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
Lemma 19.6
2. ¬|θ1|≤b→¬|θ1+θ2|≤b PA
3. ¬|θ1|≤b→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊔ -Choose: 2
4.
¬|θ1|≤b ∧
(
|θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ2)
)
∧⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2)
Weakenings: 3
5. ¬|θ2|≤b→¬|θ1+θ2|≤b PA
6. ¬|θ2|≤b→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊔ -Choose: 5
7. ⊔z(z=θ1) ∧ ¬|θ2|≤b ∧⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) Weakenings: 6
8. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧ ¬|t1+t2|≤b→¬|θ1+θ2|≤b Logical axiom
9. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧ ¬|t1+t2|≤b→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊔ -Choose: 8
10. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧ t=t1+t2→ t=θ1+θ2 Logical axiom
11. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧ t=t1+t2→⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊔-Choose: 10
12. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧⊔z(z=t1+t2)→⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊓-Introduction: 11
13. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧⊔z(z=t1+t2)→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊔ -Choose: 12
14. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧
(
|t1+t2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=t1+t2)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊓ -Introduction: 9,13
15. t1=θ1 ∧ t2=θ2 ∧⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) ⊔-Chooses: 14
16.
⊔z(z=θ1) ∧⊔z(z=θ2) ∧⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2)
⊓-Introductions: 15
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17.
⊔z(z=θ1) ∧
(
|θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ2)
)
∧⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2)
⊓ -Introduction: 7,16
18.
(
|θ1|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1)
)
∧
(
|θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ2)
)
∧
⊓x⊓y
(
|x+y|≤b⊐⊔z(z=x+y)
)
→ |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2)
⊓ -Introduction: 4,17
19. |θ1+θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1+θ2) MP: (85),(86),1,18
Case 5: τ is θ1×θ2 for some terms θ1 and θ2. Here we only outline a proof/solution for the target
|θ1×θ2|≤b⊐⊔z(z=θ1×θ2). Using the induction hypothesis (85) and Axiom 9,19 we figure our whether θ1=0
or not. If θ1=0, then θ1×θ2 is also 0, and we solve the target by choosing its right component ⊔z(z=θ1×θ2)
and then naming the value of 0 (which is found using Axiom 8) for z. Suppose now θ1 6=0. Then we do for
θ2 the same as what we did for θ1, and figure out whether θ2=0 or θ2 6=0. If θ2=0, we solve the target as
we did in the case θ1=0. Suppose now θ2, just like θ1, does not equal to 0. Note that then the proof given
in Case 4 goes through for our present case virtually without any changes, only with “×” instead of “+”
and “Lemma 19.7” instead of “Lemma 19.6”. Indeed, the only steps of that proof that would be generally
incorrect for × instead of + are steps 2 and 5. Namely, the formula of step 2 is false when θ2=0, and the
formula of step 5 is false when θ1=0. But, in the case that we are considering, these possibilities have been
handled separately and by now are already ruled out.
19.8 The efficient computability of subtraction
The formula of the following lemma, as a computational problem, is about finding the difference z between
any two numbers x and y and then telling whether this difference is x−y or y−x.
Lemma 19.9 PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊓y⊔z(x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z).
Proof. As we did in the case of Lemma 19.7, showing a proof idea or sketch instead of a detailed formal
proof would be sufficient here. By BSI+ induction on s, we want to prove ⊓y⊔z(s=y+z ⊔ y=s+z), from
which the target formula follows by ⊓-Introduction.
The basis
⊓y⊔z(0=y+z ⊔ y=0+z) (87)
of induction is proven as follows:
1. t=0+t PA
2. 0=t+t ⊔ t=0+t ⊔ -Choose: 1
3. ⊔z(0=t+z ⊔ t=0+z) ⊔-Choose: 2
4. ⊓y⊔z(0=y+z ⊔ y=0+z) ⊓-Introduction: 3
The inductive step is
|s0|≤b ∧⊓y⊔z(s=y+z ⊔ y=s+z)→⊓y⊔z(s0=y+z ⊔ y=s0+z) ⊓⊓y⊔z(s1=y+z ⊔ y=s1+z). (88)
To prove (88), it would be sufficient to prove the following two formulas, from which (88) follows by ⊓ -
Introduction:
|s0|≤b ∧⊓y⊔z(s=y+z ⊔ y=s+z)→⊓y⊔z(s0=y+z ⊔ y=s0+z); (89)
|s0|≤b ∧⊓y⊔z(s=y+z ⊔ y=s+z)→⊓y⊔z(s1=y+z ⊔ y=s1+z). (90)
Let us focus on (89) only, as the case with (90) is similar. (89) follows from the following formula by
⊓-Introduction:
|s0|≤b ∧⊓y⊔z(s=y+z ⊔ y=s+z)→⊔z(s0=t+z ⊔ t=s0+z). (91)
A strategy for the above, which can eventually be translated into a bottom-up PTA-proof, is the following.
Using Axiom 12, we find the binary predecessor r of t, and also determine whether t=r0 or t=r1.
19Strictly speaking, Axiom 13 or Lemma 13.2 will also be needed here to be sure that, if the size of θ1 exceeds b, then θ1 6=0.
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Consider the case of t=r0. Solving (91) in this case essentially means solving
|s0|≤b ∧⊓y⊔z(s=y+z ⊔ y=s+z)→⊔z(s0=r0+z ⊔ r0=s0+z). (92)
We can solve the above by using the second conjunct of the antecedent (specifying y as r in it) to find a w
such that s=r+w or r=s+w, with “or” here being a choice one, meaning that we will actually know which of
the two alternatives is the case. Let us say the case is s=r+w (with the other case being similar). From PA
we know that, if s=r+w, then s0=r0+w0. So, in order to solve the consequent of (92), it would be sufficient
to specify z as the value u of w0, and then choose the left ⊔ -disjunct s0=r0+u of the resulting formula. Such
a u can be computed using Axiom 11: |w0|≤b→⊔x(x=w0), whose antecedent is true because, according to
the first conjunct of the antecedent of (92), the size of s0 — and hence of w0 — does not exceed b.
The remaining case of t=r1 is similar, but it additionally requires proving ⊓x
(
x 6=0⊐⊔y(x=y ′)
)
(the
efficient computability of unary predecessor), doing which is left as an exercise for the reader.
19.9 The efficient computability of “x’s yth bit”
For a natural numbers n and i — as always identified with the corresponding binary numerals — we will
write (n)i =0 for a formula saying that |n|>i and bit #i of n is 0. Similarly for (n)i =1. In either case the
count of the bits of n starts from 0 rather than 1, and proceeds from left to right rather than (as more
common in the literature) from right to left. So, for instance, if n = 100, then 1 is its bit #0, and the 0s are
its bits #1 and #2.
Lemma 19.10 PTA ⊢ ⊓x⊓y
(
|x|>y ⊐ (x)y =0 ⊔ (x)y =1
)
.
Proof. We limit ourselves to providing an informal argument within PTA. The target formula follows
by ⊓-Introduction from ⊓y
(
|s|>y ⊐ (s)y =0 ⊔ (s)y =1
)
, and the latter we prove by BSI.
The basis of induction is
⊓y
(
|0|>y ⊐ (0)y =0 ⊔ (0)y =1
)
. (93)
Solving it is easy. Given any y, using Axiom 9, figure out whether y=0 or y 6=0. If y=0, then resolve (93) by
choosing (0)y =0 in it. Otherwise, choose ¬|0|>y.
The inductive step is
⊓y
(
|s|>y ⊐ (s)y =0 ⊔ (s)y =1
)
→
⊓y
(
|s0|>y ⊐ (s0)y =0 ⊔ (s0)y =1
)
⊓⊓y
(
|s1|>y ⊐ (s1)y =0 ⊔ (s1)y =1
)
.
(94)
Solving it is not hard, either. It means solving the following two problems, from which (94) follows by first
applying ⊔-Choose, then ⊓-Introduction and then ⊓ -Introduction:
|s|>r ⊐ (s)r =0 ⊔ (s)r =1→ |s0|>r ⊐ (s0)r =0 ⊔ (s0)r =1; (95)
|s|>r ⊐ (s)r =0 ⊔ (s)r =1→ |s1|>r ⊐ (s1)r =0 ⊔ (s1)r =1. (96)
To solve (95), wait till the environment selects one of the three ⊔ -disjuncts in the antecedent. If (s)r =0
is selected, then select (s0)r =0 in the consequent and you are done. Similarly, if (s)r =1 is selected, then
select (s0)r =1 in the consequent. Suppose now ¬|s|>r is selected. In this case, using Lemma 19.1, find the
value of |s| and then, using Lemma 18.3, figure out whether |s|=r or |s| 6=r. If |s|=r, then select (s0)r =0 in
the consequent of (95); otherwise, if |s| 6=r, select ¬|s0|>r there.
The problem (96) is solved in a similar way, with the difference that, where in the previous case we
selected (s0)r =0, now (s1)r =1 should be selected.
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20 Two more induction rules
This section establishes the closure of PTA under two additional variations of the PTI and WPTI rules.
These variations are not optimal as they could be made stronger,20 nor are they natural enough to deserve
special names. But these two rules, exactly in their present forms, will be relied upon later in Section 21.
Thus, the present section is a purely technical one, and a less technically-minded reader may want to omit
the proofs of its results.
Lemma 20.1 The following rule is admissible in PTA:
R→E(w) ∧ F (w) |t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧F (t)→E(t) ∧
(
E(t ′) ⊓ F (t ′)
)
R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t)
,
where R is any elementary formula, w is any variable, t is any variable other than b, τ is any b-term,
E(t), F (t) are any formulas, E(w) (resp. E(t ′)) is the result of replacing in E(t) all free occurrences of t by
w (resp. t ′), and similarly for F (w), F (t ′).
Idea. Wemanage reduce this rule to PTI by takingR ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s) andR ∧ |w+s|≤b→ F (w+s)
in the roles of the formulas E(s) and F (s) of the latter.
Proof. Assume all conditions of the rule, and assume its premises are provable, i.e.,
PTA ⊢ R→E(w) ∧ F (w); (97)
PTA ⊢ |t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧ F (t)→E(t) ∧
(
E(t ′) ⊓ F (t ′)
)
. (98)
Our goal is to show that PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧F (t).
Let us agree on the following abbreviations:
E˜(s) = R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s); F˜ (s) = R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ F (w+s).
As easily seen, we have
CL4 ⊢ f =w ∧
(
p→ P (w) ∧Q(w)
)
→
(
p ∧ q→ P (f)
)
∧
(
p ∧ q→Q(f)
)
and hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢ w+0=w ∧
(
R→E(w) ∧ F (w)
)
→
(
R ∧ |w+0|≤b→E(w+0)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+0|≤b→ F (w+0)
)
.
The above, together with (97) and the obvious fact PA ⊢ w+0=w, by Modus Ponens, yields
PTA ⊢
(
R ∧ |w+0|≤b→E(w+0)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+0|≤b→ F (w+0)
)
,
i.e., using our abbreviations,
PTA ⊢ E˜(0) ∧ F˜ (0). (99)
With a little effort, the following can be seen to be a valid formula of classical logic:
(
|t ′|≤b ∧ p1(t) ∧ q1(t)→ p2(t) ∧ q2(t ′)
)
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ →(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ p1(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ q1(w+s)
)
→(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ p2(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s ′|≤b→ q2(w+s
′)
)
.
Applying Match four times to the above formula, we find that CL4 proves
(
|t ′|≤b ∧ P1(t) ∧Q1(t)→ P2(t) ∧Q2(t ′)
)
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ →(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ P1(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→Q1(w+s)
)
→(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ P2(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s ′|≤b→Q2(w+s
′)
)
.
(100)
20For instance, the rule of Lemma 20.1 can be easily strengthened by weakening the consequent of its right premise to the
more PTI-style E(t ′) ⊓ (F (t ′) ∧ E(t)), and/or strengthening the antecedent of that premise by adding the conjuncts R and
w≤ t<τ (on the additional condition that t does not occur in R).
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Now we claim that
PTA ⊢ s≤τ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s). (101)
Below comes a justification of this claim:
1. ¬|w+s ′|≤b ⊔⊔z(z=w+s ′) Lemma 19.8
2. ¬|w+s ′|≤b→ E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
((
R ∧ |w+s ′|≤b→E(w+s ′)
)
⊓
(
R ∧ |w+s ′|≤b→ F (w+s ′)
))
CL4-Instantiation, instance of ¬p→ P ∧Q1→ P ∧
(
(q ∧ p→Q2) ⊓ (q ∧ p→Q3)
)
3. ¬|w+s ′|≤b→ E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
abbreviating 2
4. |v|≤b Axiom 13
5. |v|≤b→ v=w+s ′ → |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ PA
6. v=w+s ′ → |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ MP: 4,5
7. ¬|w+s|≤b ⊔⊔z(z=w+s) Lemma 19.8
8. ¬|w+s|≤b→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
CL4-Instantiation, instance of ¬p→ q1 ∧ p ∧ q2→Q
9.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧F (t)→E(t) ∧E(t ′)
)
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ →(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ F (w+s)
)
→(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s ′|≤b→E(w+s ′)
) CL4-Instantiation, instance of (100)
10.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧ F (t)→E(t) ∧E(t ′)
)
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧ E˜(s ′)
abbreviating 9
11.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧F (t)→E(t) ∧
(
E(t ′) ⊓ F (t ′)
))
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧ E˜(s ′)
⊔ -Choose: 10
12.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧ F (t)→E(t) ∧F (t ′)
)
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ →(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ F (w+s)
)
→(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s ′|≤b→ F (w+s ′)
) CL4-Instantiation, instance of (100)
13.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧ F (t)→E(t) ∧F (t ′)
)
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s ′)
abbreviating 12
14.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧F (t)→E(t) ∧
(
E(t ′) ⊓ F (t ′)
))
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s ′)
⊔ -Choose: 10
15.
(
|t ′|≤b ∧E(t) ∧F (t)→E(t) ∧
(
E(t ′) ⊓ F (t ′)
))
→
t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ →
E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
) ⊓ -Introduction: 11,14
16. t=w+s→ |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
MP: (98),15
17.
⊔z(z=w+s)→
|w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s≤b| ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
) ⊓-Introduction: 16
18. |w+s ′|≤b ∧ |w+s|≤b ∧ (w+s) ′ =w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
⊔ -Elimination: 7,8,17
19. v=w+s ′ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
TR: 6,18
20. ⊔z(z=w+s ′)→ E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
⊓-Introduction: 19
21. E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
⊔ -Elimination: 1,3,20
22. E˜(s) ∧
(
E˜(s ′) ⊓ F˜ (s ′)
)
→ E˜(s ′) ⊓
(
F˜ (s ′) ∧ E˜(s)
)
CL4-Instantiation
23. E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s)→ E˜(s ′) ⊓
(
F˜ (s ′) ∧ E˜(s)
)
TR: 21,22
24. s≤τ → E˜(s) ∧ F˜ (s) PTI: (99), 23
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The following is a disabbreviation of (101):
PTA ⊢ s≤τ →
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ F (w+s)
)
.
It is easy to see that, by CL4-Instantiation, we also have
PTA ⊢
(
s≤τ →
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s)
)
∧
(
R ∧ |w+s|≤b→ F (w+s)
))
→
s≤τ ∧R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s) ∧ F (w+s).
Hence, by Modus Ponens,
PTA ⊢ s≤τ ∧R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s) ∧F (w+s). (102)
Now, the following sequence is an PTA-proof of the target formula R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t), which
completes our proof of the present lemma:
1. ⊓x⊓y⊔z(x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z) Lemma 19.9
2. ⊔z(w=t+z ⊔ t=w+z) ⊓-Elimination (twice): 1
3. s=0 ⊔ s 6=0 Axiom 8
4. s=0→ (w=t+s→ t=w) PA
5.
(
R→E(w) ∧F (w)
)
→ (w=t+s→ t=w)→
(
w=t+s→R→E(t) ∧ F (t)
)
CL4-Instantiation
6. (w=t+s→ t=w)→
(
w=t+s→R→E(t) ∧ F (t)
)
MP: (97),5
7. s=0→w=t+s→R→E(t) ∧ F (t) TR: 4,6
8. s=0→w=t+s→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t) Weakening: 7
9. s 6=0→w=t+s→¬w≤t≤τ PA
10. s 6=0→w=t+s→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧F (t) Weakenings: 9
11. w=t+s→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t) ⊔ -Elimination: 3,8,10
12. |t|≤b Axiom 13
13. t=w+s ∧w≤t≤τ → s≤τ PA
14.
|t|≤b ∧ (t=w+s ∧w≤t≤τ → s≤τ) ∧
(
s≤τ ∧R ∧ |w+s|≤b→E(w+s) ∧ F (w+s)
)
→ t=w+s→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t)
CL4-Instantiation
15. t=w+s→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t) MP: 12,13,(102),14
16. w=t+s ⊔ t=w+s→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t) ⊓ -Introduction: 11,15
17. ⊔z(w=t+z ⊔ t=w+z)→R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧ F (t) ⊓-Introduction: 16
18. R ∧w≤t≤τ →E(t) ∧F (t) MP: 2,17
Lemma 20.2 The following rule is admissible in PTA:
R→ F (w) R ∧w≤t<τ ∧ F (t)→ F (t ′)
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
,
where R is any elementary formula, w is any variable, t is any variable not occurring in R and different
from b, F (t) is any formula, τ is any b-term, and F (w) (resp. F (t ′)) is the result of replacing in F (t) all
free occurrences of t by w (resp. t ′).
Idea. This rule can be reduced to the rule of Lemma 20.1 by taking ⊤ and R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t) in the
roles of E(t) and F (t) of the latter, respectively.
Proof. Assume all conditions of the rule, and assume its premises are provable, i.e.,
PTA ⊢ R→ F (w); (103)
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PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t<τ ∧ F (t)→ F (t ′). (104)
Our goal is to show that PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t).
Let us agree on the following abbreviation:
F˜ (t) = R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t).
From (103), by Weakening, we have
PTA ⊢ R→ F˜ (w). (105)
We now claim that
PTA ⊢ |t ′|≤b ∧⊤ ∧ F˜ (t)→⊤ ∧
(
⊤ ⊓ F˜ (t ′)
)
. (106)
This claim is justified a follows:
1. ¬|t ′|≤b ⊔⊔z(z=t ′) Lemma 19.8
2. |w|≤b Axiom 13
3. |w|≤b→¬|t ′|≤b→ t ′ 6=w Logical axiom
4. ¬|t ′|≤b→ t ′ 6=w MP: 2,3
5. ¬|t ′|≤b→ t ′ =w ⊔ t ′ 6=w ⊔ -Choose: 4
6. ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x) Lemma 18.3
7. r=w ⊔ r 6=w ⊓-Elimination (twice): 6
8. r=w→ r=t ′ → t ′ =w Logical axiom
9. r=w→ r=t ′ → t ′ =w ⊔ t ′ 6=w ⊔ -Choose: 8
10. r 6=w→ r=t ′ → t ′ 6=w Logical axiom
11. r 6=w→ r=t ′ → t ′ =w ⊔ t ′ 6=w ⊔ -Choose: 10
12. r=t ′ → t ′ =w ⊔ t ′ 6=w ⊔ -Elimination: 7,9,11
13. ⊔z(z=t ′)→ t ′ =w ⊔ t ′ 6=w ⊓-Introduction: 12
14. t ′ =w ⊔ t ′ 6=w ⊔ -Elimination: 1,5,13
15. (R→ F (w)
)
→ t ′ =w→
(
R→ F (t ′)
)
CL4-Instantiation
16. t ′ =w→
(
R→ F (t ′)
)
MP: (103),15
17. t ′ =w→
(
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
→
(
R ∧w≤t ′≤τ → F (t ′)
)
Weakenings: 16
18. t ′ 6=w→ (w≤t ′≤τ →w≤t≤τ ∧w≤t<τ) PA
19.
(
R ∧w≤t<τ ∧ F (t)→ F (t ′)
)
→
(w≤ t ′≤τ →w≤t≤τ ∧w≤t<τ)→
(
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
→
(
R ∧w≤t ′≤τ → F (t ′)
)
CL4-Instantiation, instance of (q ∧ p3 ∧ P →Q)→ (p1→ p2 ∧ p3)→ (q ∧ p2→ P )→ (q ∧ p1→Q)
20. (w≤ t ′≤τ →w≤t≤τ ∧w≤t<τ)→
(
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
→
(
R ∧w≤t ′≤τ → F (t ′)
)
MP: (104),19
21. t ′ 6=w→
(
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
→
(
R ∧w≤t ′≤τ → F (t ′)
)
TR: 18,20
22.
(
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
→
(
R ∧w≤t ′≤τ → F (t ′)
)
⊔ -Elimination: 14,17,21
23. F˜ (t)→ F˜ (t ′) abbreviating 22
24. |t ′|≤b ∧⊤ ∧ F˜ (t)→ F˜ (t ′) Weakenings: 23
25. F˜ (t ′)→⊤ ∧
(
⊤ ⊓ F˜ (t ′)
)
CL4-Instantiation
26. |t ′|≤b ∧⊤ ∧ F˜ (t)→⊤ ∧
(
⊤ ⊓ F˜ (t ′)
)
TR: 24,25
From (105) and (106), by the rule of Lemma 20.1, we get PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤τ →⊤ ∧ F˜ (t). Of course (by
CL4-Instantiation) PTA ⊢ ⊤ ∧ F˜ (t)→ F˜ (t), so, by Transitivity, PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤τ → F˜ (t). Disabbrevi-
ating the latter, we thus have
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤τ →R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t).
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We also have
PTA ⊢ (R ∧w≤t≤τ →R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
→
(
R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t)
)
(the above formula is an instance of the obviously CL4-provable (p→ p→Q)→ (p→Q)). So, by Modus
Ponens, we find that PTA proves the desired R ∧w≤t≤τ → F (t).
21 The extensional completeness of PTA
This section is devoted to proving the completeness part of Theorem 12.3. It means showing that, for any
arithmetical problem A that has a polynomial time solution, there is a theorem of PTA which, under the
standard interpretation, equals (“expresses”) A.
So, let us pick an arbitrary polynomial-time-solvable arithmetical problem A. By definition, A is an
arithmetical problem because, for some formula X of the language of PTA, A = X†. For the rest of this
section, we fix such a formula
X,
and fix
X
as an HPM that solves A (and hence X†) in polynomial time. Specifically, we assume that X runs in time
ξ(b),
where ξ(b), which we also fix for the rest of this section and which sometimes can be written simply as ξ, is
a b-term (a term containing no variables other than b).
X may not necessarily be provable in PTA, and our goal is to construct another formula X for which,
just like for X , we have A = X
†
and which, perhaps unlike X , is provable in PTA.
Remember our convention about identifying formulas of ptarithmetic with (the games that are) their
standard interpretations. So, in the sequel, just as we have done so far, we shall typically write E,F, . . . to
mean either E,F, . . . or E†, F †, . . .. Similar conventions apply to terms as well. In fact, we have just used
this convention when saying that X runs in time ξ. What was really meant was that it runs in time ξ†.
21.1 Preliminary insights
Our proof is long and, in the process of going through it, it is easy to get lost in the forest and stop seeing it
for the trees. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to try to get some preliminary insights into the basic idea
behind this proof before venturing into its details.
Let us consider the simplest nontrivial special case where X is
Y (x) ⊔Z(x)
for some elementary formulas Y (x) and Z(x) (perhaps Z(x) is ¬Y (x), in which case X expresses an ordinary
decision problem — the problem of deciding the predicate Y (x)).
The assertion “X does not win X in time ξ” can be formalized in the language of PA through as a certain
formula L. Then we let the earlier mentioned X be the formula
(
Y (x) ∨ L
)
⊔
(
Z(x) ∨ L
)
.
Since X does win game X in time ξ, L is false. Hence Y (x) ∨L is equivalent to Y (x), and Z(x) ∨ L is
equivalent to Z(x). This means that X and X , as games, are the same, that is, X
†
= X†. It now remains
to understand why PTA ⊢ X.
A central lemma here is one establishing that the work of X is “provably traceable”. Roughly, this means
the provability of the fact that, for any time moment t≤ξ(b), we can tell (“can tell” formally indicated with
⊔ or ⊔ applied to the possible alternatives) the state in which X will be, the locations of its three scanning
heads, and the content of any of the cells of any of the three tapes. Letting X work for ξ(b) steps, one of
the following four eventual scenarios should take place, and the provable traceability of the work of X can
be shown to imply that PTA proves the ⊔ -disjunction of formulas describing those scenarios:
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Scenario 1: X makes the move 0 (and no other moves).
Scenario 2: X makes the move 1 (and no other moves).
Scenario 3: X does not make any moves.
Scenario 4: X makes an illegal move (perhaps after first making a legal move 0 or 1).
In the case of Scenario 1, the play over X hits Y (x) ∨ L. And PTA — in fact, PA — proves that, in
this case, Y (x) ∨ L is true. The truth of Y (x) ∨ L is indeed very easily established: if it was false, then Y (x)
should be false, but then the play of X over X (which, as a game, is the same as X) hits the false Y (x) and
hence is lost, but then L is true, but then Y (x) ∨ L is true. Thus, PTA ⊢ (Scenario 1)→ Y (x) ∨ L, from
which, by ⊔ -Choose, PTA ⊢ (Scenario 1)→X.
The case of Scenario 2 is symmetric.
In the case of Scenario 3, (PTA proves that) X loses, i.e. L is true, and hence, say, Y (x) ∨ L (or
Z(x) ∨ L if you like) is true. That is, PTA ⊢ (Scenario 3)→ Y (x) ∨ L, from which, by ⊔ -Choose, PTA ⊢
(Scenario 3)→X.
The case of Scenario 4 is similar.
Thus, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, PTA ⊢ (Scenario i)→X. And, as we also have
PTA ⊢ (Scenario 1) ⊔ (Scenario 2) ⊔ (Scenario 3) ⊔ (Scenario 4),
by ⊔ -Elimination, we find the desired PTA ⊢ X.
The remaining question to clarify is how the provable traceability of the work of X is achieved. This
is where PTI comes into play. In the roles of the two formulas E and F of that rule we employ certain
nonelementary formulas E and F. With t being the “current time”, E(t) is a formula which, as a resource,
allows us to tell ( ⊔ or ⊔) the current state of X , and ( ∧ ) the locations of its three heads, and ( ∧ ) the
contents of the three cells under the three heads. And F(t) allows us, for any (⊓) cell of any ( ∧ ) tape, to
tell ( ⊔ ) its current content.
In order to resolve F(t ′) — that is, to tell the content of any (⊓) given cell #c at time t+1 — all we
need to know is the state of X , the content of cell #c, the locations of the scanning heads (perhaps only one
of them), and the contents of the three cells scanned by the three heads at time t. The content of cell #c at
time t can be obtained from (a single copy of) the resource F(t), and the rest of the above information from
(a single copy of) the resource E(t). PTA is aware of this, and proves E(t) ∧ F(t)→ F(t ′).
Similarly, it turns out that, in order to resolve E(t ′), a single copy of E(t) and a single copy of F(t) are
sufficient, and PTA, being aware of this, proves E(t) ∧ F(t)→ E(t ′).
The above two provabilities, by ⊓ -Introduction, imply PTA ⊢ E(t) ∧ F(t)→E(t ′) ⊓ F(t ′). This is al-
most the inductive step of PTI. What is missing is a ∧ -conjunct E(t) in the consequent. Not to worry.
Unlike F(t), E(t) is a recyclable resource due to the fact that it does not contain ⊓ or ⊓ (albeit it
contains ⊔ ,⊔). Namely, once we learn — from the antecedental resource E(t) — about the state of
X , the locations of the three scanning heads and the cell contents at those locations at time t, we can
use/recycle that information and “return/resolve back” E(t) in the consequent. A syntactic equivalent
— or rather consequence — of what we just said is that the provability of E(t) ∧ F(t)→ E(t ′) ⊓ F(t ′) im-
plies the provability of E(t) ∧ F(t)→
(
E(t ′) ⊓ F(t ′)
)
∧ E(t), and hence also the provability of the weaker
E(t) ∧ F(t)→ E(t ′) ⊓
(
F(t ′) ∧ E(t)
)
.
Thus, PTA ⊢ E(t) ∧ F(t)→E(t ′) ⊓
(
F(t ′) ∧E(t)
)
. We also have PTA ⊢ E(0) ∧ F(0), as this for-
mula is essentially just a description of the initial configuration of the machine. Then, by PTI, PTA ⊢
t≤ξ(b)→E(t) ∧ F(t). This is exactly what we meant by the provable traceability of the work of X .
The above was about the pathologically simple case of X = Y (x) ⊔Z(x), and the general case will be
much more complex, of course. Among other things, provable traceability would have to account for the
possibility of the environment making moves now and then. And showing the provability of X would require
a certain metainduction on its complexity, which we did not need in the present case. But the idea that
we have just tried to explain would still remain valid and central, only requiring certain — nontrivial but
doable — adjustments and refinements.
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21.2 The overline notation
Throughout the rest of this section, we assume that the formula X has no free occurrences of variables other
than b. There is no loss of generality in making such an assumption, because, if X does not satisfy this
condition, it can be replaced by the both semantically and deductively equivalent ⊓-closure of it over all free
variables different from b.
We shall sometimes find it helpful to write X as
X(b).
When, after that, writing X(b) (where b is a constant), one should keep in mind that it means the result
of substituting b by b in X(b) not only where we explicitly see b, but also in choice quantifiers ⊓ and ⊔,
which, as we remember, are lazy ways to write ⊓b and ⊔b. So, for instance, if X(b) is ⊔xE(x) and c 6= b,
then X(c) is not the same as X(b) even if b does not occur in E(x), because the former is ⊔cxE(x) and the
latter is ⊔bxE(x). The same applies to any formula written in the form F (b, . . .), of course.
Let us say that a formula is safe iff no two occurrences of quantifiers in it bind the same variable. For
simplicity and also without loss of generality, we further assume that the formula X is safe (otherwise make
it safe by renaming variables).
Since X has no free variables other than b, for simplicity we can limit our considerations to valuations
that send every non-b variable to 0. We call such valuations standard and use a special notation for them.
Namely, for an integer b, we write
eb
for the valuation such that eb(b) = b and, for any other variable v, eb(v) = 0.
By a politeral of a formula we mean a positive occurrence of a literal in it. While a politeral is not
merely a literal but a literal L together with a fixed occurrence, we shall often refer to it just by the name
L of the literal, assuming that it is clear from the context which (positive) occurrence of L is meant.
We assume that the reader is sufficiently familiar with Go¨del’s technique of encoding and arithmetizing.
Using that technique, we can construct a sentence
L
of the language of PA which asserts — more precisely, implies — “X does not win X in time ξ”.
Namely, let E1(b, ~x), . . . , En(b, ~x) be all subformulas of X , where all free variables of each Ei(b, ~x) are
among b, ~x (but not necessarily vice versa). Then the above sentence L is a natural formalization of the
following statement:
“There is a (finite) run Γ generated by X on some standard bounded valuation eb such that:
1. ⊤’s time in Γ is not smaller than ξ(b), or
2. Γ is a ⊤-illegal run of X(b), or
3. Γ is a legal run of X(b) and there is a tuple ~c of constants (~c of the same length as ~x) such
that:
• 〈Γ〉X(b) = E1(b,~c), and we have ¬‖E1(b,~c)‖ (i.e., ‖E1(b,~c)‖ is false),
• or . . ., or
• 〈Γ〉X(b) = En(b,~c), and we have ¬‖En(b,~c)‖ (i.e., ‖En(b,~c)‖ is false).”
As we remember, our goal is to construct a formula X which expresses the same problem as X does and
which is provable in PTA. For any formula E — including X — we let
E
be the result of replacing in E every politeral L by L ∨ L.
Lemma 21.1 Any literal L is equivalent (in the standard model of arithmetic) to L ∨ L.
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Proof. That L implies L ∨ L is immediate, as the former is a disjunct of the latter. For the opposite
direction, suppose L ∨ L is true at a given valuation e. Its second disjunct cannot be true, because X does
win X in time ξ, contrary to what L asserts. So, the first disjunct, i.e. L, is true.
Lemma 21.2 For any formula E, including X, we have E† = E
†
.
Proof. Immediately from Lemma 21.1 by induction on the complexity of E.
In view of the above lemma, what now remains to do for the completion of our completeness proof is to
show that PTA ⊢ X . The rest of the present section is entirely devoted to this task.
21.3 This and that
Lemma 21.3 For any formula E, PTA ⊢ L→E.
Idea. E is a logical combination of “quasipoliterals” of the form L ∨ L. Under the assumption (of
the truth of) L, each such quasipoliteral becomes true and, correspondingly, E essentially becomes a logical
combination of ⊤s. Any such combination is very easy to solve/prove.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of E.
If E has the form E[H1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn], then, by the induction hypothesis, PTA ⊢ L→E[H1]. From here,
by ⊔ -Choose, we get the desired PTA ⊢ L→E[H1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn].
Quite similarly, if E has the form E[⊔xH(x)], then, by the induction hypothesis, PTA ⊢ L→E[H(v)]
(for whatever variable v you like). From here, by ⊔-Choose, we get PTA ⊢ L→E[⊔xH(x)].
Now assume E has no surface occurrences of ⊔ - and ⊔-subformulas. The formula ‖E‖ is a ( ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃)-
combination of ⊤s (originating from ⊓ - and ⊓-subformulas when elementarizing E) and formulas L ∨ L
(originating from L when transferring from E to E) where L is a politeral of E. ⊤ is true. If L is true, then
each L ∨ L is also true no matter what the values of the variables of L are (if L contains any variables at
all). Therefore, clearly, ‖E‖, as a ( ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃)-combination of (always) true formulas, is true. Formalizing
this argument in PA and hence in PTA yields PTA ⊢ L→ ‖E‖, which, taking into account that L is an
elementary formula and hence L = ‖L‖, is the same as to say that
PTA ⊢ ‖L→E‖. (107)
Suppose E has the form E[H1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Hn]. Then, by the induction hypothesis, PTA proves L→E[Hi]
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Similarly, suppose E has the form E[⊓xH(x)]. Let v be a variable different from
b and not occurring in E[⊓xH(x)]. Then, again by the induction hypothesis, PTA proves L→E[H(v)].
These observations, together with (107), by Wait, yield the desired PTA ⊢ L→E.
We shall say that a run generated by the machine X is prompt iff ⊥’s time in it is 0. In a prompt
run, the environment always reacts to a move by X instantaneously (on the same clock cycle as on which X
moved), or does not react at all. An exception is clock cycle #0, on which the environment can move even if
X did not move. Such runs are convenient to deal with, because in them ⊤’s time equals the timestamp of
the last move. And this, in turn, means that no moves by either player are made at any time greater or equal
to ξ(b), where b is the value assigned to b by the valuation spelled on the valuation tape of the machine.
By our assumption, X wins X (in time ξ), meaning that every run Γ generated by X on a bounded
valuation e is a ⊤-won run of e[X ], including the cases when Γ is prompt and e is standard. This allows us
to focus on prompt runs and standard valuations only. Specifically, we are going to show that X is provable
because X wins (in time ξ) every prompt run of X on every standard bounded valuation.
Further, for our present purposes, environment’s possible strategies can be understood as (limited to)
fixed/predetermined behaviors seen as finite sequences of moves with non-decreasing timestamps. Let us
call such sequences counterbehaviors. The meaning of a counterbehavior
〈(α1, t1), (α2, t2), . . . , (αn, tn)〉
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is that the environment makes move α1 at time t1, move α2 at time t2, . . . , move αn at time tn. If two
consecutive moves have the same timestamp, the moves are assumed to be made (appear in the run) in the
same order as they are listed in the counterbehavior.
Given a standard valuation e and a counterbehavior C = 〈(α1, t1), . . . , (αn, tn)〉, by the (C, e)-branch
we mean the e-computation branch of X where the environment acts according to C — that is, makes move
α1 at time t1, . . . , move αn at time tn. And the (C, e)-run is the run spelled by this branch.
For natural numbers b and d, we say that a counterbehavior C is (b, d)-adequate iff the following three
conditions are satisfied:
1. the (C, eb)-run is not a ⊥-illegal run of X(b);
2. the (C, eb)-run is prompt;
3. the timestamp of the last move of C (if C is nonempty) is less than d.
Thus, “C is (b, d)-adequate” means that, using this counterbehavior against X with eb on the valuation tape
of the latter, the environment has played legally (condition 1), acted fast/promptly (condition 2), and made
all (if any) moves before time d (condition 3).
Just as any finite objects, counterbehaviors can be encoded through natural numbers. The code (Go¨del
number) of an object O will be denoted by
pOq.
Under any encoding, the size of the code of a counterbehavior of interest will generally exceed the value of
b. But this is not going to be a problem as we will quantify counterbehaviors using blind rather than choice
quantifiers.
For convenience, we assume that every natural number is the code of some counterbehavior. This allows
us to terminologically identify counterbehaviors with their codes, and say phrases like “a is a (b, d)-adequate
counterbehavior” — as done below — which should be understood as “Where C is the counterbehavior
with a = pCq, C is (b, d)-adequate”. Similarly, “the (a, e)-branch” (or “the (a, e)-run”) will mean “the
(C, e)-branch (or (C, e)-run) where C is the counterbehavior with a = pCq”.
Let E = E(b, ~s) be a formula all of whose free variables are among b, ~s (but not necessarily vice versa).
We will write
W
E(z, t1, t2, b, ~s)
to denote an elementary formula whose free variables are exactly (the pairwise distinct) z, t1, t2, b, ~s, and
which is a natural arithmetization of the predicate which, for any constants a, d1, d2, b,~c, holds — that is,
WE(a, d1, d2, b,~c) is true — iff the following conditions are satisfied:
• 0<d1≤d2≤ξ(b);
• a is a (b, d1)-adequate counterbehavior;
• where Φ is the initial segment of the (a, eb)-run obtained from the latter by deleting all moves except
those whose timestamps are less than d1, Φ is a legal position of E(b,~c);
• for the above Φ, we have 〈Φ〉X(b) = E(b,~c), and PA proves this fact;
• either d1 = 1 or, in the (a, eb)-branch, X has made some move at time d1− 1 (so that the effect of that
move first took place at time d1);
• for any k with d1≤k<d2, no move is made at time k (i.e. no move has the timestamp k) in the
(a, eb)-run.
Thus, in the context of the (a, eb)-branch, W
E(a, d1, d2, b,~c) says that, exactly by time d1,
21 the play
has hit the position E(b,~c), and that this position has remained stable (there were no moves to change it)
throughout the interval [d1, d2]. It does not rule out that a move was made at time d2 but, as we remember,
the effect of such a move will take place by time d2 + 1 rather than d2.
21Only considering nonzero times in this context.
It may be worthwhile to comment on the meaning of the above for the special case where t2 is ξ(b).
Keeping in mind that X runs in time ξ(b), the formula
W
E(z, t, ξ(b), b, ~s),
for any given values a, d, b,~c for z, t, b, ~s, asserts — or rather implies — that, in the scenario of the (a, eb)-
branch, at time d, the play (position to which X has evolved) hits E(b,~c) and remains stable ever after, so
that E(b,~c) is the final, ultimate position of the play.
We say that a formula E or the corresponding game is critical iff one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
• E is a ⊔ - or ⊔-formula;
• E is ∀yG or ∃yG, and G is critical;
• E is a ∨ -disjunction, with all disjuncts critical;
• E is a ∧ -conjunction, with at least one conjunct critical.
The importance of the above concept is related to the fact that (PA knows that) a given legal run of X
is lost by X if and only if the eventual formula/position hit by that run is critical.
Lemma 21.4 Assume E = E(b, ~s) is a non-critical formula all of whose free variables are among b, ~s.
Further assume θ, ω, ~ψ are any terms (~ψ of the same length as ~s), and z is a variable not occurring in these
terms or in E. Then
PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, θ, ξ(ω), ω, ~ψ)→ ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖.
Idea. The antecedent of the above formula implies that some run of X generated by X yields the
non-critical eventual position E(ω, ~ψ). If ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖ is true, then so is ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖. Otherwise, if ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖ is
false, X has lost, so L is true. But the truth of the formula L, which is disjuncted with every politeral of
E(ω, ~ψ), easily implies the truth of ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖. This argument is formalizable in PA.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Argue in PA. Consider arbitrary values of θ, ω, ~ψ,
which we continue writing as θ, ω, ~ψ. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the ultimate position — that is,
the position reached by the time ξ(ω) — of some play of X over X is E(ω, ~ψ) (i.e., ∃zWE(z, θ, ξ(ω), ω, ~ψ) is
true) but ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖ is false. The falsity of ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖ implies the falsity of ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖. This is so because the
only difference between the two formulas is that, wherever the latter has some politeral L, the former has a
disjunction containing L as a disjunct.
But ending with an ultimate position whose elementarization is false means that X does not win X in
time ξ (remember Lemma 9.3). In other words,
L is true. (108)
Consider any non-critical formula G. By induction on the complexity of G, we are going to show that
‖G‖ is true for any values of its free variables. Indeed:
If G is a literal, then ‖G‖ is G ∨ L which, by (108), is true.
If G is H1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Hn or ⊓xH(x), then ‖G‖ is ⊤ and is thus true.
G cannot be H1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn or ⊔xH(x), because then it would be critical.
If G is ∀yH(y) or ∃yH(y), then ‖G‖ is ∀y‖H(y)‖ or ∃y‖H(y)‖. In either case ‖G‖ is true because, by
the induction hypothesis, ‖H(y)‖ is true for every value of its free variables, including variable y.
If G is H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn, then the formulas H1, . . . , Hn are non-critical. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
‖H1‖, . . . , ‖Hn‖ are true. Hence so is ‖H1‖ ∧ . . . ∧ ‖Hn‖ which, in turn, is nothing but ‖G‖.
Finally, if G is H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn, then one of the formulas Hi is non-critical. Hence, by the induction
hypothesis, ‖Hi‖ is true. Hence so is ‖H1‖ ∨ . . . ∨ ‖Hn‖ which, in turn, is nothing but ‖G‖.
Thus, for any non-critical formula G, ‖G‖ is true. This includes the case G = E(ω, ~ψ) which, however,
contradicts our earlier observation that ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖ is false.
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Lemma 21.5 Assume E = E(b, ~s) is a critical formula all of whose free variables are among b, ~s. Further
assume θ, ω, ~ψ are any terms (~ψ of the same length as ~s), and z is a variable not occurring in these terms
or in E. Then
PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, θ, ξ(ω), ω, ~ψ)→E(ω, ~ψ).
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. By induction on complexity, one can easily see that the
elementarization of any critical formula is false. Thus, ‖E(ω, ~ψ)‖ is false. Arguing further as we did in the
proof of Lemma 21.4 when deriving (108), we find that, if ∃zWE(z, θ, ξ(ω), ω, ~ψ) is true, then so is L. And
this argument can be formalized in PA, so that we have
PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, θ, ξ(ω), ω, ~ψ)→L.
The above, together with Lemma 21.3, by Transitivity, implies PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, θ, ξ(ω), ω, ~ψ)→E(ω, ~ψ).
21.4 Taking care of the case of small bounds
|ξ(b)| is logarithmic in b and hence, generally, it will be much smaller than b. However, there are exceptions.
For instance, when b = 1 and ξ(b) = b+b, the size of ξ(b) is 2, exceeding b. Such exceptions will only occur
in a finite number of cases, where b is “very small”. These pathological cases — the cases with ¬|ξ(b)|≤b
— require a separate handling, which we present in this subsection. The main result here is Lemma 21.11,
according to which PTA proves ¬|ξ(b)|≤b→X, i.e. proves the target X on the assumption that we are
dealing with a pathologically small b. The remaining, “normal” case of |ξ(b)|≤b will be taken care of later
in Subsection 21.6.
For a natural number n, by the formal numeral for n, denoted nˆ, we will mean some standard variable-
free term representing n. For clarity, let us say that the formal numeral for zero is 00, the formal numeral
for one is 01, the formal numeral for two is 010, the formal numeral for three is 011, the formal numeral for
four is 0100, etc.
The above-mentioned provability of ¬|ξ(b)|≤b→X will be established through showing (Lemma 21.10)
that, for each particular positive integer b, including all of the finitely many b’s with ¬|ξ(bˆ)|≤ bˆ, PTA proves
b= bˆ→X. But we need a little preparation first.
Lemma 21.6 Let r be any variable, b any positive integer, and N the set of all natural numbers a with
|a|≤b. Then
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ ⊔ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N}.
Idea. On the assumption b= bˆ and due to Axiom 13, PTA knows that, whatever r is, its size cannot
exceed bˆ. In other words, it knows that r has to be one of the elements of N . The main technical part of
our proof of the lemma is devoted to showing that this knowledge is, in fact, constructive, in the sense that
PTA can tell exactly which ( ⊔ ) element of N the number r is.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Obviously we have
PA ⊢ |r|≤b→ b= bˆ→ ∨ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N},
modus-ponensing which with Axiom 13 yields
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ ∨ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N}. (109)
Next, consider any a ∈ N . We claim that
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ, (110)
which is justified as follows:
1. ¬|aˆ|≤b ⊔⊔z(z= aˆ) Lemma 19.8
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2. ¬|aˆ|≤b→ b 6= bˆ PA
3. ¬|aˆ|≤b→
(
b= bˆ→⊔z(z= aˆ)
)
Weakening: 2
4. ⊔z(z= aˆ)→
(
b= bˆ→⊔z(z= aˆ)
)
CL4-Instantiation, instance of P → (q→ P )
5. b= bˆ→⊔z(z= aˆ) ⊔ -Elimination: 1,3,4
6. ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x) Lemma 18.3
7. s=r ⊔ s 6=r ⊓-Elimination (twice): 6
8. s=r→ s= aˆ→ r= aˆ Logical axiom
9. s=r→ s= aˆ→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ ⊔ -Choose: 8
10. s 6=r→ s= aˆ→ r 6= aˆ Logical axiom
11. s 6=r→ s= aˆ→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ ⊔ -Choose: 10
12. s= aˆ→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ ⊔ -Elimination: 7,9,11
13. ⊔z(z= aˆ)→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ ⊓-Introduction: 12
14. b= bˆ→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ TR: 5,13
Now, with a little thought, the formula
(b= bˆ→ ∨ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N}) ∧ ∧ {b= bˆ→ r= aˆ ⊔ r 6= aˆ | a ∈ N}→ (b= bˆ→ ⊔ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N})
can be seen to be provable in CL3 and hence in PTA. Modus-ponensing the above with (109) and (110)
yields the desired PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ ⊔ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N}.
Lemma 21.7 Let r be any variable, b any positive integer, and E(r) any formula. Assume that, for each
natural number a with |a|≤b, PTA ⊢ E(aˆ). Then PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→E(r).
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Let N be the set of all numbers a with |a|≤b. Consider
any a ∈ N . Clearly, by CL4-Instantiation, PTA ⊢ E(aˆ)→ r= aˆ→E(r). Modus-ponensing this with the
assumption PTA ⊢ E(aˆ) yields PTA ⊢ r= aˆ→E(r). This holds for all a ∈ N , so, by ⊓ -Introduction,
PTA ⊢ ⊔ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N}→E(r). But, by Lemma 21.6, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ ⊔ {r= aˆ | a ∈ N}. Hence, by
Transitivity, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→E(r).
Below and elsewhere, for a tuple ~c = c1, . . . , cn of constants, ~ˆc stands for the tuple cˆ1, . . . , cˆn.
Lemma 21.8 Assume E = E(b, ~s) is a formula all of whose free variables are among b, ~s, b is any positive
integer, and a,d1, d2,~c are any natural numbers (~c of the same length as ~s). Then W
E(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is true
iff it is provable in PA.
Proof. PA only proves true sentences. PA is also known to prove all “mechanically verifiable” (of
complexity Σ01, to be precise) true sentences such as W
E(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is if true.
Lemma 21.9 Under the conditions of Lemma 21.8, if WE(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is true, then PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc).
Idea. In the context of the (a, eb)-branch, the assumptions of the lemma imply that, at some (d1) point,
the play hits the position E(b,~c). X may or may not make further moves to modify this position.
If a move is made, it brings us to a new position expressed through a simpler formula, from which E(b,~c)
follows by ⊓ -Choose or ⊓-Choose. This allows us to apply the induction hypothesis to that formula, and
then find the provability of b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc) by the corresponding Choose rule.
Suppose now no moves are made, so that the play ends as E(b,~c). This position has to be non-critical,
or otherwise X would be the loser. Then Lemmas 21.4 and 21.8 allow us to find that the elementarization
of the target formula is provable. Appropriately manipulating the induction hypothesis, we manage to find
the provability of all additional premises from which the target formula follows by Wait.
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Proof. Our proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of E(b, ~s). Assume WE(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is
true. We separately consider the following two cases.
Case 1: WE(aˆ, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc) is not true. On the other hand, by our assumption, W
E(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is true.
The latter implies that, in the (a, eb)-branch, the play reaches (by time d1) the position E(bˆ,~ˆc) which persists
up to time d2; and the former implies that this situation changes sometime afterwards (the latest by time
ξ(b)). So, a move is made at some time m with d2≤m<ξ(b). Such a move β (the earliest one if there are
several) cannot be made by the environment, because, as implied by the assumption WE(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc), a is
a (b, d1)-adequate counterbehavior. So, β is a move by X . Since X wins X , β cannot be an illegal move of
the play. It is obvious that then one of the following conditions holds:
(i) There is a formula H = H(b, ~s) which is the result of replacing in E(b, ~s) a surface occurrence of a
subformula G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn by one of the Gi’s, such that W
H(aˆ, mˆ ′, mˆ ′, bˆ,~ˆc) is true.
(ii) There is formula H = H(b, ~s, r), where r is a variable not occurring in E(b, ~s), such that H(b, ~s, r)
is the result of replacing in E(b, ~s) a surface occurrence of a subformula ⊔yG(y) by G(r), and
WH(aˆ, mˆ ′, mˆ ′, bˆ,~ˆc, kˆ) is true for some constant k with |k|≤b. .
Thus, H(b,~c) (in case (i)) or H(b,~c, k) (in case (ii)) is the game/position to which E(b,~c) is brought down
by the above-mentioned legal labmove ⊤β.
Assume condition (i) holds. By the induction hypothesis, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H(bˆ,~ˆc). Then, by ⊔ -Choose,
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→E(bˆ, ~ˆc).
Assume now condition (ii) holds. Again, by the induction hypothesis,
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H(bˆ,~ˆc, kˆ). (111)
Obviously CL4 ⊢
(
p→Q(f)
)
→
(
r=f → p→Q(r)
)
whence, by CL4-Instantiation,
PTA ⊢
(
b= bˆ→H(bˆ,~ˆc, kˆ)
)
→
(
r= kˆ→ b= bˆ→H(bˆ,~ˆc, r)
)
.
Modus-ponensing the above with (111) yields
PTA ⊢ r= kˆ→
(
b= bˆ→H(bˆ,~ˆc, r)
)
from which, by ⊔-Choose,
PTA ⊢ r= kˆ→
(
b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc)
)
and then, by ⊓-Introduction,
PTA ⊢ ⊔z(z= kˆ)→
(
b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc)
)
. (112)
We also have
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→⊔z(z= kˆ), (113)
justified as follows:
1. ¬|kˆ|≤b ⊔⊔z(z= kˆ) Lemma 19.8
2. ¬|kˆ|≤b→ b 6= bˆ PA
3. ¬|kˆ|≤b→ b= bˆ→⊔z(z= kˆ) Weakening: 2
4. ⊔z(z= kˆ)→ b= bˆ→⊔z(z= kˆ) CL4-Instantiation, instance of P → q→ P
6. b= bˆ→⊔z(z= kˆ) ⊔ -Elimination: 1,3,4
From (113) and (112), by Transitivity, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc). But, by CL4-Instantiation, we have
PTA ⊢
(
b= bˆ→ b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc)
)
→
(
b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc)
)
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(this matches (p→ p→Q)→ (p→Q)). Hence, by Modus Ponens, we find PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc), as desired.
Case 2: WE(aˆ, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc) is true. Then, by Lemma 21.8, PTA proves W
E(aˆ, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc). PTA also
proves the following formula because it is a logical axiom:
W
E(aˆ, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc)→ ∃zW
E(z, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc).
Hence, by Modus Ponens,
PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc). (114)
WE(aˆ, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc) implies that E(b,~c) is the final position of the play over X according to the scenario of
the (a, eb)-branch. Note that, therefore, E(b, ~s) cannot be critical. This is so because, as observed earlier,
the elementarization of any critical formula is false, and having such a formula as the final position in some
play would make X lose, contrary to our assumption that X (always) wins X . Therefore, by Lemma 21.4,
PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, dˆ1, ξ(bˆ), bˆ,~ˆc)→ ‖E(bˆ,~ˆc)‖.
Modus-ponensing the above with (114) yields PTA ⊢ ‖E(bˆ,~ˆc)‖, from which, by Weakening, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→
‖E(bˆ,~ˆc)‖, which is the same as to say that
PTA ⊢ ‖b= bˆ→E(bˆ,~ˆc)‖. (115)
Claim 1. Assume E(bˆ,~ˆc) has the form H [G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gm], and i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H [Gi].
Proof. Assume the conditions of the claim. Let F = F (b, ~s) be the formula such that F (bˆ,~ˆc) = H [Gi].
Let β be the environment’s move that brings H [G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gm] to H [Gi]. Let k be the (code of the)
counterbehavior obtained by appending the timestamped move (β, d1−1) to (the counterbehavior whose
code is) a. Since WE(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is true, obviously W
F (kˆ, dˆ1, dˆ1, bˆ,~ˆc) also has to be true. Then, by the
induction hypothesis, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ F (bˆ,~ˆc), i.e. PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H [Gi].
Claim 2. Assume E(bˆ,~ˆc) has the form H [⊓yG(y)], and r is an arbitrary non-b variable not occurring
in E(b, ~x). Then PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H [G(r)].
Proof. Assume the conditions of the claim. Let F = F (b, ~s, r) be the formula such that F (bˆ,~ˆc, r) =
H [G(r)]. For each constant m whose size does not exceed b, let βm be the environment’s move that
brings H [⊓yG(y)] to H [G(m)], and let km be the (code of the) counterbehavior obtained by appending
the timestamped move (βm, d1−1) to (the counterbehavior whose code is) a. Since W
E(aˆ, dˆ1, dˆ2, bˆ,~ˆc) is
true, obviously, for each constant m with |m|≤b, WF (kˆm, dˆ1, dˆ1, bˆ,~ˆc, mˆ) is also true. Then, by the in-
duction hypothesis, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ F (bˆ,~ˆc, mˆ), i.e. PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H [G(mˆ)]. But then, by Lemma 21.7,
PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ b= bˆ→ F (bˆ,~ˆc, r), i.e. PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→ b= bˆ→H [G(r)]. By CL4-Instantiation, we also have
PTA ⊢
(
b= bˆ→ b= bˆ→H [G(r)]
)
→
(
b= bˆ→H [G(r)]
)
(this is an instance of (p→ p→Q)→ (p→Q)). So, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→H [G(r)].
From (115), Claim 1 and Claim 2, by Wait, we find the desired PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→E(bˆ, ~ˆc).
Lemma 21.10 For any positive integer b, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→X(b).
Proof. Consider any positive integer b. Let a be (the code of) the empty counterbehavior. Of course,
WX(aˆ, 1ˆ, 1ˆ, bˆ) is true. Then, by Lemma 21.9, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→X(bˆ). But the formula
(
b= bˆ→X(bˆ)
)
→
(
b= bˆ→X(b)
)
is an instance of the CL4-provable
(
b=f → P (f)
)
→
(
b=f → P (b)
)
and, by CL4-Instantiation, is provable
in PTA. Hence, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ b= bˆ→X(b).
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Lemma 21.11 PTA ⊢ ¬|ξ(b)|≤b→X(b).
Idea. PTA knows that, if ¬|ξ(b)|≤b, then b= bˆ for one of finitely many particular (“very small”)
positive integers b. Furthermore, as in Lemma 21.6, we can show that such knowledge is constructive, in the
sense that PTA can tell ( ⊔ ) exactly for which b do we have b= bˆ. Then the desired conclusion easily follows
from Lemma 21.10.
Proof. The size of ξ(b) can be greater than b for only a certain finite number of “small” non-0 values
of b. Let N be the set of all such values. Obviously
PA ⊢ b 6=0→¬|ξ(b)|≤b→ ∨ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N},
modus-ponensing which with Lemma 13.2 yields
PTA ⊢ ¬|ξ(b)|≤b→ ∨ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N}. (116)
By Lemma 21.10, for each a ∈ N we have PTA ⊢ b= aˆ→X(b). Hence, by ⊓ -Introduction,
PTA ⊢ ⊔ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N}→X(b). (117)
Next we claim that
for each a ∈ N , PA ⊢ b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ. (118)
Below is a justification of this claim for an arbitrary a ∈ N :
1. ¬|aˆ|≤b ⊔⊔z(z= aˆ) Lemma 19.8
2. ¬|aˆ|≤b→ b 6= aˆ PA
3. ¬|aˆ|≤b→ b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ ⊔ -Choose: 2
4. ⊓x⊓y(y=x ⊔ y 6=x) Lemma 18.3
5. s=b ⊔ s 6=b ⊓-Elimination (twice): 4
6. s=b→ s= aˆ→ b= aˆ Logical axiom
7. s=b→ s= aˆ→ b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ ⊔ -Choose: 6
8. s 6=b→ s= aˆ→ b 6= aˆ Logical axiom
9. s 6=b→ s= aˆ→ b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ ⊔ -Choose: 8
10. s= aˆ→ b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ ⊔ -Elimination: 5,7,9
11. ⊔z(z= aˆ)→ b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ ⊓-Introduction: 10
12. b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ ⊔ -Elimination: 1,3,11
The following formula can be easily seen to be provable in CL3 and hence in PTA:
PTA ⊢ ∧ {b= aˆ ⊔ b 6= aˆ | a ∈ N}→ ∨ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N}→ ⊔ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N}.
Modus-ponensing the above with (118) yields
PTA ⊢ ∨ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N}→ ⊔ {b= aˆ | a ∈ N}. (119)
Now, from (116), (119) and (117), by Transitivity applied twice, we get PTA ⊢ ¬|ξ(b)|≤b→X(b) as
desired.
21.5 Ptarithmetizing HPM-computations
In this subsection we prove the earlier-mentioned “provable traceability” of the work of X , in a certain tech-
nically strong form necessary for our further treatment. As we remember, roughly it means the constructive
knowledge by PTA of the configurations of X in its interaction with a given adversary (the latter thought
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of as a counterbehavior). The present elaboration is the first relatively advanced example of “ptarithme-
tization” or, more generally, “clarithmetization” — extending Go¨del’s arithmetization technique from the
classical context to the context of computability logic.
Let STATES be the set of all states of the machine X , and SYMBOLS be the set of all symbols that may
appear on any of its tapes. As we know, both sets are finite. We assume that the cells of each of the three
tapes are numbered consecutively starting from 0 (rather than 1).
Below we introduce elementary formulas that naturally arithmetize the corresponding metapredicates.
• Adequate(z, w, t) means “z is a (w, t)-adequate counterbehavior”.
• For each a ∈ STATES, Statea(z, w, t) means “In the (z, ew)-branch, at time t, X is in state a”.
• For each a ∈ SYMBOLS, VSymbola(z, w, t, u) means “In the (z, ew)-branch, at time t, cell #u of
the valuation tape contains symbol a”. Similarly for WSymbola(z, w, t, u) (for the work tape) and
RSymbola(z, w, t, u) (for the run tape).
• VHead(z, w, t, u) means “In the (z, ew)-branch, at time t, the head of the valuation tape is over cell
#u”. Similarly for WHead(z, w, t, u) (for the work tape) and RHead(z, w, t, u) (for the run tape).
• Runsize(z, w, t, u) means “In the (z, ew)-branch, at time t, the leftmost blank cell of the run tape is
cell #u”.
• E(z, t) abbreviates
Adequate(z, b, t) ∧
⊔ {Statea(z, b, t) | a ∈ STATES} ∧(
∃x
(
Runsize(z, b, t, x) ∧ |x|≤b
)
⊐⊔xRunsize(z, b, t, x)
)
∧
⊔x
(
VHead(z, b, t, x) ∧ ⊔ {VSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
)
∧
⊔x
(
WHead(z, b, t, x) ∧ ⊔ {WSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
)
∧
⊔x
(
RHead(z, b, t, x) ∧ ⊔ {RSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
)
.
• F(z, t) abbreviates
⊓x
(
⊔ {VSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
)
∧
⊓x
(
⊔ {WSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
)
∧(
⊓x
(
⊔ {WSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
)
⊓⊓x
(
⊔ {RSymbola(z, b, t, x) | a ∈ SYMBOLS}
))
.
Note that both formulas E(z, t) and F(z, t), in addition to z and t, contain b as a free variable, which we
however do not explicitly indicate as it will never be replaced by any other term.
We use ∃! as a standard abbreviation, defined by
∃!zT (z) = ∃z
(
T (z)∧ ∀y
(
T (y)→ y=z)
))
.
Let z be any variable and T — let us (also) write it in the form T (z) — any elementary formula. We say
that T is functional for z iff PTA ⊢ ∃!zT (z).
For variables z,t and an elementary formula T = T (z) functional for z, we will be using E(zT , t) as an
abbreviation defined by
E(zT , t) = ∀z
(
T (z)→E(z, t)
)
.
Similarly for F(zT , t). It is our convention that, whenever using these abbreviations, the variables z and t
are not the same, so that t does not get bound by the external ∀z. Similarly, if we write E(zT , θ) or F(zT , θ)
where θ is a term, it will be assumed that θ does not contain z.
Lemma 21.12 For any elementary formula T functional for z, PTA proves
E(zT , t)→ E(zT , t) ∧E(zT , t).
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Idea. As explained in Subsection 21.1, E — whether in the form E(z, t) or E(zT , t) — is essentially a
“recyclable” resource because it does not contain ⊓ ,⊓.
Proof. Bottom-up, a proof of the target formula goes like this. Keep applying ⊓-Introduction and
⊓ -Introduction until the antecedent (in the given branch of the proof tree) becomes
∀z
(
T →
Adequate(z, b, t) ∧
Statea(z, b, t) ∧
Runsize(z, b, t, u) ∧(
VHead(z, b, t, v) ∧VSymbolb(z, b, t, v)
)
∧(
WHead(z, b, t, w) ∧WSymbolc(z, b, t, w)
)
∧(
RHead(z, b, t, r) ∧VSymbold(z, b, t, r)
))
— or, maybe, the same but with “¬∃x
(
Runsize(z, b, t, x) ∧ |x|≤b
)
” instead of “Runsize(z, b, t, u)” — for some
variables u, v, w, r, state a and symbols b, c, d. Then apply a series of ⊔ -Chooses and ⊔-Chooses and bring
the consequent to a conjunction of two copies of the antecedent. Now we are dealing with a classically valid
and hence provable elementary formula of the form F → F ∧ F .
Lemma 21.13 For any elementary formula T functional for z, PTA proves
E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t)→ F(zT , t ′). (120)
Idea. For reasons in the spirit of an explanation given in Subsection 21.1, a single copy of the resource
E(zT , t) and a single copy of the resource F(zT , t) turn out to be sufficient so solve the problem F(zT , t ′).
Proof. The following formula is provable in CL4 by Match applied three times:
∀z
(
P1(z) ∧ P2(z)→ P3(z)
)
→
(
∀z
(
q(z)→ P1(z)
)
∧ ∀z
(
q(z)→ P2(z)
)
→ ∀z(q(z)→ P3(z)
))
. (121)
Consider the formula
∀z
(
E(z, t) ∧ F(z, t)→ F(z, t ′)
)
. (122)
The formula (122)→ (120), which — after disabbreviating zT in (120) — is
∀z
(
E(z, t) ∧ F(z, t)→ F(z, t ′)
)
→
(
∀z
(
T (z)→ E(z, t)
)
∧ ∀z
(
T (z)→ F(z, t)
)
→ ∀z
(
T (z)→ F(z, t ′)
))
,
can be seen to be an instance of (121) and hence, by CL4-Instantiation, provable in PTA. Therefore, if
PTA proves (122), then, by Modus Ponens, it also proves the target (120). Based on this observation, we
now forget about (120) and, in what follows, exclusively devote our efforts to showing that PTA ⊢ (122).
This is one of those cases where giving a full formal proof in the style practiced earlier is not feasible.
But by now we have acquired enough experience in working with PTA to see that the informal argument
provided below can be translated into a strict PTA-proof if necessary.
Argue in PTA. Consider an arbitrary (∀) counterstrategy z. The context of our discourse will be the
play of X against z on the standard valuation eb — the (z, eb)-branch, that is. Assume that a single copy of
the antecedental resource E(z, t) ∧ F(z, t) is at our disposal. We need to show how to resolve the consequental
problem F(z, t ′).
For resolving the first conjunct of F(z, t ′), we need to tell, for an arbitrary (⊓) given x, the content of cell
#x of the valuation tape at time t ′. This is very easy: the content of the valuation tape never changes. So,
the symbol in cell #x at time t ′ will be the same as at time t, and what symbol it is we can learn from the
first conjunct of (the antecedental resource) F(z, t). In more detailed terms, a solution/deduction strategy
corresponding to the above outline is to wait (bottom-up ⊓-introduction) till the environment specifies a
value (syntactically, a “fresh” variable) s for x in the first ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t ′); then, using the same s
(bottom-up ⊔-Choose), specify the value of x in the first ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t); after that, wait (bottom-up
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⊓ -introduction) till the environment selects one of the ⊔ -disjuncts in the first ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t) (or
rather of what that formula has become), and then select (bottom-up ⊔ -Choose) the same ⊔ -disjunct in
the first ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t ′). Henceforth we will no longer provide such details, and will limit ourselves
to just describing strategies, translatable (as we just saw) into bottom-up PTA-deductions.
For resolving the second conjunct of F(z, t ′), we need to tell, for an arbitrary (⊓) given x, the content of
cell #x of the work tape at time t ′. This is not hard, either. At first, using the fifth conjunct of E(z, t), we
determine the location m of the work-tape head and the tape symbol cW at that location at time t. If m 6= x
(Lemma 18.3 can be used to tell whether this is the case or not), then the symbol in cell #x at time t ′ will
remain the same cW . Suppose now m = x. Then we further use the second, fourth and sixth conjuncts of
E(z, t) to learn about the state a of the machine at time t and the symbols cV and cR scanned at that time
by the heads of the valuation and the run tapes. Now, knowing cV , cW , cR and a, based on the transition
function of X , we can tell what symbol will be written in cell #x of the work tape by time t ′.
The left ⊓ -conjunct of the third ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t ′) is identical to the second ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t ′),
and it can be resolved as we just saw above. However, to avoid an (unacceptable/unavailable) repeated
usage of resources, we will employ the first ⊓ -conjunct of the third ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t) instead of the
second ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t) as was done in the previous case. Of course, we will also need to use some
parts of the resource E(z, t) which were already used by the procedure of the previous case. This, however,
does not create any resource conflicts. Because any information extracted from E(z, t) earlier is still there,
so the relevant parts of E(z, t) do not really need to be “queried” again, as we already know answers. That
(re)using E(z, t) does not create any competition for resources should be remembered through the remaining
part of this proof and the proof of the following lemma as well. This phenomenon of the “recycleability” of
E(z, t) was, in fact, already established in Lemma 21.12.
Finally, for resolving the right ⊓ -conjunct of the third ∧ - conjunct of F(z, t ′), we need to tell, for an
arbitrary (⊓) given x, the content of cell #x of the run tape at time t ′. This is how it can be done. Let us
call j the location of the leftmost blank cell of the run tape at time t. At first, we wait till the environment
selects one of the ⊔ -disjuncts of the third ∧ -conjunct of E(z, t). If the left disjunct is selected, then b< |j|
(or else the selected disjunct is false and we win). Then we also have (|x|< |j| and hence) x<j, because the
size of (the ⊔ -bound) x cannot exceed b. If the right disjunct is selected instead, the environment will have
to further provide the actual value of j. Then, using Lemma 19.9, we can figure out whether x<j or not.
Thus, in either case, we will know whether x<j or x≥j and, if x≥j, we will also know the value of j. First,
suppose x<j. Then the content of cell #x at time t ′ is obviously the same as at time t, and information
about this content can be obtained from the right ⊓ -conjunct of the third ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t).22 Similarly
if the state of X was not a move state at time t (and information about whether this was the case is available
from the second conjunct of E(z, t)). Now assume (we know the value of j and) x≥j, and also assume the
state of X at time t was a move state. If x=j (use Lemma 18.3 to tell if this is so or not), then the content
of cell #x at time t ′ will be the symbol ⊤. Otherwise, if x 6=j, meaning that x>j, then the content of cell
#x at time t ′ will be the content c of cell #(x−j−1) of the work tape at time t (Lemma 19.9 can again
be used to compute the value of x−j−1). Such a c can be found using the left ⊓ -conjunct of the third
∧ -conjunct of F(z, t). Well, what we just said is true unless x−j−1 is greater than or equal to the location
of the work-tape head at time t (known from E(z, t)), in which case the content of cell #x of the run tape
at time t ′ will be blank.
Lemma 21.14 For any elementary formula T functional for z, PTA proves
|t ′|≤b ∧ E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t)→ E(zT , t ′). (123)
Idea. As in the previous lemma, a single copy of the resource E(zT , t) and a single copy of the resource
F(zT , t) turn out to be sufficient so solve the problem E(zT , t ′). A minor additional technical condition for
this in the present case is that the size of t ′ should not exceed b.
Proof. For reasons similar to those given at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 21.13, it would be
22The third ∧-conjunct of F(z, t) was already used in the previous paragraph. But there is no resource conflict here, as we
have a choice (rather than parallel) conjunction between the problems whose solutions are described in the present and the
previous paragraphs, so that only one of them will actually have to be solved.
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sufficient to show the PTA-provability of the following formula instead of (123):
∀z
(
|t ′|≤b ∧ E(z, t) ∧ F(z, t)→ E(z, t ′)
)
. (124)
Argue in PTA. Consider an arbitrary (∀) counterstrategy z. As in the proof of the previous lemma, the
context of our discourse will be the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. Assume |t ′|≤b. And
assume that a single copy of the resource E(z, t) ∧ F(z, t) is at our disposal. We need to show how to resolve
E(z, t ′).
The first conjunct of E(z, t) is Adequate(z, b, t). It implies that the environment does not move at t or
any greater time, so that z will remain adequate for any value greater than t as well. Thus, Adequate(z, b, t ′)
is true, which takes care of the first conjunct of E(z, t ′).
The resource E(z, t) contains full information about the state of the machine at time t, the locations of
the three scanning heads, and the symbols at those three locations. This allows us to determine the next
state, and the next locations of the heads (“next” means “at time t ′”). Note that we will have no problem
naming those locations, as they cannot exceed t′ (moving a head farther than cell #t ′ would require more
than t ′ steps) and hence, in view of the assumption |t ′|≤b, their sizes cannot exceed b. What we just said
fully takes care of the second conjunct of E(z, t ′), and partially takes care of the fourth, fifth and sixth
conjuncts. To turn this “partial care” into a full one, we need to show how to tell the symbols looked at by
the three heads at time t ′.
The content of the cell scanned by the valuation-tape head at time t ′ will be the same as the content of
that cell at time t, and this information can be obtained from the first conjunct of F(z, t).
Since scanning heads (almost) always move left or right, the content of the cell scanned by the work-tape
head at time t ′ will generally also be the same as the content of that cell at time t, which can be obtained
from the second conjunct of F(z, t). An exception is when the head is at the beginning of the tape at time
t, writes a new symbol and tries to move left which, however, results in staying put. In such a case, we can
obtain the symbol just written (i.e., the content of the cell scanned by the head at time t ′) directly from our
knowledge of the transition function and our knowledge — already obtained earlier from E(z, t) — of the
state of X and the contents of the three cells scanned at time t.
Let the cell scanned by the head of the run tape at time t ′ be cell #i (the value of i has already been
established earlier). Let the leftmost blank cell of that tape at time t be cell #j. Since the run-tape head
can never move past the leftmost blank cell, we have either i=j or (i 6=j and hence) i<j. The third conjunct
of E(z, t) in combination with Lemma 18.3 can be used to tell which of these two alternatives is the case. If
i<j, then the content of the run-tape cell #i at time t ′ will be the same as at time t, and this information
can be obtained from the right ⊓ -conjunct of the third ∧ -conjunct of F(z, t). Similarly if the state of X was
not a move state at time t (and information about whether this was the case is available from the second
conjunct of E(z, t)). Assume now i=j, and the state of X at time t was a move state. Then the content of
cell #i at time t ′ will be the symbol ⊤ (the label of the move made at time t).
The above three paragraphs complete taking care of the fourth, fifth and sixth conjuncts of E(z, t ′).
Finally, to solve the remaining third conjunct of E(z, t ′), wait till the environment selects one of the two
⊔ -disjuncts of the third conjunct of E(z, t). If the left disjunct is selected there, do the same in the third
conjunct of E(z, t ′). Suppose now the right conjunct is selected. Wait till the environment further specifies
a value j for x there. If X is not in a move state at time t, do the exact same selections in the third conjunct
of E(z, t ′). Suppose now X is in a move state at time t. Then the location of the leftmost blank cell at time
t ′ will be j+ i+1, where i is the location of the work-tape head at time t. Using the results of Section 19, try
to compute m with m=j+ i+1. If |m| turns out to exceed b, select the left ⊔ -disjunct of the third conjunct
of E(z, t ′). Otherwise select the right disjunct, and specify x as m there.
Lemma 21.15 For any elementary formula T functional for z, PTA proves
|t ′|≤b ∧ E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t)→ E(zT , t) ∧
(
E(zT , t ′) ⊓ F(zT , t ′)
)
.
Idea. This is a logical consequence of the previous three lemmas (i.e. a consequence exclusively due to
logical axioms and rules, without appealing to induction or any nonlogical axioms ofPTA). Correspondingly,
the proof given below is a purely syntactic exercise.
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Proof. The following sequence is a CL4-proof:
1. (p1→ p2 ∧⊤) ∧ (⊥ ∧⊥→⊤) ∧ (q ∧⊥ ∧⊥→⊤)→ q ∧ p1 ∧⊤→ p2 ∧⊤ Tautology
2. (p1→ p2 ∧ p3) ∧ (⊥ ∧⊥→⊤) ∧ (q ∧ p3 ∧ p4→ p5)→ q ∧ p1 ∧ p4→ p2 ∧ p5 Tautology
3. (p1→ p2 ∧ p3) ∧ (Q1 ∧Q2→Q4) ∧ (q ∧ p3 ∧ p4→ p5)→ q ∧ p1 ∧ p4→ p2 ∧ p5 Wait: 2
4. (p1→ p2 ∧Q1) ∧ (Q1 ∧Q2→Q4) ∧ (q ∧Q1 ∧Q2→Q3)→ q ∧ p1 ∧Q2→ p2 ∧Q3 Match (3 times): 3
5. (p1→ p2 ∧ p3) ∧ (p3 ∧ p4→ p5) ∧ (q ∧⊥ ∧⊥→⊤)→ q ∧ p1 ∧ p4→ p2 ∧ p5 Tautology
6. (p1→ p2 ∧ p3) ∧ (p3 ∧ p4→ p5) ∧ (q ∧Q1 ∧Q2→Q3)→ q ∧ p1 ∧ p4→ p2 ∧ p5 Wait: 5
7. (p1→ p2 ∧Q1) ∧ (Q1 ∧Q2→Q4) ∧ (q ∧Q1 ∧Q2→Q3)→ q ∧ p1 ∧Q2→ p2 ∧Q4 Match (3 times): 6
8. (p1→ p2 ∧Q1) ∧ (Q1 ∧Q2→Q4) ∧ (q ∧Q1 ∧Q2→Q3)→ q ∧ p1 ∧Q2→ p2 ∧ (Q3 ⊓Q4) Wait: 1,4,7
9. (Q1→Q1 ∧Q1) ∧ (Q1 ∧Q2→Q4) ∧ (q ∧Q1 ∧Q2→Q3)→ q ∧Q1 ∧Q2→Q1 ∧ (Q3 ⊓Q4) Match (twice): 8
The following formula matches the last formula of the above sequence and hence, by CL4-Instantiation,
it is provable in PTA:
(
E(zT , t)→E(zT , t) ∧ E(zT , t)
)
∧
(
E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t)→ F(zT , t ′)
)
∧
(
|t ′|≤b ∧ E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t)→E(zT , t ′)
)
→ |t ′|≤b ∧ E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t)→E(zT , t) ∧
(
E(zT , t ′) ⊓ F(zT , t ′)
)
.
But, by Lemmas 21.12, 21.13 and 21.14, the three conjuncts of the antecedent of the above formula are
also provable. Hence, by Modus Ponens, so is (the desired) consequent.
Lemma 21.16 Assume R is an elementary formula, w is any variable, t is a variable other than b, z is a
variable other than b, w, t, T is an elementary formula functional for z, and
PTA ⊢ R→ E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w). (125)
Then
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤ξ(b)→E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t). (126)
Proof. Immediately from Lemmas 21.15 and 20.1.
21.6 Taking care of the case of large bounds
We will be using
A(z, r, t)
for a natural formalization of the predicate saying that r≤t, z is a (b, r)-adequate counterbehavior (so that
b is a hidden free variable of this formula) and, in the (z, eb)-branch, X is not in a move state at any time
v with r≤v<t.
Next, we will be using
B(z, r, t)
as an abbreviation of
t<ξ(b) ∧A(z, r, t) ∧ ¬A(z, r, t ′).
In the context of the (z, eb)-branch, B(z, r, t) thus asserts that, on the interval [r, t], one single move β
was made, and it was made exactly at time t. Note that, since the condition of the (b, r)-adequacy of z is
implied by (A(z, r, t) and hence) B(z, r, t), PA knows that the above move β can only be made by X .
For a variable z and an elementary formula T functional for z, as we did in the case of E and F, we will
write A(zT , r, t) as an abbreviation of ∀z(T →A(z, r, t)). Similarly for B(zT , r, t) and WE(zT , t1, t2, b, ~s).
Lemma 21.17 Assume x, u, z, w,~s are pairwise distinct non-b variables, R is an elementary formula, T is
an elementary formula functional for z, E = E(b, ~s) is a safe formula all of whose free variables are among
b, ~s, and the following provabilities hold:
PTA ⊢ R→ ξ(b)=u; (127)
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PTA ⊢ R→WE(zT , w, w, b, ~s); (128)
PTA ⊢ R→ E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w). (129)
Then PTA proves
R→WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x). (130)
Idea. According to (128), PTA knows that, under the assumptions (of the truth of) R and T , z is a
(b, w)-adequate counterbehavior and, in the context of the (z, eb)-branch, by time w, the play is legal and it
has evolved to the position E(b, ~s). Under the above assumptions, the target (130) is the problem of telling
whether the same situation persists up to time u (the left ⊔ -disjunct of the consequent), or whether a (legal
or illegal) move is made at some time x with w≤x<ξ(b) (the right ⊔ -disjunct), i.e. — in view of (127) —
at some time x with w≤x<u.
Solving this problem is not hard. Conditions (127) and (129), by Lemma 21.16, imply full knowledge
of the configurations of the machine at any time t with w≤t<u. Using this knowledge, we can trace the
work of the machine step-by-step starting from w and ending with u−1 and see if a move is made or not.
Technically, such “tracing” can be implemented relying on the induction rule of Lemma 20.2.
Proof. Assume all conditions of the lemma. We shall point out that the condition on the safety of
E is not relevant to the present proof, and it is included in the formulation of the lemma merely for the
convenience of future references.
By Lemma 21.16, condition (129) implies
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤ξ(b)→ E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t) (131)
which, in turn, in view of condition (127), can be easily seen to further imply
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤u→E(zT , t) ∧ F(zT , t). (132)
Obviously PA ⊢ WE(zT , w, w, b, ~s)→A(zT , w, w). This, together with (128), by Transitivity, yields
PTA ⊢ R→A(zT , w, w), whence, by ⊔ -Choose,
PTA ⊢ R→A(zT , w, w) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x). (133)
Claim 1: PTA proves
R ∧w≤t<ξ(b) ∧
(
A(zT , w, t) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x)
)
→A(zT , w, t ′) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x). (134)
Proof. As in the case of Lemmas 21.13 and 21.14, we will have to limit ourselves to an informal reasoning
within PTA. Assume R ∧w≤t<ξ(b), and (a single copy) of the resource
A(zT , w, t) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x) (135)
from the antecedent of (134) is at our disposal. Our task is to solve the consequental problem
A(zT , w, t ′) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x). (136)
The environment will have to choose one of the two ⊔ -disjuncts of (135). If the right disjunct is chosen,
then we also choose the identical right disjunct in (136), thus reducing the (relevant part of the) overall play
to ⊔xB(zT , w, x)→⊔xB(zT , w, x) which, having the form F → F , is, of course, solvable/provable.
Suppose now the left disjunct of (135) is chosen, bringing the latter to A(zT , w, t). If this formula is
false, we win. So, assume it is true. In view of (131), we have access to the resource E(zT , t), which contains
information about the state of the machine at time t in the play against the counterbehavior z (“the” due
to the functionality of T for z) for which T is true. If that state is not a move state, then we resolve (136)
by choosing its left component. And if that state is a move state, then we resolve (136) by choosing its right
component and specifying x as t in it. With a little thought, this can be seen to guarantee a win.
From (133) and Claim 1, by the rule of Lemma 20.2, we find
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤ξ(b)→A(zT , w, t) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x)
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which, in view of condition (127), obviously implies
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤t≤u→A(zT , w, t) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x).
Applying first ⊓-Introduction and then ⊓-Elimination to the above formula, we get
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤u≤u→A(zT , w, u) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x). (137)
But the condition w≤ξ(b) is part ofWE(zT , w, w, b, ~s) and hence, in view of (128) and (127), PTA obviously
proves R→w≤u≤u. This, in conjunction with (137), can be easily seen to imply the PTA-provability of
R→A(zT , w, u) ⊔⊔xB(zT , w, x). (138)
Clearly PA ⊢ WE(zT , w, w, b, ~s)→A(zT , w, u)→WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s). This, together with (128), by Transi-
tivity, implies that PTA proves
R→A(zT , w, u)→WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s). (139)
One can easily verify that CL4 proves
(p→ q1 ⊔Q) ∧ (p→ q1→ q2)→ (p→ q2 ⊔Q).
Now, (138) ∧ (139)→ (130) can be seen to be an instance of the above formula and hence provable in PTA.
Modus-ponensing it with (138) and (139) yields (the PTA-provability of) the desired (130).
Assume E is a safe formula. We say that a formula G is a ⊔ -deletion of E iff G is the result of replacing
in E some surface occurrence of a subformula H1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Hm by Hi (some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). And we say
that a formula G(y) is a ⊔-deletion of E iff G(y) is the result of replacing in E some surface occurrence
of a subformula ⊔yH(y) by H(y) (deleting “⊔y”, that is). Note that ⊔ -deletions and ⊔-deletions of a safe
formula remain safe, and do not create free occurrences of variables that also have bound occurrences, which
would otherwise violate Convention 8.1.
Lemma 21.18 Assume the conditions of Lemma 21.17 are satisfied. Let G1 = G1(b, ~s), . . . , Gm = Gm(b, ~s)
be all of the ⊔ -deletions of E, and H1 = H1(b, ~s, y1), . . . , Hn = Hn(b, ~s, yn) be all of the ⊔-deletions of E
(each Hi is obtained from E by deleting a surface occurrence of “⊔yi”). Let t be a fresh variable, and C(t)
and D(t) be abbreviations defined by
C(t) = WG1(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ⊔ . . . ⊔WGm(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s);
D(t) = ⊔y1WH1(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, y1) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔ynWHn(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yn).
Then PTA proves
R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→ L ⊔C(t) ⊔D(t). (140)
Idea. By the conditions of the lemma plus the additional condition expressed by the antecedent of
(140), and in the context of the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch (for the counterbehavior
z satisfying T ), we — PTA, that is — know that, by time w, the play has evolved to the position E, and
that, at time t with w≤t<ξ(b), some new move β has been made by the machine. From (131), we have
all information necessary to determine whether β is legal or not and — if β is legal — what move exactly
it is. If β is illegal, the machine does not win X after all, so we can choose L in the consequent of (140).
And if β is legal, then, depending on what it is, we can choose C(t) or D(t) in the consequent of (140), and
then further choose in it the corresponding subcomponent WGi(zT , t, t, b, ~s) or (⊔yiWHi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi)
and then) WHi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, c).
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Let us fix the two sets {α1, . . . , αm} and {β1, . . . , βn} of
strings such that the move that brings E(b, ~s) down to Gi(b, ~s) is αi,
23 and the move that brings E(b, ~s)
down to Hi(b, ~s, c) (whatever constant c) is βi.c.
23Strictly speaking, more than one move can bring E to the same ⊔-deletion (e.g., think of the case E = Y ⊔ Y ). But this is
not a serious problem, and is easily taken care of by assuming that the list G1, . . . , Gm has repetitions if necessary so that, for
each move that turns E into one of its ⊔-deletions, the list contains a separate copy of the corresponding ⊔-deletion.
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For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let Gi(z) be an elementary formula saying that B(z, w, t) is true and the move
made by the machine at time t in the (z, eb)-branch is αi. Extending our notational practice to this formula,
Gi(z
T ) will be an abbreviation of ∀z
(
T →Gi(z)
)
.
Claim 1. PTA proves
R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→G1(z
T ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Gm(z
T ) ⊔ ¬
(
G1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Gm(z
T )
)
. (141)
Proof. Let k be the greatest of the lengths of the moves α1, . . . , αm. Argue in PTA. Assume
R ∧ B(zT , w, t). Consider the counterbehavior z for which T is true, and consider the play according to
the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. B(z
T , w, t) implies w≤t<ξ(b). Therefore, in view of (131), full infor-
mation is available about the situation in the machine at time t. Using this information, we first find the
location l of the work-tape head and, using the results of Section 19, find a with a = min(l, k). Then we
construct a full picture of the contents of cells #0 through #(a−1) of the work tape at time t. From this
picture, we can determine whether it shows making one of the moves αi (and which one), or none, and
accordingly choose the true ⊔ -disjunct of the consequent of (141).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Hi(z) be an elementary formula saying that B(z, w, t) is true and the move
made by the machine at time t in the (z, eb)-branch has the prefix “βi.”. Hi(z
T ) will be an abbreviation of
∀z
(
T →Hi(z)
)
.
Claim 2. PTA proves
R ∧B(zT , w, t)→H1(z
T ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn(z
T ) ⊔ ¬
(
H1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Hn(z
T )
)
. (142)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Claim 1.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let H′i(z, y) be an elementary formula saying that Hi(z) is true and the move made
by the machine at time t in the (z, eb)-branch is βi.y. H
′
i(z
T , y) will be an abbreviation of ∀z
(
T →H′i(z, y)
)
.
Claim 3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, PTA proves
R ∧Hi(z
T )→⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔L. (143)
Proof. Take any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let k be the length of the string “βi.”. Let J(z, v, y) be a formula saying
“ Hi(z) (is true) and, in the (z, eb)-branch, at time t, on the work tape, cells #k through #(k+v)
spell constant y, and the location of the head is not any of the cells #0,#1, . . . ,#(k+v+1)”.
J(zT , v, y) will be an abbreviation of ∀z
(
T → J(z, v, y)
)
.
Argue in PTA. We want to prove, by WPTI induction on v, that
v≤ kˆ+b→R ∧Hi(z
T )→L ⊔⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , v, y). (144)
The basis is
R ∧Hi(z
T )→L ⊔⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , 0, y). (145)
Assume the (truth of the) antecedent of the above. Consider the counterbehavior z for which T is true, and
consider the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. We will implicitly rely on the fact that, in
view of (131) (whose antecedent is implied by R ∧Hi(z
T )), full information is available about the situation
in the machine at time t. The problem (145) is solved as follows, where “head” and “cell” always mean those
of the work tape, and “located” or “contains” mean that this is so at time t.
1. Using the results of Section 19, figure out whether |k+1|≤b (|kˆ ′|≤b, that is) and, if so, find the values
of k and k+1 and then continue according to Steps 2-4. If, however, |k+1|>b, then choose L in the
consequent of (145) and you are done as it is guaranteed to be true. This is so because, from Axiom
13, we know that |t|≤b, and thus k+1>t; this, in turn, means that the head would not have enough
time to go as far as cell #(k+1); and, if so, the machine cannot make a legal move at time t, so it
loses.
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2. If the location of the head is not greater than k, then we are dealing with the fact of X having just (at
time t) made an illegal move which is “βi.” or some proper initial substring of it, so choose L in the
consequent of (145) because X loses.
3. Suppose the head is located at cell #(k+1). Then:
• If cell #k contains 0, then we are dealing with the fact of X having made the move βi.0, so choose
⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) in the consequent of (145) and specify yi as 0 in it.
• If cell #k contains 1, then we are dealing with the fact of X having made the move βi.1, so choose
⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) in the consequent of (145) and specify yi as 1 in it.
• If cell #k contains any other symbol, then we are dealing with the fact of X having made an
illegal move, so choose L.
4. Suppose the location of the head is greater than k+1. Then:
• If cell #k contains 0, choose ⊔yJ(zT , 0, y) in the consequent of (145) and specify y as 0 in it.
• If cell #k contains 1, choose ⊔yJ(zT , 0, y) in the consequent of (145) and specify y as 1 in it.
• If cell #k contains any other symbol, choose L.
The inductive step is
(
R ∧Hi(z
T )→L ⊔⊔yiH′i(zT , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , v, y)
)
→(
R ∧Hi(z
T )→L ⊔⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , v ′, y)
)
.
(146)
Assume R ∧Hi(z
T ) is true (otherwise (146) is won). Under this assumption, solving (146) essentially means
solving the following problem:
L ⊔⊔yiH′i(zT , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , v, y)→L ⊔⊔yiH′i(zT , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , v ′, y). (147)
This problem is solved as follows. Wait for the environment to choose a ⊔ -disjunct in the antecedent. If
that choice is one of the first two disjuncts, choose the identical disjunct in the consequent, and then resolve
the resulting problem of the form F → F . Suppose now the third disjunct ⊔yJ(zT , v, y) is chosen. Wait
till it is further brought to J(zT , v, c) for some c. Consider the counterbehavior z for which T is true, and
consider the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. As was done when justifying the basis of
induction, we will rely on the fact that, in view of (131), full information is available about the situation in
the machine at time t. In our subsequent discourse, “head” and “cell” always mean those of the work tape,
and “located” or “contains” mean that this is so at time t. Note that, as implied by J(zT , v, c), the location
of the head is greater than k+v ′. So, using the results of Section 19, we can tell ( ⊔ ) whether that location
is k+v ′ +1 or greater than k+v ′ +1. We correspondingly consider the following two cases and resolve the
consequent of (147) accordingly:
1. Suppose the head is located at cell #(k+v ′ +1). Then:
• If cell #(k+v ′) contains 0, then we are dealing with the fact of X having made the move βi.c0,
so choose ⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) in the consequent of (147) and specify yi as c0 in it.
• If cell #(k+v ′) contains 1, then we are dealing with the fact of X having made the move βi.c1,
so choose ⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) in the consequent of (147) and specify yi as c1 in it.
• If cell #k contains any other symbol, then we are dealing with the fact of X having made an
illegal move, so choose L.
2. Suppose the location of the head is greater than k+v ′ +1. Then:
• If cell #k contains 0, choose ⊔yJ(zT , v′, y) in the consequent of (147) and specify y as c0 in it.
• If cell #k contains 1, choose ⊔yJ(zT , v′, y) in the consequent of (147) and specify y as c1 in it.
• If cell #k contains any other symbol, choose L.
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Now, (144) follows by WPTI from (145) and (146).
We continue our proof of Claim 3 by arguing in PTA towards the goal of justifying (143). Assume (the
truth of) the antecedent of the latter. As before, we let z be the counterbehavior satisfying T , and let the
context of our discourse be the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. From (131), we find the
location l of the work-tape head at time t. If l=0, we are dealing with the fact of the machine having made
an illegal move (the empty move), so choose L in the consequent of (143). Otherwise, we find the number a
with l=a ′ (the results of Section 19 will allow us to do so). From (144), we get
a≤ kˆ+b→R ∧Hi(z
T )→L ⊔⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , a, y). (148)
Next, we figure out (again relying on the results of Section 19) whether a≤k+b or not. If not, we are
obviously dealing with the case of the machine having made an illegal (“too long a”) move, so we choose L
in the consequent of (143). Suppose now a≤k+b. Then, from (148) by Modus Ponens applied twice, we get
L ⊔⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔⊔yJ(zT , a, y). (149)
Our remaining task is to show how to solve the consequent
⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi) ⊔ L (150)
of (143) using the resource (149). This is very easy. Wait till the environment selects a ⊔ -disjunct of (149).
If one of the first two disjuncts is selected, select the identical disjunct in (150) and, having brought things
down to a problem of the form F → F , solve it. And if the third disjunct ⊔yJ(zT , a, y) of (149) is selected,
we win. That is because, no matter what c the environment further selects for y in it, the resulting formula
J(zT , a, c) will be false as it implies that the work-tape head at time t is not located at cell #(a+1), which
is a contradiction — as we remember, l=a ′ is exactly the location of the head.
Our proof of Claim 3 is now complete.
Claim 4. PA ⊢ R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→¬
(
G1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Gm(z
T )
)
∧ ¬
(
H1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Hn(z
T )
)
→L.
Proof. This and the following two claims can be proven by a straightforward argument within PA based
on the meanings of the predicates involved in the formula. Assume R ∧ B(zT , w, t) and
¬
(
G1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Gm(z
T )
)
∧ ¬
(
H1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Hn(z
T )
)
. (151)
Consider the counterbehavior z satisfying T , and the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch.
According to (128), by time w the play has evolved to position E(b, ~s). And, according to B(zT , w, t), a
(first new) move β has been made by the machine at time t. Obviously the assumption (151) precludes the
possibility of such a β being a legal move of E(b, ~s). So, β is illegal, which makes the machine lose the game,
and hence L is true.
Claim 5. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, PA ⊢ R→Gi(zT )→WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s).
Proof. Argue in PA. Assume R and Gi(z
T ). Consider the counterbehavior z satisfying T , and the play
according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. According to (128), by time w the play has evolved to position
E(b, ~s). And, according to Gi(z
T ), a (first new) move has been made by the machine at time t, and such a
move is αi. But this move brings E(b, ~s) down to Gi(b, ~s). This, in turn, implies that W
Gi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) is
true.
Claim 6. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, PA ⊢ R→H′i(z
T , yi)→W
Hi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi).
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Claim 5. Argue in PA. Assume R and H′i(z
T , yi). Consider the
counterbehavior z satisfying T , and the play according to the scenario of the (z, eb)-branch. According to
(128), by time w the play has evolved to position E(b, ~s). And, according to Hi(z
T , yi), a (first new) move
has been made by the machine at time t, and such a move is βi.yi. But this move brings E(b, ~s) down to
Hi(b, ~s, yi). This, in turn, implies that W
Hi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi) is true.
To complete our proof of Lemma 21.18, it remains to observe that (140) is a logical consequence of Claims
1-6. Since we have played more than enough with CL4, here we only schematically outline how to do this
purely syntactic exercise.
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First of all, Claims 1 and 2 can be easily seen to imply
PTA ⊢ R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→G1(zT ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Gm(zT ) ⊔H1(zT ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn(zT ) ⊔(
¬
(
G1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Gm(z
T )
)
∧ ¬
(
H1(z
T ) ∨ . . . ∨Hn(z
T )
))
.
The above, together with Claim 4, further implies
PTA ⊢ R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→G1(zT ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Gm(zT ) ⊔H1(zT ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn(zT ) ⊔ L.
This, in turn, together with Claim 5, further implies
PTA ⊢ R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→C(t) ⊔H1(zT ) ⊔ . . . ⊔Hn(zT ) ⊔L.
The above, together with Claim 3, further implies
PTA ⊢ R ∧ B(zT , w, t)→C(t) ⊔⊔y1H′1(zT , yi) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔ynH′n(zT , yn) ⊔ L. (152)
Claim 6 can be seen to imply
PTA ⊢ R→⊔yiH′i(z
T , yi)→⊔yiWHi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi)
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This, together with (152), can be seen to imply the desired (140).
Lemma 21.19 Under the conditions of Lemma 21.17 and using the abbreviations of Lemma 21.18, PTA
proves
R→ L ⊔⊔x
(
C(x) ⊔D(x)
)
⊔W
E(zT , w, u, b, ~s). (153)
Idea. This is a logical consequence of the previous two lemmas.
Proof. Assume the conditions of Lemma 21.17. Then, according to Lemmas 21.17 and 21.18, PTA
proves (130) and (140) (where, in the latter, t is a fresh variable). The target formula (153) is a logical
consequence of those two formulas, verifying which is a purely syntactic exercise. As we did in the proof
of the previous lemma, here we only provide a scheme for such a verification. It is rather simple. First,
applying ⊔-Choose and ⊓-Introduction to (140), we get
PTA ⊢ R ∧⊔xB(zT , w, x)→L ⊔⊔x
(
C(x) ⊔D(x)
)
.
And then we observe that the above, together with PTA ⊢ (130), implies PTA ⊢ (153).
Lemma 21.20 Under the conditions of Lemma 21.17, PTA ⊢ R→E(b, ~s).
Idea. Under the assumption of the truth of R, one of the three ⊔ -disjuncts of the consequent of (153)
is available as a resource. In each case, we need to show (in PTA) how to solve the target E = E(b, ~s).
1. The case of L is taken care of by Lemma 21.3, according to which PTA ⊢ L→E.
2. The case of ⊔x
(
C(x) ⊔D(x)
)
, depending on which of its ⊔- and ⊔ -components are further chosen,
allows us to jump to a formula F (one of the Gi, 1≤i≤m or Hi, 1≤i≤n) from which E follows by ⊔ -Choose
or ⊔-Choose. With appropriately readjusted R and certain other parameters, by the induction hypothesis,
we know how to solve F . Then (by ⊔ -Choose or ⊔-Choose) we also know how to solve E.
3. Finally, consider the case of WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s). E can be critical or non-critical. The case of E being
critical is almost immediately taken care of by Lemma 21.5, according to whichPTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, w, u, b, ~s)→E.
Suppose now E is non-critical. Then, by Lemma 21.4, according to which PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, w, u, b, ~s)→ ‖E‖,
the elementarization of E is true/provable. Relying on the induction hypothesis as in the previous case, and
replacing T (z) by a formula S(z) saying that z is a certain one-move extension of the counterbehavior
satisfying T , we manage to show that any other (other than ‖E‖) necessary Wait-premise of E is also
solvable/provable. Then, by Wait, we know how to solve/prove E.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by (meta)induction on the complexity of E(b, ~s). Assume the conditions
of Lemma 21.17. Then, by Lemma 21.19, PTA ⊢ (153).
By Lemma 21.3, PTA ⊢ L→E(b, ~s), whence, by Weakening,
PTA ⊢ L ∧R→E(b, ~s). (154)
In what follows, we will rely on the additional assumptions and abbreviations of Lemma 21.18.
Claim 1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, PTA ⊢WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→E(b, ~s).
Proof. Pick any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a fresh variable v.
From condition (127), by Weakenings, we have
PTA ⊢ v=t ′ ∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→ ξ(b)=u. (155)
And, of course, we also have
PTA ⊢ v=t ′ ∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→WGi(zT , v, v, b, ~s). (156)
Condition (129) and Lemma 21.16 imply
PTA ⊢ R ∧w≤v≤ξ(b)→ E(zT , v) ∧ F(zT , v). (157)
In view of condition (128), we also obviously have
PTA ⊢ v=t ′ ∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→R ∧w≤v≤ξ(b). (158)
From (158) and (157), by Transitivity, we get
PTA ⊢ v=t ′ ∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→ E(zT , v) ∧ F(zT , v). (159)
By the induction hypothesis of our lemma, with v, Gi(b, ~s) and v=t
′
∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R in the
roles of w, E(b, ~s) and R, (155), (156) and (159) — which correspond to (127), (128) and (129), respectively
— imply
PTA ⊢ v= t ′ ∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→Gi(b, ~s).
The above, by ⊓-Introduction, yields
PTA ⊢ ⊔x(x= t ′) ∧WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→Gi(b, ~s). (160)
Remembering the definition ofW, the condition t ′≤ξ(b) is one of the conjuncts ofWGi
(
zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s). Hence
PA ⊢WGi
(
zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s)→ t ′≤ξ(b). Together with condition (127), this implies
PTA ⊢WGi
(
zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→ t ′≤u.
But, by Axiom 13, PTA ⊢ |u|≤b. Hence, obviously, PTA ⊢WGi
(
zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→ |t ′|≤b. This, together
with in Axiom 10, by Transitivity, yields PTA ⊢ WGi
(
zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→⊔x(x= t ′). And the latter, in
turn, in conjunction with (160), can be seen to imply
PTA ⊢WGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→Gi(b, ~s). (161)
Now, it remains to notice that the desiredWGi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ∧R→E(b, ~s) follows from (161) by ⊔ -Choose.
Claim 2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, PTA ⊢ ⊔yiWHi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi) ∧R→E(b, ~s).
Proof. Pick any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Arguing as we did for (161) in the proof of Claim 1, we find
PTA ⊢WHi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi) ∧R→Hi(b, ~s, yi).
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Applying first ⊔-Choose and then ⊓-Introduction to the above, we get the desired conclusion PTA ⊢
⊔yiWHi(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yi) ∧R→E.
Claims 1 and 2, by ⊓ -Introductions, imply
PTA ⊢
((
WG1(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s) ⊔ . . . ⊔WGm(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s)
)
⊔(
⊔y1WH1(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, y1) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔ynWHn(zT , t ′, t ′, b, ~s, yn)
))
∧R→E(b, ~s)
which, using the abbreviations of Lemma 21.18, is written as PTA ⊢
(
C(t) ⊔D(t)
)
∧R→E(b, ~s). The latter,
by ⊓-Introduction, yields
PTA ⊢ ⊔x
(
C(x) ⊔D(x)
)
∧R→E(b, ~s). (162)
Claim 3. If E(b, ~s) is not critical, then PTA ⊢ ‖WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→E(b, ~s)‖.
Proof. Assume E(b, ~s) is not critical. Then, Lemma 21.4, together with the fact of T being functional
for z, can be easily seen to imply PTA ⊢ WE(zT , w, ξ(b), b, ~s
)
→ ‖E(b, ~s)‖. Remembering condition (127),
the latter can be seen to further imply PTA ⊢ WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→ ‖E(b, ~s)‖, which is the same as to
say that PTA ⊢ ‖WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→E(b, ~s)‖, because both WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) and R are elementary.
Claim 4. Assume E(b, ~s) has the form F [J1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Jk], and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→ F [Ji].
Proof. From (127), by Weakening, we have
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→ ξ(b)=u. (163)
Assume E(b, ~s) = F [J1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Jk] and 1≤i≤k. Let α be the move whose effect is turning F [J1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Jk]
into F [Ji]. Let us write our formula T in the form T (z). Let S = S(z) be a formula saying that z is
the code of the counterbehavior resulting by adding the timestamped move (α,w−1) to the counterbe-
havior a for which T (a) holds. Of course, S is functional for z. It is not hard to see that PA proves
WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s)→WE(zT , w, w, b, ~s) and WE(zT , w, w, b, ~s)→WF [Ji](zS, w, w, b, ~s). Therefore it proves
WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s)→WF [Ji](zS , w, w, b, ~s), whence, by Weakening,
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→WF [Ji](zS , w, w, b, ~s). (164)
Next, we claim that
PTA ⊢ R→E(zS , w) ∧ F(zS , w). (165)
Here is a brief justification of (165) through reasoning in PTA. Let a be the counterbehavior for which
T (a) is true, and let d be the counterbehavior for which S(d) is true. Assume R. Then, in view of (129),
the resource E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w) is available for us in unlimited supply. That is, we have full information
about the configuration of X at time w in the (a, eb)-branch. Solving (165) means being able to generate full
information about the configuration of X at time w in the (d, eb)-branch. Since the time w is fixed and is
the same in both cases, let us no longer explicitly mention it. Note that the two configurations are identical,
for the exception of the contents of the run tape. So, from the resource E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w) which describes
the configuration of the (a, eb)-branch, we can directly tell the (identical) state of X in the configuration
of the (d, eb)-branch, as well as the locations of all three scanning heads, and the contents of any cells of
the valuation and work tapes. Next, in order to tell the location of the leftmost blank cell on the run tape
in the configuration of the (d, eb)-branch (or tell that the size of this location exceeds b), all we need is to
compute i+j+1, where i is the location of the leftmost blank cell of the run tape in the configuration of the
(a, eb)-branch (unless |i|≥b, in which case the size of the sought value also exceeds b), and j is the location
of the work-tape head in the configuration of the (a, eb)-branch. Finally, consider any cell #c of the run
tape. If c is less than the above i, then the content of cell #c in the configuration of the (d, eb)-branch is
the same as in the (a, eb)-branch. Otherwise, if c≥i, then the sought content is the (c−i)th symbol (starting
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the count of those symbols from 0 rather than 1) of the labmove ⊥α — unless c−i is greater or equal to the
length of this labmove, in which case the sought content of cell #c is blank.
From (165), by Weakening, we have
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→E(zS , w) ∧ F(zS, w). (166)
By the induction hypothesis of our lemma, with F [Ji] and W
E(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R in the roles of E and
R, (163), (164) and (166) — which correspond to (127), (128) and (129), respectively — imply the desired
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→ F [Ji].
Claim 5. Assume E(b, ~s) has the form F [⊓xJ(x)], and v is a variable not occurring in E(b, ~s). Then
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→ F [J(v)].
Proof. Assume E = F [⊓xJ(x)], and v is a fresh variable. Let α be the string such that, for
whatever constant c, α.c is the move which brings F [⊓xJ(x)] down to F [J(c)]. Arguing almost liter-
ally as in the proof of Claim 4, only with “α.v” instead of α and “J(v)” instead of “Ji”, we find that
PTA ⊢ WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→ F [J(v)]. The only difference and minor complication is related to the fact
that, while in the proof of Claim 4 the labmove ⊤α was constant, the corresponding labmove ⊤α.v in the
present case is not. Hence, its size is not given directly but rather needs to determined (while arguing within
PTA). No problem, this (for the “v” part of the labmove) can be done using Lemma 19.1. Similarly, various
symbols of the labmove that were given directly in the proof of Claim 4 will now have to be determined
using some general procedure. Again no problem: this (for the “v” part of the labmove) can be done using
Lemma 19.10.
Now we claim that
PTA ⊢WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→E(b, ~s). (167)
Indeed, if E(b, ~s) is not critical, then the above follows from Claims 3, 4 and 5 by the closure of PTA
under Wait. Suppose now E(b, ~s) is critical. Then, by Lemma 21.5, PTA ⊢ ∃zWE(z, w, ξ(b), b, ~s)→E(b, ~s).
This, in view of the functionality of T for z and condition (127), can be easily seen to imply PTA ⊢
WE(zT , w, u, b, ~s) ∧R→E(b, ~s), as claimed.
From (154), (162) and (167), by ⊓ -Introduction, we find that PTA proves
(
L ⊔⊔x
(
C(x) ⊔D(x)
)
⊔W
E(zT , w, u, b, ~s)
)
∧R→E(b, ~s). (168)
In turn, the PTA-provability of (153) and (168) can be easily seen to imply the desired PTA-provability
of R→E(b, ~s). This completes our proof of Lemma 21.20.
Lemma 21.21 PTA ⊢ ⊔x
(
x=ξ(b)
)
→X(b).
Idea. We take u=ξ(b) ∧w=0 ′ in the role of R, X in the role of E and show that the conditions
of Lemma 21.17 are satisfied. Then, by Lemma 21.20, PTA proves u=ξ(b) ∧w=0 ′ →X . And the target
formula ⊔x
(
x=ξ(b)
)
→X is an almost immediate logical consequence of the latter and Lemma 13.3.
Proof. Let R be the formula u=ξ(b) ∧w=0 ′. Then, of course, we have
PTA ⊢ R→ ξ(b)=u. (169)
Let T (z) be an elementary formula saying that z is (the code of) the empty counterbehavior. Obviously
PA proves b 6=0→WX(zT , 0 ′, 0 ′, b) and hence, in view of Lemma 13.2, PTA proves WX(zT , 0 ′, 0 ′, b).
Therefore, as R contains the condition w=0 ′,
PTA ⊢ R→WX(zT , w, w, b). (170)
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Next, we observe that PTA ⊢ E(zT , 0) ∧ F(zT , 0). Indeed, arguing in PTA, solving both E(zT , 0) and
F(zT , 0) is very easy as we know exactly and fully the situation in the machine at time 0, which is nothing
but the start configuration of the machine. The observation that we just made, of course, implies
PTA ⊢ v=0→E(zT , v) ∧ F(zT , v). (171)
From (171), by Lemma 21.16, we get
PTA ⊢ v=0 ∧ v≤w≤ξ(b)→ E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w). (172)
Since w=0 ′ is a conjunct of R, PA obviously proves b 6=0→ v=0→R→ v=0 ∧ v≤w≤ξ(b).24 But, by Lemma
13.2, PTA ⊢ b 6=0. Hence, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ v=0→R→ v=0 ∧ v≤w≤ξ(b). From here and (172),
by Transitivity, we get
PTA ⊢ v=0→R→E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w)
whence, by ⊓-Introduction,
PTA ⊢ ⊔x(x=0)→R→E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w),
modus-ponensing which with Axiom 8 yields
PTA ⊢ R→ E(zT , w) ∧ F(zT , w). (173)
Now, with X(b) in the role of E(b, ~s), the conditions (169), (170) and (173) are identical to the conditions
(127), (128) and (129) of Lemma 21.17. Hence, by Lemma 21.20, we have PTA ⊢ R→X(b), i.e.
PTA ⊢ u=ξ(b) ∧w=0 ′ →X(b).
From the above, by ⊓-Introduction, we get
PTA ⊢ u=ξ(b) ∧⊔x(x=0 ′)→X(b).
But the second conjunct of the antecedent of the above formula is provable by Lemma 13.3. Hence, we obvi-
ously havePTA ⊢ u=ξ(b)→X(b) which, by⊓-Introduction, yields the desiredPTA ⊢ ⊔x
(
x=ξ(b)
)
→X(b).
21.7 Completing the completeness proof
By Lemma 19.8, PTA ⊢ ¬|ξ(b)|≤b ⊔⊔x
(
x=ξ(b)
)
. By Lemmas 21.11 and 21.21, we also have PTA ⊢
¬|ξ(b)|≤b→X and PTA ⊢ ⊔x
(
x=ξ(b)
)
→X. From these three facts, by ⊔ -Elimination, PTA ⊢ X .
22 Inherent extensional incompleteness in the general case
The extensional completeness of PTA is not a result that could be taken for granted. In this short section we
argue that, if one considers computability-in-general instead of polynomial time computability, extensional
completeness is impossible to achieve for whatever recursively axiomatizable sound extension of PTA.
First of all, we need to clarify what is meant by considering computability-in-general instead of polynomial
time computability. This simply means a minor readjustment of the semantics of ptarithmetic. Namely, such
a readjusted semantics would be the same as the semantics we have been considering so far, with the only
difference that the time complexity of the machine solving a given problem would no longer be required to
be polynomial, but rather it would be allowed to be arbitrary without any restrictions. Alternatively, we can
treat ⊓,⊔ as the ordinary ⊓,⊔ of computability logic (rather than ⊓b,⊔b as done throughout the present
paper), and then forget about any complexity altogether.
24Remember that X runs in time ξ(b). By definition, this means that ⊤’s time in any play is less than ξ(b). Hence, the term
ξ(b) cannot be 0, or 0×b, or anything else that always evaluates to 0. Therefore, of course, PA ⊢ ξ(b)≥b.
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In either case, our extensional incompleteness argument goes like this. Consider any system S in the style
of PTA whose proof predicate is decidable25 and hence the theoremhood predicate recursively enumerable.
Assume S is sound in the same strong sense as PTA — that is, there is an effective procedure that extracts
an algorithmic solution (HPM) for the problem represented by any formula F from any S-proof of F .
Let then A(s) be the predicate which is true iff:
• s is (the code of) an S-proof of some formula of the form ⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
, where E is elementary,
• and E(s) is false.
On our assumption of the soundness of S, A(s) is a decidable predicate. Namely, it is decided by a
procedure that first checks if s is the code of an S-proof of some formula of the form ⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
,
where E is elementary. If not, it rejects. If yes, the procedure extracts from s an HPM H which solves
⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
, and then simulates the play of H against the environment which, at the very beginning
of the play, makes the move s, thus bringing the game down to ¬E(s) ⊔E(s). If, in this play, H responds
by choosing ¬E(s), then the procedure accepts s; and if H responds by choosing E(s), then the procedure
rejects s. Obviously this procedure indeed decides the predicate A.
Now, assume that S is extensionally complete. Since A is decidable, the problem ⊓x
(
¬A(x) ⊔A(x)
)
has
an algorithmic solution. So, for some formula F with F † = ⊓x
(
¬A(x) ⊔A(x)
)
and some c, we should have
that c is an S-proof of F . Obviously F should have the form ⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
, where E is an elementary
formula with E†(x) = A(x). We are now dealing with the absurd of A(c) being true iff it is false.
23 On the intensional strength of PTA
Theorem 23.1 Let X and L be as in Section 21. Then PTA ⊢ ¬L→X.
Proof. As established in Section 21, PTA ⊢ X . By induction on the complexity of X , details of which
we omit, it can also easily be seen that PTA ⊢ X→¬L→X . So, by Modus Ponens, PTA ⊢ ¬L→X .
Remember that, in Section 21, X was an arbitrary PTA-formula assumed to have a polynomial time
solution under the standard interpretation †. And ¬L was a certain true sentence of the language of classical
Peano arithmetic. We showed in that section that PTA proved a certain formula X with X
†
= X†. That
is, we showed that X was “extensionally provable”.
According to our present Theorem 23.1, in order to make X also provable in the intensional sense, all we
need is to add to the axioms of PTA the true elementary sentence ¬L.
In philosophical terms, the import of Theorem 23.1 is that the culprit of the intensional incompleteness of
PTA is the (Go¨del’s) incompleteness of its classical, elementary part. Otherwise, the “nonelementary rest”
— the extra-Peano axioms and the PTI rule — of PTA, as a bridge from classical arithmetic to ptarithmetic,
is as perfect/strong as it could possibly be: it guarantees not only extensional but also intensional provability
of every polynomial time computable problem as long as all necessary true elementary formulas are taken
care of. This means that if, instead of PA, we take the truth arithmetic Th(N) (the set of all true sentences
of the language of PA) as the base arithmetical theory, the corresponding version of PTA will be not only
extensionally, but also intensionally complete. Unfortunately, however, such a system will no longer be
recursively axiomatizable.
So, in order to make PTA intensionally stronger, it would be sufficient to add to it new true elementary
(classical) sentences, without any need for also adding some nonelementary axioms or rules of inference
that deal with nonelementary formulas. Note that this sort of an extension, even if in a language more
expressive than that of PA, would automatically remain sound and extensionally complete: virtually nothing
in this paper relies on the fact that PA is not stronger than it really is. Thus, basing applied theories
on computability logic allows us to construct ever more expressive and intensionally strong (as well as
extensionally so in the case of properly more expressive languages) theories without worrying about how to
preserve soundness and extensional completeness. Among the main goals of this paper was to illustrate the
scalability of computability logic rather than the virtues of the particular system PTA based on it. The
25PTA can easily be readjusted to satisfy this condition by requiring that each logical axiom in a PTA-proof be supplemented
with a proof of that axiom in some known (fixed) sound and complete recursively axiomatized calculus for classical logic.
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latter is in a sense arbitrary, as is PA itself: in the role of the classical part of PTA, we could have chosen
not only any true extension of PA, certain weaker-than-PA theories as well, for our proof of the extensional
completeness of PTA does not require the full strength of PA. The reason for not having done so is purely
“pedagogical”: PA is the simplest and best known arithmetical theory, and reasoning in it is much more
relaxed, easy and safe than in weaker versions. PTA is thus the simplest and nicest representative of the
wide class of “ptarithmetics”, all enjoying the same relevant properties as PTA does.
Among the potential applications of ptarithmetic-style systems is using them as formal tools for finding
efficient solutions for problems (after developing reasonable theorem-provers, which, at this point, only
belongs to the realm of fantasy, of course). One can think of those systems as ideally declarative programming
languages, where human “programming” simply means stating the problem/formula whose efficient solution
is sought (for systematic usage in the future), and hence the program verification problem is non-existent.
Compiling such a “program” means finding a proof, followed by the easy step of translating it into an
assembly-language program/solution. This process of compiling may take long but, once compiled, the
program runs fast ever after. The stronger such a system is, the better the chances that a solution for a
given problem will be found. Of course, what matters in this context is intensional rather than extensional
strength. So, perfect strength is not achievable, but we can keep moving ever closer to it.
One may ask why not think of simply using PA (or even, say, ZFC) instead of PTA for the same
purposes: after all, PA is strong enough to allow us reason about polynomial time computability. This is
true, but PA is far from being a reasonable alternative to PTA. First of all, as a tool for finding solutions,
PA is very indirect and hence hopelessly inefficient. Pick any of the basic arithmetical functions of Section
19 and try to generate, in PA, a full formal proof of the fact that the function is polynomial-time computable
(or even just express this fact) to understand the difference. Such a proof would have to proceed by clumsy
reasoning about non-number objects such as Turing machines and computations, which, only by good luck,
happen to be amenable to being understood as numbers through encoding. In contrast, reasoning in PTA
would be directly about numbers and their properties, without having to encode any foreign beasts and
then try to reason about them as if they were just kind and innocent natural numbers. Secondly, even if
an unimaginably strong theorem-prover succeeded in finding such a proof, there would be no direct use of
it because, from a proof of the existence of a solution we cannot directly extract a solution. Furthermore,
even knowing that a given HPM X solves the problem in some polynomial time ξ, would have no practical
significance without knowing what particular polynomial ξ is, in order to asses whether it is “reasonable”
(such as b2, b3, . . . ) or takes us beyond the number of nanoseconds in the lifespan of the universe (such as
b
9999999999). In order to actually obtain a solution and its polynomial degree, one would need a constructive
proof, that is, not just a proof that a polynomial ξ and a ξ-time solution exist, but a proof of the fact that
certain particular numbers a and b are (the codes of) a polynomial term ξ and a ξ-time solution X . This
means that a theorem-prover would have to be used not just once for a single target formula, but an indefinite
(intractably many) number of times, once per each possible pair of values of a, b until the “right” values is
encountered. To summarize, PA does not provide any reasonable mechanism for handling queries in the
style “find a polynomial time solution for problem A”: in its standard form, PA is merely a YES/NO kind
of a “device”.
The above dark picture can be somewhat brightened by switching from PA to Heyting’s arithmetic HA
— the version of PA based on intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, which is known to allow us to
directly extract, from a proof of a formula ∃xF (x), a particular value of x for which F (x) is true. But
the question is why intuitionistic logic and not computability logic? Both claim to be “constructive logics”,
but the constructivistic claims of computability logic have a clear semantical meaning and justification,
while intuitionistic logic is essentially an ad hoc invention whose constructivistic claims are mainly based on
certain syntactic and hence circular considerations,26 without being supported by a convincing and complete
constructive semantics. And, while HA is immune to the second one of the two problems pointed out in
the previous paragraph, it still suffers from the first problem. At the same time, as a reasoning tool, HA is
inferior to PA, for it is intensionally weaker and, from the point of view of the philosophy of computability
logic, is so for no good reasons. As a simple example, consider the function f defined by “f(x) = x if PA is
either consistent or inconsistent, and f(x) = 2x otherwise”. This is a legitimately defined function, and we
26What creates circularity is the common-sense fact that syntax is merely to serve a meaningful semantics, rather than vice
versa. It is hard not to remember the following words from [24] here: “The reason for the failure of P ⊔ ¬P in computability
logic is not that this principle . . . is not included in its axioms. Rather, the failure of this principle is exactly the reason why
this principle, or anything else entailing it, would not be among the axioms of a sound system for computability logic”.
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all — just as PA — know that extensionally it is the same as the identity function f(x) = x. Yet, HA can
be seen to fail to prove — in the intensional sense — its computability.
A natural question to ask is: Is there a formula X of the language of PTA whose polynomial time
solvability is constructively provable in PA yet X is not provable in PTA? Remember that, as we agreed
just a while ago, by constructive provability of the polynomial time solvability of X in PA we mean that,
for some particular HPM X and a particular polynomial (term) ξ, PA proves that X is a ξ-time solution
of X . If the answer to this question was negative, then PA, while indirect and inefficient, would still have
at least something to say in its defense when competing with PTA as a problem-solving tool. But, as seen
from the following theorem, the answer to the question is negative:
Theorem 23.2 Let X be any formula of the language of PTA such that PA constructively proves (in the
above sense) the polynomial time solvability of X. Then PTA ⊢ X.
Proof. Consider any formula X of the language of PTA. Assume PA constructively proves the
polynomial time solvability of X , meaning that, for a certain HPM X and a certain term ξ (fix them), PA
proves that X solves X in time ξ. But this is exactly what the formula L of Section 21 denies. So, PA ⊢ ¬L.
But, by Theorem 23.1, we also have PTA ⊢ ¬L→X . Consequently, PTA ⊢ X .
An import of the above theorem is that, if we tried to add to PTA some new nonelementary axioms in
order to achieve a properly greater intensional strength, the fact that such axioms are computable in time
ξ for some particular polynomial ξ would have to be unprovable in PA, and hence would have to be “very
nontrivial”. The same applies to attempts to extend PTA through some new rules of inference.
24 Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar
The idea of exploring versions of Peano arithmetic motivated by and related to various complexity-theoretic
considerations and concepts is not new. In this connection one should mention a solid amount of work on
studying bounded arithmetics, with the usage of the usual quantifiers ∀, ∃ of PA restricted to forms such
as ∀x
(
x≤τ → F (x)
)
and ∃x
(
x≤τ ∧ F (x)
)
, where τ is a term not containing x. Parikh [27] was apparently
the first to tackle bounded quantifiers in arithmetic. A systematic study of bounded arithmetics and their
connections to complexity theory was initiated in the seminal work [5] by Buss. Hajek and Pudlak [9]
give an extensive survey of this area. The main relevant results in it can be summarized saying that, by
appropriately weakening the induction axiom of PA and then further restricting it to bounded formulas
of certain forms, and correspondingly readjusting the nonlogical vocabulary and axioms of PA, certain
soundness and completeness for the resulting system(s) S can be achieved. Such soundness results typically
read like “If S proves a formula of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y), where F satisfies such and such constraints, then
there is function of such and such computational complexity which, for each a, returns a b with F (a, b)”. And
completeness results typically read like “For any function f of such and such computational complexity, there
is an S-provable formula of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y) such that, for any a and b, F (a, b) is true iff b = f(a)”.
Among the characteristics that make our approach very different from the above, one should point out
that it extends rather than restricts the language and the deductive power of PA. Restricting the language
and power ofPA in the style of the approach of bounded arithmetics throws out the baby with the bath water.
Not only does it expel from the system many complexity-theoretically unsound yet otherwise meaningful and
useful theorems, but it apparently also reduces — even if only in the intensional rather than extensional sense
— the class of complexity-theoretically correct provable principles. This is a necessary sacrifice there, related
to the inability of the underlying classical logic to clearly differentiate between constructive ( ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔)
and “ordinary”, non-constructive versions ( ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃) of operators. Classical logic has never been meant to
be a constructive logic, let alone a logic of efficient computations. Hence an attempt to still make it work as
a logic of computability or efficient computability cannot go without taking a toll, and results such as the
above-mentioned soundness can only be partial.
The problem of the partiality of the soundness results has been partially overcome in [6] through basing
bounded arithmetic on intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic. In this case, soundness extends to all
formulas of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y), without the “F satisfies such and such constraints” condition (the reason
why we still consider this sort of soundness partial is that it remains to be limited to formulas of the form
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∀x∃yF (x, y), even if for arbitrary F s; similarly, completeness is partial because it is limited to functions only
which, for us, are only special cases of computational problems). However, for reasons pointed out in the
previous section, switching to intuitionistic logic signifies throwing out even more of the “baby” from the
bath tub, further decreasing the intensional strength of the theory. In any case, whether being based on
classical or intuitionistic logic, bounded arithmetics do not offer the flexibility of being amenable to being
strengthened without losing soundness, and are hence “inherently weak” theories.
In contrast, computability logic avoids all this trouble and sacrifices by giving Caesar what belongs to
Caesar, and God what belongs to God. As we had a chance to see throughout this paper, classical ( ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃)
and constructive ( ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔) logical constructs can peacefully coexist and complement each other in one
natural system that seamlessly extends the classical, constructive, resource- and complexity-conscious visions
and concepts, and does so not by mechanically putting things together, but rather on the basis of one natural,
all-unifying game semantics. Unlike most other approaches where only few, special-form expressions (if any)
have clear computational interpretations, in our case every formula is a meaningful computational problem.
Further, we can capture not only computational problems in the traditional sense, but also problems in the
more general — interactive — sense. That is, ptarithmetic or computability-logic-based theories in general,
are by an order of magnitude more expressive and deductively powerful than the classical-logic-based PA,
let alone the far more limited bounded arithmetics.
Classical logic and classical arithmetic, so close to the heart and mind of all of us, do not at all need to
be rejected or tampered with (as done in Heyting’s arithmetic or bounded arithmetic) in order to achieve
constructive heights. Just the opposite, they can be put in faithful and useful service to this noble goal. Our
heavy reliance on reasoning in PA throughout this paper is an eloquent illustration of it.
25 Thoughts for the future
The author wishes to hope that the present work is only a beginning of a longer and more in-depth line of
research on exploring computability-logic-based theories (arithmetic in particular) with complexity-conscious
semantics. There is an ocean of problems to tackle in this direction.
First of all, it should be remembered that the particular language of ptarithmetic employed in this paper
is only a modest fragment of the otherwise inordinately expressive and, in fact, open-ended formalism of
computability logic. Attempting to extend the present results to more expressive versions of ptarithmetic is
one thing that can be done in the future. Perhaps a good starting point would be considering the language
employed in [25] which, in addition to the present connectives, has the operator •–≀≀ , with A •–≀≀ B being
the problem of reducing B to A where any finite number of reusages of A is allowed. In a more ambitious
perspective, a development of this line may yield a discovery of a series of new, complexity-conscious operators
that are interesting and useful in the context of interactive computational complexity while not quite so in
the ordinary context of computability-in-principle.
Another direction to continue the work started in this paper would be to try to consider complexity
concepts other than polynomial time complexity. Who knows, maybe these studies can eventually lead
to a discovery of substantially new, not-yet tried weapons for attacking the famous and notorious open
problems in complexity theory. Two most immediate candidates for exploration are logarithmic space and
polynomial space computabilities. While the precise meaning of logarithmic space computability in our
interactive context is yet to be elaborated, a definition of polynomial space computability comes almost for
free. It can be defined exactly as we defined polynomial time computability in Section 7, only, instead of
counting the number of steps taken by the machine (⊤’s time, to be more precise), we should count the
number of cells ever visited by the head of the work tape. What, if any, variations of the PTI rule (and
perhaps also the nonlogical axioms) would yield systems of psarithmetic (“polynomial space arithmetic”)
or larithmetic (“logarithmic space arithmetic”), sound and complete with respect to polynomial space or
logarithmic space computability in the same sense as PTA is sound and complete with respect to polynomial
time computability?
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